Micronutrient Initiative : evaluation of programs and operations, 1992-2000 by Mestor Associates Canada
THE MICRONUTRIENT INITIATIVE 
EVALUATION OF' 
PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS 
1992-2000 
MESTOR ASSOCIATES CANADA 




List of tables 
Executive Summary 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Background to the evaluation 
1.2 Terms of reference 
1.3 Evaluation approach and methodology 
1.3.1 Field visits 
1.3.2 Interview survey 
1.3.3 Review of files, documents and publications 
1.4 Acknowledgements 
2 MI: ORIGINS, MISSION AND SCOPE OF WORK 
2.1 Origins 
2.2 Mission 
2.3 Scope of MI's current program 
2.3.1 . Current projects by micronutrients and approach 
2.3.2 Geographic distribution of current projects 
2.3.3 Project partnerships 
3 OBJECTIVES AND PERFORMANCE 
3.1 MI's strategic objectives 
3.2 Success stories 
3.3 Progress in implementing activities 1997-2000 
3.4 MI's work in advocacy 
3.5 Research and technology 
3.5.1 Double fortified salt 
3.6 National and regional programs 
3.7 Publications and website 
3.7.1 Publications 
3.7.2 Website 
4 KEY PROGRAM ISSUES 
4.1 What is MI's niche in micronutrients? 
4.2 Program strategy and focus 
4.3 Decision criteria for program management 
4.3.1 What would a Performance Based Management System do for MI? 
4.4 Management of partnerships 5 1 
4.4.1 What kind of partner does MI want to be? 
4.4.2 Bridging the public-private gap 
4.5 Sustainability and capacity building 55 
4.6 Monitoring, evaluation and learning 5 7 
S 2000-2005 STRATEGIC PLAN 
5.1 Strategic planning process 
5.2 Strategic Plan 
6 KEY OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
6.1 Information management 
6.2 Secretariat functions 
6.2.1 Project review and administration 
6.2.2 Processing of contracts 
6.2.3 Commodity procurement 
6.2.4 Organization of meetings 
6.3 Staff management 
6.3.1 Organization of work 
6.3.2 Differentiation of roles 
6.3.3 Executive Committee 
6.4 Regional staff 
6.4.1 Role of regional staff 
6.4.2 Role of MI-SARO 
6.4.3 Regional Advisory Committee 
6.5 Consultants 
7 FINANCIAL ISSUES 
7.1 Financial status a id  donor support ' 
7.2 Fee for service activities 
7.3 Future diversification o f  funding 
8 GOVERNANCE 88 
8.1 Accountability structure 8 8 
8.1.1 Accountability of Steering Committee 
8.1.2 Accountability of IDRC 
8.1.3 Accountability of MHDRC to individual donors 
8.2 MI Steering Committee 92 
8.3 Technical Advisory Committee 95 
9 INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
9.1 Relationship with IDRC 
9.2 Institutional options 
9.3 Implications of a change in legal status 
10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1 General conclusions of the evaluation 
10.2 Recommendations 
10.3 Next steps 
1 1  ANNEXES 
1 1.1 List of persons interviewed 









LIST OF TABLES 
Project portfolio of MI: numbers of active projects 1999-2000 
Geographic distribution of current MI projects 1999-2000 
Strategic objectives for MI 1997-2000 
Successful MI activities as judged by MI'S partners 
MI Program 1997-2000: planned, implemented and additional activities 
Time intervals that proposals in MI pipeline on 1 April 2000 had been 
waiting for a decision 
Financial contributions to MI 1992-2000 
Annual contributions and expenditures for MI 1994-2000 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
MI is playing an important and unique role in the global fight against micronutrient 
deficiencies and has achieved international recognition within the eight years of its 
existence. This success has been achieved despite some signij7cant problems in the 
management of its program, budget and Secretariat operations which are reducing the 
effectiveness of its overall performance. These issues need urgent attention but they can 
be resolved by the actions of MI management, some of which are already underway and 
others are on the drawing board. In addition to improved systems for managing 
information, budgets and stafl MI needs a redefined governing body which can provide 
clearer direction. In the short term, an important task for the Steering Committee and for 
its host organization, IDRC, is to consider MI'S future organizational options. In view of 
the need to take stock, to reduce backlog, to establish new information and management 
systems, it may be wise to consider a transition year before MI embarks fully on its next 
jve-year strategic plan and mounts major new programs. 
Background 
This is the first external evaluation of the Micronutrient Initiative (MI) since it began operations 
eight years ago as the brainchild of the World Bank and other international organizations, which 
agreed to create an international secretariat to implement the goals of the 1990 World Summit 
for Children. The idea eventually found a home in Canada where, with the support of CIDA and 
IDRC, the MI became the first International Secretariat at IDRC. MI has grown from a small 
group of four staff managing an annual budget of less than $6 million in 1992-93, to an 
organization of 39 staff and a budget in 1999-2000 of $37.8 million. 
Purpose and approaclr of the evaluation 
The evaluation is to examine the programs, operations and management of MI with the 
expectation that it will provide information that will help MI in its new five-year strategic plan. 
The study took place in April-July 2000 and was based on (1) field visits to Bangladesh, India 
and Nepal; (2) an interview survey with 41 people in South Asia and with 74 people in Ottawa 
and by telephone in other regions, making 1 15 interviews in all; and (3) a review of the files and 
documents held in MI, particularly those relating to the last fiscal year 1999-2000 and the last 
four year workplan 1997-2000. Particular effort was paid to obtain the views of five categories 
of MI'S external partners: international organizations and donors; consultants and projects 
leaders; governments (Bangladesh, India and Nepal); private sector; and the NGO community. 
Mi's scope of work 
MI works principally on three micronutrients: vitamin A, iodine and iron. It is currently 
managing about 76 active projects, several of which have multi-million dollar budgets. The 
focus of its current projects is vitamin A (36%); multiple micronutrients (32%); iron (19%) and 
iodine (1 1%). In terms of emphasis, 31% of its current projects deal with food fortification; 
19% with supplementation; 28% are research and technology development; and 24% support 
technical assistance, advocacy, and general nutrition activities. 
MI's program of work is structured into five focus areas: 
o Advocacy and alliance building 
0 Development and application of technologies 
o National and regional initiatives 
o Information management and capacity building 
o Resolution of key operational issues 
Partnerships are critical to MI's ability to cany out its projects. All except three of its current 
project portfolio are with partners. Just over half are undertaken in partnership with 
international organizations, particularly UNICEF, WHO, PAHO, the World Bank and ICCIDD. 
MI is collaborating with UNICEF on 19% of its projects and with WHO on 17%. Governments 
are listed as partners in 39% of MI projects, and NGO's in 25%. The private sector is a partner 
in only 5 projects (7%). 
The geographic distribution of MI's projects is 33% in Asia, 13% in Africa, 15% in the Middle 
East and North Africa and 16% in Latin America and the Caribbean. There are also 22% of 
projects by number which are either inter-regional or are non-region specific. Thus MI presently 
has project activities in 50 different countries (table 2). 
Objectives and performance 
MI set out objectives for its five focus areas for the period 1997-2000 (table 3).  These reflect an 
expanded range of activities from that which were initially envisaged for MI. It was not possible 
L to directly measure the performance of MI against the objectives given in the Workplan for 1997-2000 because MI reporting on activities to its Steering Committee is not referenced to the 
focus area objectives, which are cast more as goals than measurable objectives. 
Instead, the evaluation examined a selection of the projects in each focus area and compared the 
findings with the views of MI's external partners on MI's performance. The activities set out in 
the 1997-2000 Workplan were also compared with those that were actually implemented. This 
showed that in the four-year period MI undertook an additional 32% of projects and did not 
implement 58% of those it had spelled out in the Workplan (table 5). This shift in the project 
portfolio reflects MI's responsiveness to new proposals. It is also a result of major grants from 
CIDA in the form of Special Projects during the four years. There appears to be a negative 
relationship between many new activities and the effectiveness of the Secretariat operations. 
Success stories 
MI has some notable success stories that have achieved international recognition. These include 
its advocacy work in general, vitamin A supplementation distribution (especially when linked to 
National Immunization Days), their contribution towards universal salt iodization, and the 
development of double fortified salt. An example of MI's responsiveness is the fast turnaround 
of six weeks to provide vitamin A premix to Nicaragua in 1999 in response to an emergency 
call. MI is also recognized for its contribution to resolving key scientific debates by supporting 
a meta-analysis of 22 completed trials of iron supplementation, which compared the efficacy of 
weekly and daily supplementation patterns. 
Ml's work in advocacy 
MI has targetted much of its work in advocacy to international organizations, governments and 
the private sector concerning micronutrient malnutrition, especially vitamin A and iodine - to 
the neglect of iron. It plans to give iron higher priority through a new global initiative. There is 
a concern that in the future the attention of the donor community may shift from micronutrient 
malnutrition. 
The evaluation recommends that MI consider changing advocacy from a separate focus area to a 
main modality through which it implements all its programs. Other recommendations include 
more emphasis on critical advocacy and less promotional advocacy; ensuring that advocacy is 
built on alliances with key partner organizations, and a special advocacy strategy targetted at the 
private sector. 
Research and Technology 
MI'S work on research and technology cuts across two of its focus areas: Development and 
Application of Technologies and Resolution of Key Operational Issues. It supports research and 
development across the continuum from measuring micronutrient deficiencies in human 
populations before and after interventions are made; to identifying the best food vehicles for 
fortification; to developing the food fortification technologies and going to scale after successful 
trials and pilot projects. 
The recommendations are that MI should continue to support the development and testing of 
technologies, with the suggestion that more networking between projects will increase the 
chances of technology transfer between regions. Other recommendations include: MI could do 
more policy research on enabling legislative and economic environments for promoting food 
fortification by the private sector; more attention to small scale food fortification; and that MI 
commission an independent scientific assessment of the work it has supported in double or 
multiple fortified salt. 
National and regional programs 
Some of the most successful parts of MI'S activities have been in helping countries to develop 
national plans for micronutrient supplementation and fortification, as well as other strategies 
such as dietary diversification. They are also some of the more controversial activities that MI 
undertakes from the perspective of other international agencies. National program activities in 
South Asia have proved to be very labour-intensive and "hands-on" for MI. Regional networks 
focused on specific themes such as flour fortification may be a more effective approach for MI 
to strengthen programs at the national scale. 
The recommendations for this focus area are that MI should consider reducing its work in 
national programs and work more on thematic regional networks with strong partners like WHO; 
and national programs should include a large capacity building component even if they take 
longer. 
Publications and website 
MI has produced many publications some of which have been well received, especially the more 
technical ones. MI does not appear to have been very strategic in its publications and they have 
taxed staff resources in editing meeting proceedings etc. This has also led to problems in reports 
being delayed and not well disseminated. MI'S website is in urgent need of rebuilding and 
redesign. It is inadequately updated and is not interactive. It should become a key 
dissemination and discussion tool for MI and a premier website on micronutrients. 
The recommendations are that MI should have a strategy for information dissemination which 
encompasses its publications and its website. It should do fewer print publications and focus on 
technical reports and briefings, as well as outsourcing most of the technical editing. It should 
ensure that it has explicit agreements in place for co-sponsored publications. As many as 
possible of its publications should be made available for free downloading from the website. MI 
should re-launch an updated and more interactive website as a priority. 
Key program issues 
MI'S niclre 
MI faces questions from its partners about its core business. It is important therefore that it 
clearly defines its niche in the context of its comparative advantages, especially as MI is a new 
and small organization compared to some of the major players. Its niche is best defined as 
advocacy on food fortification, and alliance building with the public and private sectors, through 
the provision of funds and technical expertise. 
Decision criteria for program management 
MI does not have clear, corporate criteria for program management, for assigning priorities and 
for making decisions on funding projects. 
It is recommended that MI put in place a Performance Based Management System (PBMS) that 
will allow it to link planning, progress and results. CIDA has made some proposals for results 
based indicators that can be incorporated into a PBMS. In developing the PBMS, it is 
recommended that MI discuss with its external partners the feasibility of some common 
indicators for measuring progress in reducing micronutrient malnutrition and in expanding food 
fortification. 
Management ofM19s partnerships 
MI implements its program through and with its partners. Its relationships with them are 
therefore critical to MI'S success. MI has not always been able to fulfill the expectations of its 
partners and this has led to some criticisms in the past. 
It is recommended that MI develop an internal "code of conduct" that can support more effective 
working relationships with its partners. 
In working with the private sector, it is recommended that MI inform them about the broader 
context of its work, beyond that in which the private sector corporation is working with MI. MI 
should also seek corporate funds for some of its work in food fortification and should have in 
place a policy for accepting private sector donations. 
Sustainability and capacity building 
While it is recognized that sustainability in micronutrient programs is a long way off in many 
developing countries, MI can work to achieve greater sustainability for the projects that it 
initiates. Capacity building is a key mechanism for building long term sustainability. 
It is recommended that MI give higher priority to capacity building in the future. 
Monitoring, evaluation and learning 
MI has not given as much attention to monitoring and evaluation in the past, including of its own 
performance, as it should in the future. 
It is recommended that it develop an evaluation framework as part of the PBMS which will 
include more project evaluations and other systematic ways of gathering information on MI'S 
performance. 
Strategic Plan 2000-2005 
The strategic planning process took more than a year and was time consuming for MI 
management and the Steering Committee. A new strategic plan is in place. 
It is recommended that objectives be added to the strategic plan and that an Implementation Plan 
be prepared for the five-year period in addition to annual programs of work and budget. 
Key Operational Issues 
MI'S operations are a constraint to its program performance. Chief among its problems is the 
lack of information systems to manage its programs and financial reporting. The other is 
management, especially the organization of staff, and relationships with the MI-SARO Regional 
Office and MI consultants. 
Information management 
This evaluation was hampered by the lack of systematic information available in MI. The 
problem is much more severe for MI'S operations. It is one of the most urgent issues for MI and 
IDRC. to discuss, since the question revolves about the suitability of the IDRC program 
management system for MI. 
It is recommended that MI immediately establish a Task Force to review the options for a 
program management information system that can link financial data and project data, both 
project characteristics and results, and be capable of generating a range of reports for MI and its 
donors. 
Secretariat functions 
MI has undergone tremendous growth in it; budget and staff in the last two years. This has 
contributed to a situation in which MI is not operating as efficiently as it could. 
It is recommended that MI should reduce administrative tasks by funding fewer, larger projects 
and using executing agencies for monitoring and evaluation, especially for network projects. MI 
and IDRC should continue to find ways to reduce administrative duplication and MI program 
staff should develop internal performance standards similar to those used in IDRC. 
Staff management 
MI needs to better organize its work, both to work more effectively in teams and to have clear 
responsibilities for tasks. Directors should focus more on managing and should reduce their own 
project portfolios. The Executive Director should use his time more strategically to manage the 
Secretariat, build external alliances and represent MI at the highest levels. He should delegate 
most of his current work and travel for project development and management of consultant tasks 
to his staff. New program staff needs more training in IDRC procedures and performance 
standards. 
Regional staff 
There should be a clearer understanding of the roles of MI-SARO and MI-Ottawa and MI- 
SARO should be involved in any major decision being considered by MI management in respect 
1 of the region. 
L 
It is recommended that MI SARO take the lead in program development in the region and be 
informed of all visits by MI staff and consultants well ahead of their arrival in the region. 
National Program Officers should not be "too hands-on" when advising national governments 
and they should be granted clearly defined levels of authority with respect to programs and 
funds. New Advisory Committee structures to advise on MI programs in the region should be 
established and the Steering Committee should be regularly informed about them. 
Consultants 
MI needs to think more strategically about how to use its consultants which play a key role in 
MI'S human resource structure. MI'S long-term consultants should be managed by results. 
Current administrative difficulties between MI and IDRC in handling consultants can be reduced 
by agreeing on an agreed framework for departures from IDRC normal policies for contracts and 
for travel. 
Financial Issues 
The contributions to MI from its donors have tripled in the last four years to nearly CAD $38 
million. This has created an unspent accumulation of over CAD $18.9 million at the beginning 
of 2000-2001, which needs to be reduced as soon as possible. 
It is recommended that MI reduces its accumulated surplus as a matter of priority and does not 
seek additional donors or undertake more fee-for-service activities until it can show that it has 
taken steps to reduce its surplus and to increase the efficiency of the Secretariat. 
Governance 
There are three important aspects of MI'S governance that affect its operation and its 
accountability. One is that it is legally part of IDRC and there is a complex accountability 
structure between MI, its Steering Committee, its individual donors, and the President and Board 
of IDRC. The second is that the Steering Committee is a small body of donors that has a 
membership fee and proportional "voting" according to contribution. This has meant some 
important partners for MI are not on the Steering Committee, and the members feel that they 
have unequal voices around the table. The third important aspect of MI'S governance is that it 
has one dominant donor, CIDA which has provided more than 88% of its budget since inception. 
It is recommended that the Steering Committee be enlarged by the addition of independent 
experts and representatives of other key partners, and that members be asked to act as advisors to 
MI rather than as representatives of their own agencies' interests. It is also recommended that 
information to the Steering Committee be improved by providing integrated fiscal and program 
data referred to objectives that are approved by the Steering Committee. 
It is not considered necessary to establish a Technical Advisory Committee. Rather, MI could set 
up ad hoc advisory committees around its major initiatives, such as the planned global iron 
strategy. For its part, IDRC should consider appointing a senior officer with responsibility for 
managing all aspects of the IDRC-MI relationship for the Centre. The Executive Director of MI 
will need to work closely with the President of IDRC, or her designate, to ensure good 
information flow between MI and IDRC. 
Institutional issues 
Since it started, MI has grown to a size and complexity of program and organization that puts 
some strains on its current status as a Secretariat within IDRC. Its modus operandi and approach 
to development assistance are also significantly different from that of IDRC. 
It is recommended that IDRC and the Steering Committee agree on a process for examining MI'S 
future institutional development with the goal of arriving at a preliminary decision before the end 
of the fiscal year. 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the evaluation 
On April 1 2000, the Micronutrient Initiative (MI)' completed its first eight years of 
operation. During that time, MI has achieved considerable success. It has established 
itself as an important player in the international micronutrient arena: it has 
appropriated nearly CAD $100 million in its programs and has developed an 
international reputation for its technical expertise. MI has also experienced a 
tremendous growth in resources, size and workload. Its budget has increased from 
CAD $5.9 million in 1992-93 to CAD $37.8 million in 1999-2000; its staff has grown 
from four to thirty-nine; and its annual program activity has expanded to some 76 
active projects and a further 197 proposals in the pipeline by April 1 2000. 
MI has not had an external evaluation of its activities and operations before the 
present one.* IDRC undertook a review of its Secretariats in November 1998, which 
included MI as one of its case studies3. The present evaluation was requested by the 
MI Steering Committee at its meeting on July 13 1999 with the terms of reference to 
be determined by IDRC in consultation with the Steering Committee. At its meeting 
on 27 January 2000, the Steering Committee decided to establish an Advisory 
Committee to work with the evaluation team. 
One concern expressed by the Steering Committee, and which has been a challenge to 
the evaluation team, is that the evaluation is being conducted a few weeks after the 
completion of the strategic planning process for 2000-2005 and more than a year after 
a major organization restructuring and expansion including the recruitment of more 
than half of the present staff. The more usual approach is to first undertake an 
evaluation; identify what needs changing; set new goals and strategy and then hire 
staff and make any needed organizational adjustments to achieve those goals. This 
reversal of the normal order has meant that the evaluation has no baseline from which 
to work and must deal with enormous changes that have occurred within MI in the 
past two years. It also means that the follow-up to the evaluation findings and 
recommendations has to be built into a strategic planning process that is already 
underway. 
I Throughout the report MI has been referred to as a separate organization although it is legally part of 
IDRC. This reflects the perception of MI from the outside and facilitates the discussion of MI-IDRC 
relationships. 
MI has commissioned a number of specific studies to guide its strategy and to provide management with 
advice on human resources and organization. 
J. Amstrong and A. Whyte, 1998, Learning Partnerships: A review of IDRC Secretariats; IDRC, Ottawa. 
This situation has influenced the evaluation in two important ways. First, although 
the evaluation is the first one for eight years, it was decided to concentrate the 
research for the program evaluation on the period of the last Workplan 1997-2000 and 
for the evaluation of MI operations on 1999-2000, after the major recruitment had 
been completed. In this way it is hoped that the findings and recommendations are 
most relevant to the current situation in MI. The earlier years are referred to in terms 
of their historical perspective. 
The second way in which the evaluation has taken account of the recent strategic 
planning process is to bring together the implications of our findings for the next 
stage of the Strategic Plan 2000-2005 (section 5). 
1.2 Terms of reference 
The evaluation is to examine the programs, operations and management of MI with 
the expectation that the evaluation will provide information that will contribute to the 
new five-year plan and will constitute a learning experience for the MI. The specific 
terms of reference are that the evaluation will: 
a) evaluate the past performance of the programs of the MI with respect to MI'S 
stated goals and objectives; 
b) examine how present operations and management support the programs; 
c) evaluate whether the goals and objectives of MI are appropriate and realistic; 
d) assess the impact of the work of MI on its partners and on its external 
environment, especially with respect to systems of delivery for micronutrients and 
national micronutrient programs; 
e) identify the reasons/critical factors that explain the successes or failures of MI 
programs and how successes might be replicated; 
f) create a learning experience for all stakeholders, especially the MI Secretariat and 
thereby contribute to the development of organizational and individual capacities; 
and 
g) help MI use the information gathered to guide and improve its kture 
programming. 
In addition, the Steering Committee had expressed the views that the evaluation 
would also comment on the new strategic plan and would seek external views of the 
MI and its strategy from partner organizations. 
1.3 Evaluation approach and methodology 
The evaluation study was conducted by Robert Auger and Anne Whyte of Mestor 
Associates Canada and consisted of 115 days work over three and a half months 
(April-July 2000). Three main approaches were adopted to provide different 
types of information to the evaluation and to act as partial crosschecks to one 
another: 
(1) field visit to one region in which MI has program activities and is working 
with a range of local and international partners; 
(2) interview survey with representatives of partner organizations, 
consultants, and grantees to obtain external views of MI'S work and 
operations, and interviews and group discussions with all MI management 
and staff to obtain internal views and experience; 
(3) review of documents and files held by MI. 
1.3.1 Field visit 
The field visit was to South Asia (New Delhi and Calcutta in India; Dhaka in 
Bangladesh and Kathmandu in Nepal) as it is in this region that MI has 
concentrated its activities at the national and local levels. The visits took place 
over 17 days from April 3 to 20 2000. The evaluation team had interviews with 
41 people representing 30 organizations that are working with MI in the region, 
including government, the private sector, local NGOs and national and regional 
offices of international organizations. As the visit coincided with one of the two 
times annually that the vitamin A capsules are distributed nationally in Nepal, the 
team had the opportunity to make field observations of the process in some of the 
small rural communities around Kathmandu. 
The evaluation team also interviewed all the MI program staff in the region, 
including the Regional Director and National Program Officers, and held a focus 
group discussion on April 14 2000 with all Regional MI program and local 
support staff in the SARO Regional Office, on regional strategic issues for MI. 
1.3.2 Interview survey 
In addition to the 41 persons interviewed during the field visit, an interview 
survey was undertaken during May-June 2000 with an additional 74 persons 
making a total of 1 15 persons interviewed. This included all MI managers and 
some senior staff in individual interviews of one or more hours, and three small 
group meetings (2-6 persons in each) with MI staff (program staff, program 
assistants and grant assistants). All members of the MI Steering Committee were 
interviewed. In addition, interviews were held with the key personnel within 
IDRC who provide services to MI, including the Client Services Group, 
Partnership and Business Development Office (PBDO), legal and travel services. 
Appendix 1 lists all the internal and external persons interviewed internationally, 
in Ottawa and in the South Asia region. The external interviews were held with 
representative samples of five key groups: 
o international organizations and donors with which MI works most closely 
(43 persons interviewed representing 14 organizations. Representatives of 
all of MI'S key partners in this category were interviewed); 
o consultants and pro-iect leaders receiving grants from MI (14 persons); 
o government representatives in India, Bangladesh and Nepal (12 persons 
interviewed during the field visit); 
o private sector (8 persons interviewed representing both multinational 
corporations and national food industry representatives in India and 
Canada, including most of MI's key international industry partners); 
o NGO communitv (1 1 persons interviewed representing 7 NGO partners 
working in South Asia). 
These samples were selected from a combination of suggestions from the 
Evaluation Advisory Committee and as a result of our review of the files. Some 
additional interviews took place as follow-ups to suggestions received during 
earlier interviews. A very few people who were selected for the original sample 
were not able to take part owing to travel commitments during May and June, but 
there were no refusals. 
The interview survey was deliberately made more extensive than originally 
planned to ensure that an adequate range of experience and views among the 
external partners was captured. For the international partner organizations and 
donors, virtually all the key organizations were included in the survey. Similarly, 
with the private sector - most of the key international organizations were 
contacted, but not the regional ones. For the national industry partners and the 
local NGOs, only representatives in South Asia were interviewed, and the validity 
of their comments is restricted to their experience of MI in that region. For the 
consultants and grantees, 12 persons were interviewed. This is believed to be a 
representative sample of MI's main consultants, the grantees interviewed were all 
Canadian. 
The interviews in Ottawa and in India, Bangladesh and Nepal were generally in 
person. The international interviews were undertaken by phone. For both the 
face-to-face and telephone interviews, an interview guide was provided to the 
interviewee beforehand, which listed the main areas of the interview. Several 
different guides were prepared to account for differences between the internal and 
external interviews; the Steering Committee; the specialized roles of the IDRC 
service groups; the representatives of international partners and donors; 
consultants and grantees; and the private sector. All interviews included core 
questions on: 
the mission and goals, comparative advantage and niche of MI; 
program and geographic priorities in the past and future; 
main successes and failures or shortcomings of MI; 
performance of the Secretariat; 
program monitoring and evaluation; 
MI'S work in advocacy; 
program sustainability; 
decision-making; strategic planning and policy development; 
the collaborative process; partnership with MI and key partner 
organizations for MI; 
longer term future for MI. 
The interviews were semi-structured with open questions. The great value from 
the interviews lay in the wealth of qualitative data that they provided, and which 
has been used extensively throughout this report. Some content analysis was 
undertaken on specific questions to provide quantitative information and to 
identify where there were different perspectives and experiences across the 
various groups. 
The interviewee was assured of absolute confidentiality in the interview and was 
asked to provide advice for the evaluation study itself as well as being invited to 
ask questions of the interviewer. The interviews ranged from 35 minutes to 3 
hours with the median time being just over one hour each. The immediate 
response from interviewees to the interview format and questions was all positive: 
some also expressed enthusiasm for the inclusion of the views of external partners 
in the evaluation and said that it reflected well on the openness of MI to learning 
lessons from its partners and their experience. 
1.3.3 Review of files, documents and publications 
This part of the evaluation took place after most of the interviews were 
completed. The file review was in part to follow-up on information provided 
during the interviews to document facts and to verify the more important issues 
that they raised. In addition, some purposive sampling (about 20% sample of 
each group) was undertaken of files as part of the evaluation of MI operations. 
These included: 
o proposals accepted by MI during 1999-2000; 
o proposals rejected by MI during 1999-2000; 
o proposals awaiting decision at end of fiscal year 1999-2000; 
o files on meetings in various years organized by MI; 
o consultant files; 
o files relating to double fortified salt. 
Most of the systematic sampling of files focused on the last fiscal year (1999-2000) 
for two main reasons. This was the only year in which the present complement of 
staff was largely in place and thus the human resource strength was closest to the 
expected future situation. Secondly, the only database available on MI activities is 
for the last fiscal year. 
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arranging our meetings and field visits, and giving us such insights into MI'S work in 
their countries. All MI Directors and staff have been cooperative with the evaluation 
team and have taken the time to meet with us and to share documents. Carrie Smith 
provided administrative liaison and support to the evaluation team and was helpful to 
us in many ways. We have had free access to files and documents available. 
Most important, we have met everywhere within MI an open and positive attitude 
towards the evaluation process, which is not always the lot of evaluators. For making 
our task so pleasant and rewarding, we are grateful to the MI Secretariat. In addition, 
we would like to acknowledge all those external partners who agreed to be 
interviewed, either in person or by telephone. Everybody to whom we spoke, were 
generous with their time and their ideas. 
Any gaps and errors remain the responsibility of the evaluation team. There has not 
been time to review all the activities of MI over the last eight years and in selecting 
those for closer examination, some important aspects may have been overlooked and 
we may have misinterpreted some evidence. Despite such flaws, we hope that our 
evaluation is on target in its main findings and that its recommendations will prove to 
be helpful to MI as it embarks upon its next five-year strategy. 
Advisory Committee members are Judith McGuire (World Bank), Joanne Moores (CIDA), Frank Eady 
(Deputy Executive Director, MI), Jenny Cervinskas (Program Unit-MI); Raymond Robinson (Finance and 
Administration Unit); Nada Elhusseiny (Technology And Research Unit- MI); Ibrahim Daibes (Information 
and Communication Unit -MI) and Teny Smutylo (Director, Evaluation Unit, IDRC). 
2 MI: ORIGINS, MISSION AND SCOPE OF WORK 
2.1 Origins 
The idea of an intemational Micronutrient Initiative Secretariat was one of the 
initiatives being discussed by a number of intemational agencies around the World 
Summit for Children, which was held in New York in September 1990. A number of 
recent research and technological developments at that time made people realize that 
micronutrient malnutrition had severe consequences for human health and that these 
deficiencies could be prevented with sustainable cost-effective solutions. This 
sparked greater interest among intemational agencies and bilateral donors, including 
Canada. In 1990, UNICEF started a program on micronutrients and the Global 
Micronutrient Initiative was launched by the ACCISCN (UN Administrative 
Coordinating Committee Sub-committee on Nutrition). 
The specific origins of the MI lay in a World Bank proposal5 that argued that the 
individual initiatives and new resources being spent on micronutrients on the part of 
different international agencies and donors would be more effectively allocated if 
there were a central coordinating body or focal point. The initial idea was that such a 
Micronutrient Initiative would be affiliated with the ACC/SCN and that it would be 
supported by donors and private institutions, which would pool their resources. 
Behind the proposal was a vision that sustainable micronutrient strategies required a 
broader strategy than health alone, and one which brought together the efforts of 
agriculture; education; and the private sector, especially the food industry. The 
World Bank proposal was that the Micronutrient Secretariat would: 
o raise awareness among governments and international agencies about 
micronutrient malnutrition- its costs and available solutions, including best 
practice; 
o mobilize resources from new sources, including private industry and 
foundations; 
o develop regional centers for training, laboratory analysis, technical assistance 
and monitoring; 
o support research and development of emerging technologies where critical 
gaps exist; 
o develop models for addressing micronutrient malnutrition through different 
sectors; and 
World Bank, 1990,Micronutrient Malnutrition: A proposal for a new Special Grant, FY 92-94; internal 
document dated December 12 1990. 
o help donors and governments identifj opportunities for investment and 
monitor progress toward goals. 
Thus, the "blueprint" for MI was drawn as early as 1990, to meet a need identified by 
the international community, as articulated by the World Bank, which felt it had a 
particularly important role to play in the initiative because of the Bank's multi- 
sectoral perspective and its strength in assessing the economic soundness of projects. 
The original proposal included a governance structure of an Executive Board 
consisting of UNICEF, WHO, FAO, UNDP and the World Bank, together with four 
bilateral donors, three scientific experts and the Chair of the ACCISCN. 
The Canadian Government hosted a meeting on micronutrient malnutrition for Health 
Ministers in Montreal in 1991 (called Ending Hidden Hunger) and during the 
discussions on the proposed coordinating secretariat, IDRC made an offer to host the 
secretariat linked closely to IDRC programs but functioning as a self-supporting unit 
reporting to its own Executive Board. 
In the IDRC proposal6, the role of MI in research is emphasized, as well as the 
strengthening of national and regional institutions and individual skills. The proposal 
also foresees close collaboration with IDRC Health Sciences Division and seeks to 
"bridge the gap" between IDRC's mandate for research support and the putative role 
of the future MI by arguing that "IDRC focuses its support in nutrition on operational 
research, community and participatory assessment including social marketing, and 
policy and action linkages." 
The Secretariat was proposed to have a lifetime of ten years, after which it was 
anticipated, its responsibilities could be reduced and its functions transferred to an 
international organization. This was in line with the goals of the World Summit for 
Children and the progress that would be realized in reducing micronutrient 
malnutrition by 2000. Operationally, the Secretariat was planned to have a small staff 
of about four professionals and would work mainly through a roster of external 
consultants. In addition to the MI Executive Board, there would be an external 
Technical Advisory Group of recognized experts, including members from 
developing countries. 
These key elements of the IDRC proposal, which was accepted by the donors and 
international organizations in Montreal in 1991 and adopted by the IDRC Board of 
Governors in 1992, are recapitulated here because they represent the origins of some 
of the issues that emerge in the present evaluation. These are: the governance issue, 
or the degree of independence of MI from IDRC; the program "fit" issue, or how 
research-oriented MI activities are; the consultant issue; and the long-term future of 
MI. 
6 IDRC proposal for a Micronutrients Secretariats discussed by donors in Montreal in 1991 and presented 
to the IDRC Executive Committee in January 1992. 
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MI was established on 1 April 1992 as the Micronutrient Initiative with funding from 
CIDA, IDRC, the World Bank and UNICEF, as the first International Secretariat in 
IDRC, with an initial lifespan of two years. 
2.2 Mission 
MI took as its first mission the goals of the World Summit for Children held in New 
York in September 1990. These were to reach by the year 2000: 
o the virtual elimination of iodine deficiency disorders (IDD); 
o the virtual elimination of vitamin A deficiency and its consequences, 
including blindness; 
a the reduction of iron deficiency anemia among women of child-bearing age by 
one third of the 1990 levels. 
The guiding document for the period 1997-2000 is the Workplan, discussed initially 
by the Steering Committee on May 21 1997 and again on January 20 1998. In this 
document, the mission statement for 1997-2000 restates the initial MI mission 
statement of 1992. 
The mission is regarded as appropriate and clear by both external partners and within 
the MI Secretariat. Indeed, the focused mandate represented by the mission 
statement, is seen by both MI and by its external partners as one of MI'S strongest 
comparative advantages. Other organizations, such as UNICEF or WHO, have much 
broader mandates than MI, while a few (e.g. ICCIDD) are more narrowly focused on 
one micronutrient. MI'S focus on all micronutrients and a wide range of strategies to 
eliminate micronutrient deficiencies is widely regarded as "just right". 
Most of MI'S partners see MI'S main modalities for implementing its mission to be 
(1) global advocacy and agenda setting; (2) identifying gaps and opportunities; and 
(3) providing funds and technical expertise. 
2.3 Scope of MI'S current program 
MI is currently managing some 76 projects7. These range from support and follow-up 
for individual meetings, such as the Manila Food Fortification Forum held in 
February 2000, to research projects such as the one on double fortified salt with the 
University of Toronto, to a global, multimillion dollar Vitamin A procurement and 
distribution program for vulnerable children and mothers. The size and complexity of 
7 MI project database 1999-2000. The version provided to the evaluation team on which this analysis is 
based is dated June 12 2000. 
this project portfolio is truly impressive and a testament to the hard work and 
commitment - and also the enthusiasm - of MI'S leadership and staff. 
2.3.1 Current projects by micronutrient and amroach 
Table 1 provides an overview of the current portfolio of active projects. The largest 
group of projects is focused on vitamin A (36% of projects), followed by multiple 
micronutrients (32%) and iron (19%). Iodine accounts for only 11% of current 
projects. In terms of approach to fighting micronutrient deficiency, 34 projects are on 
food fortification and 21 on supplementation. The research and technical assistance 
projects are either well upstream in the research and development process from a 
specific micronutrient delivery mechanism, or are providing general technical 
assistance. About ten of the projects have a major advocacy component (including 
five major meetings) and three are more general community nutrition projects. 
Table 1 Project portfolio of MI: numbers of active projects 1999-2000 
(based on MI project database) 
MICRO- 
NUTRIENT 
* includes one project on iron and zinc and one on iron and iodine 
TOTAL 
** total is less than sum of columns because some projects include more than one approach. One of 
the 75 projects was not assigned to any of the four approaches. 
2.3.2 Geographic distribution of current proiects 
Research 
3 1 
The project database was searched for the geographic distribution of the projects 
(table 2). Again, as no data are available in the database on project budgets, the 
distribution of projects can only be discussed in terms of numbers of projects. This is 
unfortunate especially because some projects are very large compared to others, but it 
does provide some measure of the administrative demands of the project portfolio and 







2 1 34 74 
Table 2 Geographic distribution of current MI projects 1999-2000 
REGION COUNTRIES NUMBER # 
OF COUNTRIES 





































TOTAL 75 50 
* countries are included under the regional totals 
Table 2 shows that, in terms of numbers of projects, there are 25 in Asia (33%), 10 in 
Africa (1 3%), 11 in the Middle East and North Africa (15%) and 12 in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (1 6%). In addition, there are 10 global projects involving activities 
in several regions and 7 non-region specific projects. This distribution is less 
concentrated on South Asia (27%) and more evenly distributed in other regions of the 
world than was expected from the discussions in the interviews. It does represent a 
widely dispersed portfolio of activities in 50 countries that is demanding of MI staff 
time and is dependent on their effective collaboration with partners. 
2.3.3 Proiect partnerships 
Partnerships are critical to MI'S performance. All except three projects in the 1999- 
2000 database are listed as being implemented with partners. Thirty-nine projects 
(52% of the total) are being undertaken with international partner organizations 
(particularly UNICEF, WHO, PAHO, World Bank and ICCIDD). MI is collaborating 
with UNICEF on 14 projects and with WHO on 13 projects. 
These agencies therefore represent key partners for MI to realize its objectives and to 
successfully complete its projects. Twenty-nine projects (39%) have national 
governments as partners; 27 projects (36%) have research institutions as partners; 19 
projects (25%) are in partnership with NGOs (7 with local NGOs and 12 with 
international NGOs); and only five projects are in direct partnership with the private 
sector. Many of these projects are undertaken with more than one partner. The 
issues arising from MI'S major dependence on its partnerships for its success are 
discussed in section 4.4. 
3 OBJECTIVES AND PERFORMANCE 
There are essentially three parts to the question about how well MI has performed over 
the past few years. These are: 
o Are the goals and objectives of MI appropriate and realistic? 
o Are the goals and objectives clearly defined and understood by MI and its 
partners in carrying out its activities? 
o How much progress has been made towards achieving those goals and objectives? 
To measure performance, the evaluation has focused on the period 1997-2000 which is 
covered by the most recent workplan. This Workplan sets out the strategic objectives for 
MI for the last four years. For reasons discussed in section 3.1, it has not been possible to 
b 
evaluate the recent performance of MI within the framework of its own obiectives. 
Instead we have reviewed each major area of MI'S work and integrated data from our 
review of MI files and reports and on information and perceptions obtained through the 
interviews. Some of the key questions about program performance that we have tried to 
address are: 
o MI is known for, and is proud of, its track-record in advocacy. But advocacy for 
what and to whom? Should MI be more focused and more strategic in its 
advocacy activities? 
o The technology and research program can chalk up some real successes in 
identifying technological gaps and filling them. But is it doing enough to develop 
technologies that will reach the most vulnerable populations who do not eat the. 
food processed by the formal industrial sector with which MI works most closely? 
o MI has also had considerable success in its national and regional programs. But 
do they fit with MI'S comparative advantage? Should MI be working with 
governments less on its own and more with its international partners? 
o What does MI plan to achieve with its publications and website? Can it be more 
strategic with its publications and more interactive with its website? 
The assessment of MI'S performance with respect to its programs is based on: 
o analysis of MI'S active projects in 1999-2000; 
o program success stories (as seen by partners); 
o comparison of MI'S reports on its program activities to the Steering 
Committee to those foreseen in the 1997-2000 Workplan; 
o interviews with 115 people in MI, IDRC and the main organizations 
and consultants with which MI works. 
What emerges is a picture of hard work, many achievements and some outstanding 
successes, but inadequate systems in place for knowing if MI is on track, or is achieving 
the desired results and impact, or for learning from past successes and failures. What the 
evaluators found is that MI is achieving a great deal but has not systematically 
documented its own performance, or that of many of its projects. 
3.1 MI'S strategic objectives 
In the Workplan 1997-2000 MI's strategic objectives are related to its five Focus 
Areas (table 3)! 
o Advocacy and alliance building 
o Development and application of technologies 
o National and regional initiatives 
o Information management and capacity building 
Resolution of key operational issues. 
Compared to the objectives set out in the proposals for MI prepared by the World 
Bank in 1990 and by IDRC in 1991 (section 2.1), the strategic objectives for 1997- 
2000 shown in table 3 reflect an expanded range of activities. In the area of 
advocacy, the initial focus for MI was to increase awareness among key groups - 
specifically, governments, international agencies, foundations and the private sector - 
in order to stimulate action and mobilize new resources. In the strategic objectives 
set for 1997-2000, this has been expanded to increase global awareness of 
micronutrient malnutrition. Information management is a new objective, not foreseen 
specifically in the original objectives. 
8 These Focus Areas are also somewhat confusingly referred to as "thematic areas of work" and "strategic 
issues" in the Workplan. 
Table 3 Strategic objectives for MI: 1997-2000 
Two areas appear to be major extensions of what was originally envisaged: the ' 
development and application of technologies and the national and regional initiatives. 
In the original proposals for MI, the idea was that research and development would be 
supported where critical gaps exist. In the Workplan 1997-2000, the role of MI has 
been broadened to identify technology needs, to adapt and transfer available 



















It is interesting to note that it is the three sets of "new" objectives - relating to the 
information service on micronutrients; developing new technologies and research; 
and assisting in implementing national programs - that raise the most questions 
among MI'S partners about the appropriateness of what MI is doing. 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
O Increase global awareness regarding the magnitude, 
severity and consequences of micronutrient 
malnutrition; 
O Increase awareness and stimulate action by the key 
players through educating, influencing and 
motivating them; 
D Mobilize increased resources from governments, 
donor agencies, food producers, and civic 
organizations for the elimination of micronutrient 
malnutrition. 
Identification of technology needs related to 
assessment, interventions and program monitoring; 
Adapt and transfer available technologies to 
provide micronutrients to at-risk populations; and 
Develop and refine new technologies appropriate to 
specific needs. 
0 To help develop national strategies and plans; 
To help mobilize support (technical and financial) 
for these plans; 
To assist in implementing specific interventions by 
providing required program support components in 
order to improve effectiveness and increase 
program coverage. 
0 Establish and maintain the Micronutrient 
Information Management Services; 
o Develop and strengthen local capacity to design, 
plan, implement, manage and monitor programs. 
o Identify and support consultation and research to 
resolve controversies or bottlenecks on key issues 
which are critical to global micronutrient policy 
and program formulation, to support investigation 
of promising solutions, and to provide for a for 









We had originally expected to assess what progress MI has made towards achieving 
its objectives. This has proved not possible for several reasons: 
(2) the objectives identified in the Workplan are more in the nature of long 
term goals than immediate objectives for the four year program; 
(3) The indicators and expected results identified in the Worlplan are related 
to individual activities and not objectives; 
(4) The indicators identified are generally immediate outputs (e.g. meeting 
was held; materials were . distributed; feasibility of technique was 
established; national plan was prepared); 
( 5 )  The expected results are generally expressed as outcomes in general and 
qualitative terms (e.g. increased number of committed partners; transfer of 
technology to local production; public-private sector dialogue initiated; 
current micronutrient information regularly updated); 
(6 )  The Workplan provides no evaluation framework for assessing MI's 
performance in carrying out the activities or achieving the objectives and 
no systematic reporting on progress is available by objective. 
It has therefore proved not possible to directly measure MI's performance against 
its stated obiectives. Instead, this evaluation has measured the degree to which 
planned activities were actually completed within the four years (section 3.3) and 
reviewed in more detail each of MI's main areas of work (sections 3.4 to 3.7). 
We start with the success stories. 
3.2 Success stories 
During the interviews with external partners, interviewees were asked to identify 
areas or activities that they judged to be success stories for MI. Although they are 
only indicative because of the small numbers, there was sufficient consistency in 
the responses to believe that the activities named are likely to be seen more 
generally as areas where MI and its collaborating partners have performed well 
(table 4). Some of these success stories are briefly described to illustrate the 
different ways in which MI has been judged to perform outstandingly well. 
Table 4 Successful MI activities as judged by MI'S partners 
Successful MI activity % of responses 
N=80 
Advocacy work for micronutrients 19% 
Vitamin A distribution 
I 
18% 
Contribution to universal salt iodization I 10% 
Development of double fortified salt 1 10% 
Working through partners i 9% 
Sugar fortification technology transfer from Latin America to j 
Africa I 9% 
Publications with WHO on Vitamin A 9% 
Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Project 6% 
Flour fortification in North Africa'Middle East 4% 
Donation of vitamin A premix for sugar fortification in 
Nicaragua 3% 
Meta-analysis of iron supplementation i 
(Beaton and McCabe) I 3% 
Nepal Micronutrient Status Survey 
t 
3% 
Advocacv for micronutrients 
MI'S success in advocacy - "in putting micronutrients on the map" is the most 
generally recognized successful role that it has played. This advocacy is seen as 
especially important in relation to the private sector where MI has played a lead 
role. MI is also seen as having influenced governments, international agencies 
and the NGOs with which it has worked in paying more attention to micronutrient 
deficiencies in their own programs. 
Global vitamin A initiatives 
Another highly recognized success for MI is their role in the procurement and 
distribution of vitamin A in several projects supported by CIDA through a 
contribution agreement to MI. These include a project with UNICEF to 
strengthen existing national programs in 11 countries; a project with WHO-EPI in 
sub-Saharan Africa using immunization services as the delivery vehicle; a project 
with PAHO in six countries in Latin America using immunization services; a 
project with Helen Keller International in West Africa (Burkino Faso, Mali and 
Niger) working through local NGOs; and a project using mainly local NGOs in 
fourteen countries (the GVAI project) which was coordinated through PATH 
Canada in Phase 1. These projects specifically target groups such as children 
between 6 and 60 months and pregnant and lactating mothers. 
MI has also undertaken responsibility for procurement of the vitamin A under a 
commodities (vitamin A, ironlfolate, zinc and iodine) procurement grant from 
CIDA. Since 1997, MI has played a role in successfully distributing an estimated 
one billion vitamin A capsules globally to over 70 UNICEF and NGO field 
offices. The scale of the vitamin A distribution initiative has helped to put MI 
itself on the map as an international player in micronutrients. More importantly, 
where children receive the vitamin A twice a year, it has led to an almost 25% 
reduction in childhood mortality from all causes; 50% reduction in measles 
mortality; 33% reduction in diarrheal disease mortality for children between 6 
months and 5 years. These tremendous health benefits are gained at little 
incremental cost (ranging from 2%-10%) over the costs of the national 
immunization days for polio (NIDs). The linkage of vitamin A distribution with 
NIDs is widely regarded as part of the success story for UNICEF, WHO and MI. 
Donation of vitamin A Premix for sugar fortification in Nicara~ua 
Where the success of the vitamin A global distribution is associated with the large 
scale of the operation, the provision of vitamin A premix to Nicaragua is one of 
the highlights of MI operations that demonstrated its flexibility and 
responsiveness. 
After five years of negotiation between the private sector, the Government and 
international development agencies, it was agreed that sugar fortification with 
vitamin A would begin during the 1999-2000 sugar season using a loan from the 
Nordic Fund for Development to buy the premix. On this basis, MOSTIUSAID 
and the Government of Nicaragua agreed to conduct a National Baseline 
Micronutrient Survey and the Government approved an arrangement with the 
Sugar Producers Association to transfer the costs of fortification to the consumer. 
A problem emerged that meant that the Nordic funds were not available in time 
for the premix to be used in the 1999-2000 season. This caused immediate 
tension between the Government and the Sugar Producers Association, which 
threatened the previous five years of difficult negotiation and concluding 
agreement. 
MI provided an immediate donation of about CAD$500,000 worth of vitamin A 
premix (about 25% of the total needed) which "bought time" for other donors and 
the Government to arrange the provision of the remaining 75% needed. MI was 
asked by the World Bank and USAIDMicaragua if it could help Nicaragua on an 
emergency basis. MI then requested CIDA to use funds for that purpose and 
MIADRC managed to complete the administration required within record time. 
On this occasion, MI proved that it could have a more effective and rapid 
response than any other organization. 
Meta-analysis of iron supplementation 
This success story is based on MI contracting two experts to review the data and 
results of 22 completed trials of iron supplementation covering some 6000 
subjects to determine whether weekly or daily iron supplementation is most 
efficacious for pregnant women, adolescents and schoolchildren and pre-school 
children, in different situations of supervision. This has been one of the more 
contentious issues in how best to provide iron supplementation. 
The report by George Beaton and George ~ c ~ a b e ~  is s en as not only a much 
needed and outstanding piece of scientific meta-research for iron 
supplementation, but also an example of the kind of consensus building processes 
that MI should be supporting to resolve some of the outstanding debates and 
uncertainties in the micronutrient field. 
3.3 Progress in implementing activities 1997-2000 
To obtain a measure of how many of the planned activities were implemented and 
how many new activities were undertaken during the course of the four years, the 
program updates given to the Steering Committee at each meeting have been 
compared to the activities set out in the 1997-2000 Workplan. This is seen as 
important in view of the concern heard in the interviews that "MI never says no" 
and "MI does more unplanned activities than planned ones". 
There are some difficulties in this approach. The first is that the program updates 
are not referenced back to the Workplan or to the overall objectives. Some of the 
projects, for example, the various Vitamin A supplementation projects, are hard to 
pinpoint in the updates. The second difficulty is that, although there are reports on 
activities that are delayed, the updates do not appear to include planned activities 
that have not been implemented. The end result is that it is difficult for anyone 
to track the linkages between work planned and work accomplished. This has 
implications for the question of program oversight on the part of the Steering 
Committee. 
Table 5 shows the relationship between activities anticipated in the Workplan 
(which was actually finalized in May 1998 - one year into the four year period) 
and those that had been reported by April 2000. It also shows additional activities 
undertaken during the four-year period. The table shows that an impressive. 
number of some 120 planned activities are listed in the Workplan, of which the 
largest group (52) falls under national and regional initiatives. Of these 120 
activities, action and progress is reported to the Steering Committee on 49 (42%) 
while there is no information provided in the updates on what happened to the 
other 70 planned activities. 
k 9 Beaton G. and McCabe G, 1999, Efficacy of Intermittent Iron Supplementation in the Control of Iron 
Deficiency Anaemia in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Experience; MI, Ottawa, 124p. 
Table 5 MI program 1997-2000: planned, implemented and additional 
activities 
* this figure represents a major expansion of five existing projects including vitamin A 
supplementation due to two additional grants from CIDA early in 1999 for a total of $29.5 
million, rather than entirely new activities. 
This means that 58% of the activities approved by the Steering Committee as part 
of the Workplan were either not acted upon, or were implemented in whole or in 
part, but were not reported on. The largest proportion and total number of these 
"missing" activities fall within the Focus Area on National and Regional. 
Initiatives (63% of planned activities), which also saw almost as many new 
activities in 1997-2000 as ones that were both planned and implemented. 
However, the pattern of adding new activities exists across all Focus Areas. 
Focus area 
Advocacy and alliance 
building 
Development and 




Africa and Middle East 
Latin America and Carib. 
Central Asia, Russia, Europe 
Global 
Information management 
and capacity building 
Resolution of key 
operational issues 
ALL PROGRAMS 
Percent of total programs 
The undertaking by the Secretariat of some 32% more activities than planned, 
many of which are meetings, is borne out by interviews with MI staff, consultants 
and partners, and relates to the way in which program decisions are made and 





























































3.4 MI's work in advocacy 
In the 1997-2000 Workplan, MI set out some very broad objectives for its work in 
advocacy which included increasing global awareness on micronutrient malnutrition and 
mobilizing increased resources from governments, donor agencies, food producers and 
civic organizations. No indicators were provided by which progress towards these 
objectives could be measured but the general thrust of the activities proposed was to: 
o Target donors and international agencies on micronutrients' generally through 
meetings, individual presentations, the "Oslo dinner" for participants at the March 
1998 meeting of the ACCISCN; and the secondment of an MI communications 
expert to the Nutrition section of UNICEF, New York; 
o Sensitize governments on micronutrient malnutrition and especially food 
fortification; 
a Strengthen public-private sector partnerships on food fortification, mainly 
through follow-up meetings to the Ottawa Forum in 1995; 
o Increase awareness and commitment of the private sector to food fortification. 
The main activities were the preparatory meetings and special session and 
advocacy materials (including the CD-ROM) for Salt 2000. Other materials, such 
as special issues of trade journals on micronutrients or booklets on food 
fortification for the industry, were apparently not completed. 
The picture that emerges of the past four years is of an advocacy pro ram focused on ,% micronutrient malnutrition, vitamin A and iodine to the neglect of iron . A number of 
planned activities were not done, but new initiatives were taken up throughout the term of 
the Workplan. Lack of adequate forward planning and delays are reported to have 
reduced the effectiveness of some of the advocacy materials and initiatives. The new 
Information and Communication Unit was not in place until 1998-99. 
The Strategic Plan for 2000-2005 proposes some new directions while the target 
audiences of government, the private sector and "other organizations" remain. In the 
future, MI plans to promote more integrated nutrition strategies. The results will be 
evaluated in terms of changes to government policies and programs, including legislation 
and the level of commitment of the private sector to the process. Special emphasis is to 
be placed on iron deficiency anemia. These all appear to us to be moves in the right 
direction. Thev will also require some rethinking about how MI undertakes advocacv. 
The new proposals for MI's work in advocacy correspond closely to what MI's partners 
see as needed. The partners see three main target audiences for MI'S activities: national 
governments, the private sector and themselves. There is a concern expressed by 
L 'O Two major initiatives planned - a survey to design an advocacy strategy for iron and a video on iron - 
have been much delayed and are only now nearing completion. 
micronutrient experts that donor interest in supporting micronutrient programs, which has 
been sustained for the past decade, may give way to other priorities in the next decade. 
This will create a different challenge for MI's advocacy - to rekindle interest that has 
dwindled. For this reason, the partners we interviewed believe that the general message 
about the cost-effectiveness and availability of methods to combat micronutrient 
deficiencies needs to be continued. 
These experts agree with MI on a shift in emphasis to iron, but say that the message will 
be harder to get through to governments and donors because the health benefits of iron 
supplements or fortified foods are much less obvious than for vitamin A, and the 
interactions of iron deficiencies with other public health problems like malaria and 
diarrhoea1 diseases is more complex and less understood. 
bb  Iron is more difficult because there is nothing desperate about it. Women are tired and 
listless without enough iron but what's new! People don't drop dead or go blind or have 
goiter like with vitamin A deficiency. People do die on account of severe anemia but it is 
part of a larger problem"." 
The most effective means for MI to advocate for micronutrients were seen by partners to 
be (1) convening meetings of the key players and (2) specially designed products, 
including publications and CD-ROMs. 
We found a general consensus among those interviewed about the "what", "to whom" 
and the " how" in MI's future advocacy program, which is consistent with MI's own 
Strategic Plan. One missing element in the future strategy would seem to be the 
Canadian Parliament and Canadian public as key target groups for MI's advocacy, to 
ensure continued support for Canadian involvement in micronutrients and particularly for 
the leadership shown by Canadian CIDA in combating vitamin A deficiencies worldwide. 
The TV documentary "Canada's Two Cents Worth" is absolutely a step in the right 
direction. 
Some concerns were expressed by a few interviewees about the overall approach MI has 
taken in its advocacy work, which we feel point to a weakness in MI's effectiveness in 
the future, as it tackles the more difficult tasks of promoting the cause of iron deficiency 
anemia and micronutrients in a world which may have moved on to other concerns. - 
These relate to basing advocacy on the best science and addressing uncertainties and 
opposing views as part of the advocacy message. 
a Good advocacy needs to be underpinned with good science, good analysis and 
experience. As MI begins to focus on advocacy for iron, it should ensure that it 
has access to the best available expertise for advice and the design of its strategy 
and materials; 
a MI's expertise and credibility is seen to be primarily in salt iodization, vitamin A 
and food fortification. As it begins to consider playing a key role in a new 
I I Interview with representative of one of MI's international partner organizations. 
global program on iron deficiency anemia, it will have to consider how it will 
strengthen its resources and therefore its credibility to advocate on iron; 
o One of the most effective ways to advocate is to build alliances with strong 
partners and to share ownership of ideas and successes. With whom will MI 
develop alliances for advocacy on iron? Will MI be prepared to play a leading 
or a supporting role? 
We would recommend that MI should undertake more "critical advocacy". One of the 
criticisms we heard of MI is that their approach is sometimes "to start with the solution, 
instead of the question". Another is that they talk to the converted or "convertible" and 
avoid engaging, or inviting to MI meetings, those who are opposed to MI'S point of view. 
The value of the Beaton and McCabe report on iron is that the results are based on careful 
science rather than promotion of a particular scientific or medical view, and that 
dissenting views are given the last word. It is a good example of critical advocacy. 
Activities that help different views to be brought into a common framework is a role that 
is needed in fighting micronutrient deficiencies - and particularly so for developing the 
most effective strategies to fight iron deficiency anemia in different economic, social and 
environmental situations around the world. Perhaps, in their contribution to the global 
program on iron deficiency anemia, MI could work with a group like the Keystone 
Center to develop some innovative approaches to iron through multi-stakeholder 
L dialogues, that would include individuals and groups who hold (at least initially) opposing views. These opposing views may well be the stumbling blocks of advocacy 
efforts later in the day, so it is good strategy to map them out beforehand and, with luck, 
to smooth some of them out in the process. 
3.5 Research and Technology 
MI'S work on research and technology cuts across two of its Focus Areas: Develo ment. 
and Application of Technologies and Resolution of Key Operational Issues1< Its 
objectives for 1997-2000 were to: 
o focus on improving or developing promising technologies for the control and 
elimination of micronutrient malnutrition; 
help to bring them from the laboratow or pilot stage to large-scale application. 
IdentifL and support consultation and research to resolve controversies or 
bottlenecks. 
L Some of the work in "Resolution of Key Operational Issues" also falls under "Publications" (section 3.9) - .  
and "Meetings" (section 6.2.4) 
The technologies which MI has supported therefore tackle the key steps in fighting 
micronutrient deficiencies: (1) knowing what the deficiencies are in different populations; 
(2) knowing what the best opportunities are for fortifying foods to reach the poor in 
different social and cultural settings; (3) developing the technologies to fortify different 
foods; (4) measuring the impact that a specific supplementation or fortification 
intervention has on people's health status; and (5) going to scale with the technology and 
transferring it to developing countries. There are also a few projects looking at alternative 
approaches to supplementation and food fortification. The projects MI supports in this 
continuum can be grouped into eight areas, with the majority in food fortification 
technology. 
o Rapid procedures for assessing micronutrient deficiency status: for example, field 
level methods for assessing iron deficiency by analysis of dried serum spots in 
population surveys; simplified method for measuring urinary iodine; 
o Rapid assessment procedures for identifirinn the best food vehicles to fortifir: for 
example, the development and distribution of the FRAT Manual with PATH 
Canada. 
o Rapid test kits for measuring the micronutrient content of foods: for example, 
testing iodized salt; assay kits for vitamin A in fats and oils; 
o Technolonies for fortifying different food vehicles: for example, triple 
fortification of food (salt, flour and oil); micronutrient beverage for adolescent 
girls (Bangladesh); sugar fortification with vitamin A; 
o Technologies for fortifvinn foods at local and household levels: for example, 
fortification trial of maize meal at hammer-mill level (Zambia); 
o Efficacy trials for impact of food fortification on micronutrient status of human 
populations: for example, maternal vitamin A supplement trial (Bangladesh); 
efficacy trial of iron fortification of soy sauce on micronutrient status (China); 
impact of sugar fortification with vitamin A (Nicaragua); 
o Going to scale in food fortification: for example, national scale flour fortification 
(Middle East and North Africa); 
o Alternative deliverv systems for micronutrients: for example, assessment of 
carotenoid bioavailability from plant sources. 
MI supports research and technology development in most of the critical areas for 
improving micronutrient status. It includes health research on the status of populations 
for micronutrient deficiencies and the impact of supplementation and fortification 
interventions on improving their health status. Much of the work is concerned with 
developing food fortification technologies that can be integrated into industrial food 
processing. In practice, one of the criteria for selecting a suitable food vehicle for adding 
L micronutrients to people's diets, is not only the patterns of food consumption, but also the characteristics of the food processing industry in any country for that food. Thus the 
ideal food vehicle for fortification is a food, like salt, which is eaten universally and 
which is also processed by a few large factories, so that issues like quality control, 
compliance and incentives are easier for governments to manage. 
We are impressed with the work MI is supporting in technology and research and in 
identifying some of the key controversies and bottlenecks. We have not been able to 
judge the quality of individual research projects, but in general the response we heard 
from the people we interviewed who were knowledgeable, was positive about the 
technology and research program. 
The projects are targeted on some key obstacles to food fortification and cover the 
spectrum of technology development from understanding the problem, to technology 
adaptation, to technology transfer and going to national scale. Many of the projects are to 
develop rapid assessment methods and kits, and we find this excellent. The applied 
projects also lend themselves to future networking to increase the opportunities for 
technology transfer across regions. This has already happened to some extent in sugar 
fortification technology from Latin America to Africa. 
Much of MI'S networking so far has been achieved through regional workshops on 
particular technical issues. These include: Women and Food Processing (Ghana 1994), 
L Regional Anemia Consultation for Africa (1997); Food fortification workshop (China); iron deficiency workshop (Chile 1997); Regional Food Strategy in Latin America 
Meeting; Workshop on salt iodization for small salt producers in West Africa. We are 
very supportive of this approach, and of MI's work in technology and research in general. 
In an evaluation whose findings are tending towards concluding MI needs to focus more, 
it is somewhat counter-productive to suggest that MI might want to add to its agenda in 
technology and research. However, there are three additional research themes that we 
believe would strengthen MI's present scope of work: 
o Policv research to examine the national, regional and international contexts for 
food fortification and to share national experience in legislation, regulation and . 
economic incentives to encourage the private sector to fortify foods. A good 
report in this area has recently been revised and published by MI in 2000.13 
o Technolow transfer and networking. MI is already doing this but it could be 
usefully expanded to increase the impact of earlier investments in technology 
development made by MI. One example we have is to transfer and adapt the 
experience of fortification at the household milling level in Africa to Asia. 
L 13 Rose Nathan, 2000, Regulation o f  Fortified Foods to address Micronutrient Malnutrition: Legislation, 
Regulations, and Enforcement; Micronutrient Initiative, Ottawa. 
o Alternative ap~roaches to reach the largest numbers of vulnerable people to 
improve their micronutrient status. MI is doing some work on alternative 
approaches but we would recommend that it be expanded in the future. 
In many countries, most poor people do not buy food produced by the formal food 
processing industry, because it is too expensive. For example, some 70% of the 
population of India does not eat the food processed by the industry with which MI 
is currently working (except partly through the public distribution system). To 
reach them, MI must develop technologies for micro, small and medium 
enterprises; the household level; and for primary food producers like farmers; as 
well as work with national and international food aid schemes. 
Finally, it controversial, but the potential benefits of genetically modified rice with 
vitamin A for human health and economic livelihoods in Asia are so enormous that MI 
might at least discuss it, and see whether there is any role here for MI in the next five 
years, given its experience in assessing micronutrient status and food consumption 
patterns. It is an opportunity for MI to think even more out of the box. 
3.5.1 Double fortified salt 
One major research activity, started in 1992 and still continuing is the double fortification 
of salt with iodine and iron (DFS). Some early engineering research was started in India 
and, with MI'S support, a somewhat different approach was initiated at the University of 
Toronto. The Canadian DFS has been successfully tested in the field in Ghana to 
demonstrate its stability and efficacy using refined salt that was prepared in Canada and 
would not normally be available or consumed in Ghana, or the many other developing 
countries which use coarse, crystalline salt. The challenge now is not only to 
demonstrate in other trials the efficacy and consumer acceptability of refined DFS, but 
more importantly, to find a technological breakthrough to double forti@ coarse, more 
widely consumed salt. 
MI'S work in double fortified salt is quite controversial. It has been described to us as the 
single most significant activity that MI is working on, and as one of their biggest failures. 
This reflects people's view that the potential health benefits of double - or multiple - 
fortified salt are so enormous worldwide that it is worth working "big time" for a 
breakthrough. On the other side, people are wondering why MI has already been 
supporting work in this area for over six years and has only reached the stage of one trial 
in one country (whose analysis and results are somewhat disputed) with salt that is too 
refined for use in most developing countries. 
These concerns have led to three further questions that we have heard posed about MI'S 
approach to this potential high payoff technology: 
(1) Why did MI for so long "put all its eggs into the University of Toronto 
basket?" 
(2) Why didn't MI work earlier on coarse crystalline salt as the food 
vehicle? 
(3) Is MI'S implied approach to development to encourage the world to 
use refined salt to fit the technology available rather than to change the 
technology to fit cultural food patterns? 
We had hoped to do a case study of the double fortified salt project, but could not review 
all the files and complete the study in the time available for the evaluation. We believe it 
would be a usefbl study for MI to commission, and is one that we know is of interest to 
the Steering Committee. 
3.6 National and regional programs 
Some of the most successfbl parts of MI's activities have been their work in helping to 
develop national strategies and plans for micronutrients. Their objectives in this area for 
1997-2000 were to help mobilize the technical and financial support needed for these 
plans and to help in implementing specific interventions through program support to 
improve effectiveness and to increase program coverage. They are also among the more 
L controversial activities that MI undertakes, seen from the perspective of some of their key partners. 
The issues are not about whether national programs for micronutrients are important or 
not - they are. Nor are the issues about the need to provide support to governments to 
undertake micronutrient surveys and national nutrition planning. The questions are raised 
about whether this is a role for MI - whether it corresponds with MI'S comparative 
advantage and organizational niche - and how MI is going about doing national 
programming. The concentration of national programming in South Asia has also led MI 
to establish a regional presence there and to appoint National Program Officers, so it has 
institutional implications as well as program ones (section 6.4). 
National programming is highly work-intensive and hands-on for MI. In South Asia, 
they have been working with national and state governments, the private sector 
(especially the food processing industry), local NGOs, and donor agencies. They are 
involved at many levels and in many aspects within each country, including: 
o Working at the national and state policv level to position micronutrient 
deficiencies within national nutrition policy, food fortification regulations, trade 
policy relating to food, and special programs like food rations for the poor in 
India etc.; 
o Assessing the extent of micronutrient deficiencies, particularly among populations 
at risk; 
o Designing interventions to eradicate micronutrient deficiencies based on studies 
of food consumption patterns and available food vehicles for fortification; 
o Pilot proiects and testin& 
o Leveraging the financial resources to implement large scale programs; 
o Going to scale with state or national programs; 
o Monitoring im~lementation and measuring results and impacts. 
MI has not undertaken all these roles alone. It has worked with partners such as 
UNICEF, WHO, PAHO, World Bank, USAID, and HKI in different parts of the world. 
But it has played a very hands-on role in India, Bangladesh and Nepal, where it can draw 
on the resources of its National Program Officers. In Bangladesh, MI fielded a team 
from Tufts University 1997-2000 to provide support to the government in the Bangladesh 
Integrated Nutrition Project (BINP). This group was key to helping the government 
launch the National Nutrition Program in 2000 through its support to BINP in training, 
travel, workshops, research and policy advice. It helped to prepare the proposal to the 
World Bank which received the largest Bank grant ever for a nutrition project - about 
US$1 billion. 
In Nepal, MI worked closely with UNICEF to support the government in undertaking a 
National Micronutrient Status Survey in 1998, whose final analysis was being 
crosschecked at the time of our field visit in April 2000. This survey, one of the first 
national micronutrient surveys, will be used to design a Five Year National Plan of 
Action for sustained programs on micronutrient malnutrition. 
In India, MI has worked at the national level in supporting several government 
committees dealing with the policy and technical aspects of fortification of staples like 
rice, maida and atta, as well as groups working on sugar and edible oil fortification and 
salt iodization (which has recently re-entered the policy fray as a contentious issue). In 
terms of integrated programming, it has focused on two states: West Bengal and Gujurat, 
and has received requests from other states to do similar work. 
The accomplishments of MI in the South Asia region, as well as their work in Latin 
America, Africa, North Africa and the Middle East is truly impressive and a testament to 
MI'S identification of key gaps and opportunities that need to be filled. Its work in 
advocacy with the governments and private sector in those countries has led to private 
sector interest in food fortification and the problem of micronutrient malnutrition that was 
not there before MI led the way. It is probably true to say that in Bangladesh, the success 
of the BINP was directly related to the work of the MyTufts team. We heard many 
examples, small and large, of MI playing a key role in a responsive and flexible mode - 
just as they were intended to do when they were first established. 
L 
But, there were also important questions raised with us in South Asia about MI'S mode of 
operation in supporting national programs. These are: 
o Should MI work more with its partners and act less independently? Is it trying too 
hard "to find aplace in the sun"? 
o Is MI contributing to local capacity building or is it too focused on getting the job 
done? 
o Is MI helping to develop programs that are sustainable? Are other donors or the 
governments ready with funds to take the MI pilots up to scale? 
o Is MI just too small to get directly involved in implementing national programs? 
One of the concerns expressed in India was that MI was encouraging the government to 
set up a parallel initiatives for micronutrient programs by working directly with the 
Department of Women and Child Development rather than through the Department of 
Health, which has already in place Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) 
facilities at the local level, supported by WHO and the World Bank. Rather than working 
with another Department, these partners think that MI should be helping to strengthen the 
ICDS system that is already in place through much of the country. 
Another concern is that MI is too hands-on. While it might take government personnel 
longer to do the tasks undertaken by the MI consultants, A d  the result might hot be as 
polished, these critics think that in the end, the country's own capacity and ownership of 
its programs would be more enhanced if they did more themselves. We can't judge this 
one. We do think, however, that the amount of time spent by some MI consultants/staff 
on certain national or state programs is not sustainable for MI, nor replicable to many 
countries. It is just too intensive. And MI'S human resources are too limited. 
The 1997-2000 Workplan foresaw two main initiatives that are regional: the fortification 
of staple and processed food in Africa and flour fortification in the Middle East and 
North Africa. A third initiative in Latin America to introduce national integrated plans in 
the Mercosu countries and in Central America was not reported as complete beyond 
workunderway in Brazil. 
Regional initiatives around specific themes such as flour fortification seem to working 
well. They can build on MI's own expertise and they can lead to valuable networking 
between countries and the exchange of experience and ideas. The regional work in the 
Middle East and North Africa on flour fortification is one of MI's success stories and has 
led to very good collaboration with WHO in the region. Regional networking on specific 
aspects of food fortification, and bringing the public and private sectors together may 
very well be a good strategy for MI and one more suited to its comparative advantage 
than comprehensive national micronutrient programs. 
3.7 Publications and web site 
The 1997-2000 Workplan includes publications as part of MI's Micronutrient 
Information Management Services. The only stated publication objective in the workplan 
is to e x ~ a n d  MI's activities in its information clearing-house role, publications and 
Website. The Information and Communications Unit (ICU) was established part way 
through the term of the Workplan. 
3.7.1 Publications 
MI produced an impressive number of publications, some of which are highly regarded. 
These include the joint publication with WHO on Safe Vitamin A Dosage during 
Pregnancy and Lactation (1998), and the recent publication on the meta-analysis of iron 
s ~ ~ ~ l e m e n t a t i o n . ' ~  At the other end of the scale, the pamphlets giving updates on what 
is happening on Iron, Double Fortified Salt, the South Asia Project (Activity Highlights) 
and the series on Fort$cation Basics are also well received. 
One observation of the list of MI publications on their website is that many, if not most of 
the publications (at least those that are not proceedings of meetings) are edited or co- 
authored by MI staff. This we find a surprising use of MI Secretariat scarce human 
resources and may contribute to the problems of slowness in project review and other 
Secretariat functions that are discussed in section 6 on Key O~erational Issues. It is 
clearly a question of balance - it is good that professional staff undertakes some writing 
assignments, but in the future MI might wish to see where the best balance for the 
organization lies More out-sourcing the tasks of technical editing might better serve MI's 
objectives. 
Many other publications of MI are the proceedings of meetings. On these, we heard 
some criticisms - mostly stemming from problems in MI operations, which reduced the 
effectiveness of the publications themselves and put strains on relationships with 
partners. The complaints were that publications of meetings were long delayed. One co- 
sponsor of a meeting told us that they had yet to see the final report even though the 
meeting was held more than a year ago. The delay in publishing the proceedings of the 
meetings, together with a lack of other follow-up (section 6.2.4) seriously reduces the 
return on investment in organizing the meeting in the first place. Co-sponsors, 
participants and consultants expressed their views that MI was not living up to its 
promise in these cases. 
I 4  George H Beaton and George P McCabe, 1999, Efficacy of Intermittent Iron Supplementation in the 
Control of Iron Deficiency Anaemia in Developing Countries; MI, Ottawa. 
Other partners said that their views were not taken into account in the final version of a 
publication. In these collaborative endeavours, where misunderstandings can arise, it is 
important that MI ensures there is a clear understanding at the outset about what input is 
expected, what the deadlines are, and how different views and conclusions will be 
reflected in the publication. Equally sensitive is the question of proper 
acknowledgements. At least two important partners for MI complained that MI had gone 
ahead without giving them appropriate acknowledgements or using their logo on the 
cover. 
We also saw examples in the files where a publication was delayed because presenters 
had not foregone their copyright. If MI organizes a meeting, it should secure such 
waivers beforehand, and indeed they should be part of the contract with the presenter in 
paying for them to participate in the meeting. In other words. planning for the needs of 
the ~ublication should be integrated in planning for the meeting and preparing contracts. 
The conclusions that we draw from these findings are that: 
o MI has undertaken more publications than it could handle in terms of its in-house 
resources and this has led to some problems in delays, misunderstandings with 
co-sponsors, and criticisms from partners which undermine the value of the 
publications themselves; 
Its most admired publications tend to be the more technical ones, and those 
produced with key partners like WHO. A few seminal publications like these 
will further MI's mandate more than lots of meeting proceedings - which should 
rather be put out almost immediately after the meeting on the Internet. 
o Publications and dissemination are not an "add-on". They need to be an integral 
part of the strategic planning in all parts of MI's program. 
MI entered in a Memorandum of Understanding with IDRC Books on March 1 2000 for 
IDRC Books to manage all aspects of editorial production, translation, book production 
and initial distribution. MI will be responsible for conception, development, technical 
review and funding of manuscripts and both will work together on marketing. The 
agreement allows for full text in electronic form on MI'S website, in consultation with 
IDRC Books. 
This approach seems an excellent way to go: IDRC Books have the professional 
experience and resources in publications than MI does not have in-house. It allows MI to 
concentrate on the technical aspects of publications and will also lead to a more uniform 
recognizable "image" for MI publications. 
3.7.2 MI Website 
MI's website is in urgent need of rebuilding and redesign. We understand that this is a 
priority for the Information and Communications Unit in the new Strategic Plan - 
justifiably so. At presentrthe website is not interactive; it is rarely updated; and does not 
provide adequate information on MI activities. The directory of manufacturers does not 
seem to have been updated since its creation in 1997. 
Given MI'S mandate, the website is a key means to its advocacy and information work as 
well as its alliance building. It should become the website for information on food 
fortification, and one of the key sites on micronutrient malnutrition more generally. MI 
should consider how its website fits into its overall strategy - as for publications, it 
should not be an afterthought but a key tool for MI. We would recommend that MI 
consider publishing all its publications on its website and make them available for fiee 
downloading. It can use restricted pages of its website to provide meeting participants 
with meeting abstracts beforehand and proceedings immediately afterwards before they 
are made openly available on the website. 
If MI sees its future role as facilitating consensus in key debates surrounding 
micronutrients, how can its website support that role? Clearly, MI could put its resources 
into convening electronic discussion groups, electronic conferences and various levels of 
listservs and chat rooms. It needs to discuss these options, not only internally, but also 
with its partners, to determine the support these initiatives might gather and how they 
could bridge not only the public-private gap but also the information gap between the 
north and the south. 
In sum, we recommend re-launching the website so that it is a high quality technical 
resource on micronutrients and a key support to scientific and technical discussion on key 
issues, as well as allowing partners to share their program planning, upcoming meetings 
etc. MI should think hard about what resources are needed, both in-house and through 
out-sourcing, to make the website a success. It should not go too far without discussing 
its website "niche" with its partners." The past pattern of MI trying to do everything in- 
house will not succeed in the competitive world of the Internet. 
MI should clarify what information it might focus on or maintain on its website with partners like 
PAMM or ACCISCN which have a policy of  using the Internet to provide up to date infomation and to 
stimulate discussion on micronutrient 
KEY PROGRAM ISSUES 
The review of MI's program activities has identified some key issues relating to program 
management and strategy, which are discussed in this section. These are: 
o What is MI's organizational niche? What are its comparative advantages and how 
should they be translated into program activities? 
o By what criteria does MI make program decisions? This question relates to 
broader program strategy, individual activities, and how MI defines its own role 
in the activity. 
o Partnerships are a key modality by which MI achieves its goals. How does MI 
manage its present partnerships and how might they be strengthened in the future? 
o Capacity building is given short shrift in MI's Workplan for 1997-2000 and in its 
new Strategic Plan. It may be there implicitly, but should it also be an explicit 
goal? 
o How can MI build on improved monitoring and evaluation of its projects to 
transform itself into a learning organization? 
4.1 What is MI's niche in micronutrients? 
MI's new strategic plan for 2000-2005 positions MI as 
"primarily an alliance builder and technical support agency ...... it is not purely a funds 
provider or a procurement agency. The MI is not an implementing agency, a research 
institution or an information clearing house."'6 
It is important that MI clearly define its organizational role because one of the difficulties 
it has faced in the past is a lack of clarity, both within MI and with its partners, about its 
core business within the field of micronutrients. Its focused mandate on micronutrients 
and the linkage of its mission with the decadal goals of the World Summit for Children 
has been one of its early strengths. In this, MI is seen as a unique and valuable addition 
to the international organizations and expert groups working on micronutrient 
l6 Strategic Plan for the Micronutrient Initiative 2000-2005, dated May 2 2000. 
deficiencies. However, MI's recent program strategy has caused some confusion among 
its partners about its role and whether its current activities reflect MI's real strengths or 
are to some extent, duplicating the work of others. 
From its strategic plan and our interviews with staff, it is clear that MI sees its niche as 
advocacy, partnership building, and the provision of funds and expertise. Interviews with 
its international partners show that they also see MI's role as (1) advocacy; (2) fbnding; 
(3) building alliances; and (less frequently mentioned) (4) the provision of technical 
expertise. International partners and the private sector see MI's comparative advantage 
as based on its expertise in food fortification, combined with its focused mandate and its 
status as a relatively new Canadian institution (which they believe brings less political 
constraints and more possibility to be flexible and responsive). 
What is missing from this list of comparative advantages (although not from MI's 
success stories), is MI's work in supplementation, particularly commodities procurement; 
and its national and regional programs. These two activities present particular challenges 
to MI in its relationships with partners and its own operational support to programs. 
The commodity procurement activity, especially the rapid expansion of MI's role in the 
procurement of vitamin A capsules for forwarding to UNICEF for distribution to some 70 
countries, has raised questions about MI's focus and role among its main international 
partners. Although the supplementation activities accounted for more than a third of 
MI's budget in 1998-99, they are estimated to occupy only about 15% of the level of 
effort expended on programs by the secretariat". MI argues, and our interviews confirm, 
that MI's work in supplementation has brought it both visibility and new contacts. 
However, it may not necessarily have brought MI credibility as experts in the field of 
supplementation. MI's expertise in the area of procurement, distribution and 
supplementation is a question mark for both its private sector contacts and its 
international partners. In the future. MI needs to do a better job of explaining why, when 
almost everyone it works with thinks its core business should be food fortification. it 
continues to play a major role in supplementation. 
MI's role in supporting pilot projects as part of national and regional program 
development is also questioned by some international partners, especially in South Asia, 
where the partners are working with the same governments (but sometimes different 
departments) to implement micronutrient programs. Judging from the comments of its 
partners, the challenge here for MI is to work harder at the alliance building and not to be 
seen as working on its own. The challenge is also to ensure that it does not take on more 
work than it can support both technically and administratively. 
" This estimate of level of  effort is given in the MI Strategic Plan 2000-2005 and strictly speaking, refers to 
2000 onwards. It does not appear to be substantially different fiom what our interviews with MI staff 
would suggest. 
4 
4.2 Program strategy and focus 
When asked what MI's program focus should be, more than half of MI'S international 
partners identified iron as the priority for the next four years. The remaining responses 
were equally divided between vitamin A and Iodine (especially Double or Multiple 
Fortified Salt). When it came to what approach MI should adopt, almost 80% thought 
that MI should focus on food fortification. Only 15 % thought it should focus on 
supplementation initiatives, with a few people mentioning integrated approaches. The 
modalities by which MI should work on iron and on food fortification were seen to be: 
o Working with partners and strengthening those partners 
o Identifying gaps and opportunities for others as well as MI 
o Documenting results, best practice and lessons learnt 
o Capacity building of local institutions and governments 
While the' numbers are small, the areas that some international partners thought that MI 
should not be in are supplementation, field projects and databases. Rather, they see MI 
as having a core business and unique expertise in food fortification and building links 
with the private sector to achieve sustainable results. 
b What does this mean for MI'S program strategy and focus? It jibes well with the new 
program strategy as laid out in the Strategic Plan 2000-2005, with the possible exception 
of commodity procurement and distribution. It also helps to explain why MI's key 
partners have sometimes been unclear what MI's role and core business have been in the 
past. 
One challenge for MI management and for the Steering Committee is how to integrate the 
Special Projects into the overall strategy. These Special Projects account for 97% of the 
last year's program expenditures ($26,468,000 compared to a Regular Program budget of 
$724,000). They have inevitably influenced program focus and workload during the 
course of 1997-2000 and are one reason for the additional projects undertaken that were 
not foreseen in the 1997-2000 Workplan. 
4.3 Decision criteria for program management 
One of the common messages we heard was that "MI should learn how to say no". MI 
staff speak of new initiatives being launched, sometimes very late in the day, with 
repercussions for workload, stress on MI staff and on IDRC service providers - and 
inevitably also for work quality and results. 
One example given is that of the recent Salt 2000 meeting in May 2000 at The Hague. 
The original Workplan included the organization of a session at the meeting on IDD 
elimination. To this were added some preparatory regional meetings for salt producers. 
As late as January 2000, MI began to implement an idea to prepare a CD-ROM for 
meeting participants'8. The task was successfully completed but the rush to produce the 
CD-ROM reportedly affected the quality of the product. This story is not unique for MI. 
Sometimes a good idea that comes too late, is not a good idea! 
At present MI takes on too many new initiatives when its project portfolio is already full. 
It also seems to have a developed an administrative style and culture that is not as 
conducive to efficient operations as it might be (section 6.3). These two characteristics, 
when combined with a dedicated, enthusiastic staff and an annual budget that is 
considerably larger than it can disburse suggest that MI could benefit from the discipline 
of a program management system. 
CIDA has been encouraging MI to adopt results based management and has developed 
some indicators that would facilitate MI'S reporting to CIDA on its projects in 
supplementation and fortification. One key indicator developed by CIDA is the 
Additional Person-year of Coverage (APC).19 The APC can then be used to develop a 
measure of cost-effectiveness of projects by dividing the APC by the cost of the project 
to MI to calculate the Cost per Additional Person-year of Coverage (CAPC). 
There may be problems in using the CAPC in certain projects, such as fortification 
projects that result in long-term private sector initiatives or new government legislation. 
It may also be difficult to assign costs and benefits on both sides of the CAPC equation to 
specific action on the part of MI. However, the general thrust of CIDA's initiative is in 
the right direction. MI needs some clear criteria for making decisions about priorities and 
what not to do. This is what MI'S donors need for their own accountability and what MI 
needs to measure its impact and effectiveness and to plan its strategy based on that 
knowledge. 
The question of information systems for program management is discussed in section 6.1. 
Here the issue is addressed more in terms of program and project management based on 
program criteria that are important to MI'S mission and objectives. MI needs to develop 
a program management framework that is consistent with these goals and at the same 
time can provide the regular information that MI needs to measure progress towards 
those goals. MI needs to know if it is on track at several levels - for individual projects, 
for program areas or organizational units and for MI as a whole. This is no easy task, as 
most organizations that we spoke to readily admitted. 
18 The copies of the CD-ROM were packaged by MI staff up to minutes before a staff member hand 
carried them to The Hague on the last possible plane from Ottawa before the opening of the Salt 2000 
meeting. 
The APC is calculated in four steps: ( I )  estimate the number of people to be reached by the project; (2) 
estimate the proportion of those reached actually at risk of a given micronutrient deficiency (target 
population) ; (3) subtract the number of people from the target population who would be covered anyway 
through other interventions; (4) multiply the number receiving additional coverage by the number of years 
for which coverage is to be provided in the project (maximum 25 years for fortification projects). 
+hw We have already noted in section 3.1 that in its last Workplan 1997-2000, MI did not 
have clearly defined objectives with expected outcomes and measurable indicators, so 
that it was not possible to evaluate the current work against MI's own objectives. The 
new Strategic Plan seeks to remedy this with a performance-based management system, 
using objectives, measurable indicators and timeframes. This is to be commended. We 
believe that, as a matter of priority, MI should develop its own performance management 
system and try to have it operational this fiscal year. We have the following suggestions 
to make concerning the process. 
n The Strategic Plan should be integrated with the Program of Work and should 
include the main criteria by which MI is to manage its performance and the main 
objectives for 2000-2005. MI's new Performance Based Management System 
(PBMS) should provide decision criteria for planning as well as measures for 
reporting progress. 
The decision criteria should include results based management and gars analysis, 
both of which have been emphasized by the MI Steering Committee, and are 
relevant to MI's mandate. 
n The Performance Based Management Svstem (PBMS) should be desi~ned with 
the input of MI's partners. It is recommended that MI consults with its key 
partners and donors to identify what indicators they are using, or would suggest 
MI use, to measure key components of a performance management system. It 
could also bring them together in a workshop on how to measure results in 
micronutrient programs. 
The proposed consultation process would bring several benefits to MI. 
(1) It would allow MI to identify a pool of indicators which have been tried in 
other organizations from which to customize its own set to best meet MI'S 
needs; 
(2) Ideally, some of MI'S selected indicators would overlap with those used by its 
partners and donors - both to make its reporting more relevant to them (and 
vice versa); and because the longer terms outcomes and impacts are generally 
the result of collaborative actions and projects, so it would be advantageous 
for all partners to use similar measures; 
(3) Such a process would increase the transparency of MI with its partners and 
would bring direct benefits in learning and improved quality of performance 
measures to both sides of the partnerships. 
o The Performance Based Management System (PBMS) should have a core set of 
performance indicators. These would include the most accessible ones (inputs, 
throughputs or activities, outputs) as well as the more difficult to measure 
(outcomes, results, impacts). They would include qualitative and quantitative 
measures and would measure performance at several levels (project, program 
area, MI). It is likely that a manageable core set of measures would number 
somewhere between 10-20 indicators. It could include the CAPC developed by 
CIDA or something similar and should also include a criterion relevant to gender 
analysis. 
o MI could show leadership by shar in~ its Performance Based Management Svstem 
with its partners, inviting their input on the performance of MI and the the PBMS 
itself. 
o MI'S PBMS will require two major changes: a new program information system 
linked to a financial system: and a change in organizational culture on the part of 
MI leadership and staff. Both of these are seen as critical to any PBMS and both 
will require major effort over this fiscal year. 
o Finally. as a longer term goal. MI might wish to develop its Performance Based 
Management Svstem into a broader MI Learning System, linking project and 
program performance with program evaluations and inputs from national and 
international partners. This could be an interactive web-based learning system on 
fighting micronutrient deficiencies. 
4.3.1 What would a Performance Based Management System do for MI? 
It is a truism that (almost) any management system will work for an organization if the 
organization wants it to; and no system will work well if the organizational culture is 
opposed to it. We think that MI needs an improved management system to help it to be a 
more effective Secretariat. To work successfully, MI leadership and staff also need to be 
convinced that whatever Performance Based Management System they adopt, will 
actually help them to do their work better. This is one reason why we conclude that MI 
should develop its own PBMS and give it high priority this fiscal year. 
The process of discussing criteria, selecting a few key indicators (that are both 
theoretically valid and practicable to measure) and trying to benchmark their PBMS 
against those of other organizations will likely increase the commitment of the staff to 
provide the data inputs and to use the system, because the MI-PBMS will be relevant to 
their needs. However, to make the system work for MI, some changes will be needed in 
the organization of tasks and staff roles (section 6.3). 
What benefits might a PBMS bring to MI? In addition to helping MI set its priorities 
consistent with its mandate and objectives and to measure its performance, an early 
benefit of a PBMS is that it should help the Secretariat to know when to say no, and to 
say "no" and "yes" more quickly and expeditiously. This is because the decisions would 
be based on criteria that are related to MI'S mandate and objectives, are generally agreed 
across MI, and can be shared with partners and prospective grantees. Decisions based on 3 
thw known criteria also bring more transparency to the organization, more consistency fiom 
one staff member to another in terms of decisions, and usually more acceptance of them 
from the outside world. It should also speed up decisions and reduce the amount of staff 
time and administrative costs spent in responding to outside requests. 
The present situation, as we have heard from the interviews, and seen in our review of MI 
project files, is that MI staff put considerable effort into responding to proposals. Many 
are sent out for external review and are reviewed internally. From what we have seen in 
our sample of rejected and accepted proposals for 1999, this technical review is of high 
quality. But the current process poses two problems for MI: it is taking too much time 
and there is an negative spiral created when unduly long delays in responding to 
proposals mean that MI has to be more careful and detailed in the technical review and its 
response to the proposer. 
A clear set of criteria for what proposals will be funded can be set out in Calls for 
Proposals and made available on the MI Website. This will reduce the number of 
proposals received that fall outside the program priorities. For proposals that are 
received, the indicators forming the core of the MI-PBMS can allow MI staff to make 
rapid assessments of proposals and early responses to prospective partners and grantees. 
Those proposals that get through the initial tests based on the decision criteria in the 
PBMS can then undergo internal and external technical reviews as appropriate to reach a 
final decision. Some MI Directors have drafted Calls for Proposals. We would e recommend that these be finalized once the Program Based Management System is in 
place. This will avoid MI receiving more new proposals before they have a clear 
decision-framework in place. 
4.4 Management of partnerships 
Almost all MI activities are carried out with partners, including international 
organizations, national governments, and NGOs. Half of the activities in 1999-2000 
were undertaken in collaboration with just seven international agencies; and three 
agencies - UNICEF, WHO and PAHO - are the partners on 44% of all MI current 
activities. The good management of its partnerships is thus MI'S key to program success. 
The evaluators heard a rather mixed story from MI'S key partners. On the positive side, 
the partners want to continue to work with MI and find that the more personal contact 
they have with MI, the better the relationship works. They appreciate very much the work 
of individual staff with which they have contact. They find MI staff responsive on an 
individual basis, and see the participation of MI staff in meetings as excellent. But there 
also are some issues that need resolution. These difficulties are not uncommon in 
relationships between organizations working in international development, each busy 
fulfilling their own mandate and needing some share of the limelight. But MI was set up 
to be different - to be responsive, flexible and assisting others to do what they do, better. 
The criticisms we heard of MI's role as a partner are: 
P Lack of clarity about how decisions are made, policies are applied and what input 
a partner might make to any particular decision or negotiation. As one person put 
it "There is confusion about who does what and why"; 
P Lack of generosity in giving due credit to partners (this, we may note, goes both 
ways); 
Lack of sensitivity to partners in terms of their own priorities, time pressures, 
constraints and need for fair warning of actions that affect their workplans; 
P A need to define an appropriate level of intervention for MI and to allow partners 
to have more influence in shaping the outcome; 
o Considerable difficulty in reaching people within the Secretariat, compounded by 
long delays ingetting responses from them. 
These problems appear to us to be related to two underlying general causes: 
A difference in perceptions between MI and some of its partners about MI's role 
within the partnership and more generally, MI's "position" within the 
international mosaic of organizations fighting micronutrient deficiencies; 
P A need for MI to improve its operational efficiency and human resources 
management. 
4.4.1 What kind of partner does MI want to be? 
There appear to be fundamental differences between the way MI sees its role and what 
MI'S partners understand MI to be - or perhaps the way they would like MI to be. MI 
sees itself as a catalytic organization, flexible and responsive, an influential advocate for 
micronutrients sitting at the tables that matter, and backed by technical expertise and 
financial resources. It sees itself as a good partner. The view from the partners is 
generally supportive of this image, but with some important caveats. 
MI has both the burden and the advantage of being a new organization in the 
micronutrient field. In working with larger, more established organizations like WHO, 
UNICEF, the World Bank and PAHO, MI has successfully influenced them to pay more 
attention to the problem of micronutrient deficiencies. Although MI staff like to stress 
the value of the technical expertise MI brings to the partnership, many partners see MI 4 
L primarily as a funder, albeit with in-house expertise (what one partner called "an 
intelligent donor"). Some partners feel that MI oversteps its technical role and tries to 
"re-design everything" without allowing its partners to have enough input on the 
technical aspects. When this is combined with lengthy delays, the partners do not see the 
"value added" of MI's technical contributions. Furthermore, on occasions they have felt 
that their own expertise was not respected sufficiently by MI. 
Partners would like to see MI helping their organizations strengthen their own approaches 
to micronutrient malnutrition; for example, through MI undertaking the studies which can 
identify gaps and opportunities for future programming by the larger institutions. The 
partners believe that, by helping them to change, MI's contribution to the overall effort 
would be more sustainable in the long term, than by MI building up their own portfolio of 
programs. This is one reason why WHO, UNICEF and the World Bank are supportive of 
MI's strategy to place people on secondment in their organizations. They are also very 
appreciative of the individuals filling the positions. 
A related issue in managing partnerships is sharing credit between all parties. There is a 
feeling, expressed both inside and outside the Secretariat, that MI is seeking to make a 
name for itself. To do this, there is a perceived tendency for MI to want to "own" and 
gain credit for collaborative activities by putting its own stamp on them. A number of 
examples were given to the evaluators where partners felt that MI did not share credit 
L 
with them. Some of these can be attributed to administration and operational support. 
But beyond administration, we encountered a feeling among several key partners that MI 
is sometimes over-anxious to take credit. 
The issue of clarity and organizational transparency has already been discussed with 
respect to MI's niche and the need for clearer definition of its strategy and decision- 
making processes. The concern here is that the present confusion expressed by some 
partners about what "business MI is in" and how MI decides what to do, is affecting the 
relationship with MI'S partners. The good news is that steps taken to have some MI 
system in place for Performance Based Management should also help MI to better 
manage its relationships with its partners. 
4.4.2 Bridging the public-private gau 
MI has a strong comparative advantage and track record in bringing the private sector 
into the global fight against micronutrient deficiencies. Almost all its partners, in both 
the public and private sectors attest to MI's credibility and initiative in bringing private 
sector leaders around the table to meet with government representatives and 
intergovernmental agencies. It is indeed hard to see which other organization in the 
micronutrient field would be so able to bridge the public-private gap. 
Much of the credit for MI so successfully exploiting this niche must go to the'Executive 
Director who has personal credibility and therefore access to key people in the food 
industries, especially the salt producers. His particular understanding of the perspective 
of the private sector and the ways in which national legislation and regulations can be 
either an enabling environment or a disincentive to private sector commitment to food 
fortification, has been critical to MI'S success so far. 
Several private sector representatives have told us that it when they attended their first MI 
meeting on food fortification, it was like "a revelation" to them to realize that they could 
play a key role in bringing significant health benefits to children. MI'S work with the 
flour millers and sugar producers in different parts of the world are real success stories 
for MI. One particularly important meeting, convened by MI, PAMM and the Keystone 
Center was held in Ottawa, December 6-8 1995. This meeting brought together 120 
participants from the private sector, governments and international agencies to discuss a 
strategy for food fortification on the basis that 
"Micronutrient malnutrition is a global problem. But it will be tackled one country at 
9 ,  20 a time . 
However, there are some potential shoals ahead for MI in managing its relationships with 
private sector partners. One is that the private sector representatives that we spoke to did 
not understand MI'S mission and role as well as did other groups. Their contact with MI 
was more limited to particular transactions and appeared to be a less broad "partnership" 
than with other organizations. It is important for these private sector partners to 
understand the broader context in which MI operates for at least two reasons: 
o Their commitment to food fortification is strengthened when they see both a 
commercial and corporate public good advantage in their participation; 
o They are the experts in food production and processing and can play a more 
creative role in defining strategy and solutions if they also share in the bigger 
picture. 
Another issue that was raised with us was that of the danger of MI being perceived as 
promoting private sector for-profit interests. MI'S role in the procurement of vitamin A 
capsules from Canadian companies has contributed to this perception, particularly in 
India, which has a national capacity to produce vitamin A. This aspect of their work with 
the private sector requires special attention to how, and with whom, MI works. 
We have four suggestions for MI'S future work with the private sector: 
o For those companies which derive commercial benefit (including commercially 
useful information) from working with MI, there should be a policy in place that 
seeks to have the companies contribute to the public good - and specifically to 
further the goals of food fortification for poor and vulnerable populations. One 
in-kind, contribution that international firms could make is to provide training 
Forum on Food Fortification, 1996, Sharing Risk and Reward: Public-Private Collaboration to eliminate 
micronutrient Malnutrition; Ottawa December 6-8 1995. 
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opportunities for companies in developing countries or even for public sector 
employees who work in relevant government departments. 
a MI should have a strategy and program of work within its advocacy program to 
promote the involvement of the private sector in fighting micronutrient 
deficiencies. This could build on the plan of action outlined at the Ottawa Forum 
in 1995, which included involving the Codex Alimentarius Commission and its 
regional organizations in developing guidelines and standards for food 
fortification that would help the private sector and governments to take action. 
a MI could seek corporate funds for some of its work in food fortification, 
particularly from the charitable arms of major companies in the food production, 
food processing and pharmaceutical fields. Some of the proposals made at the 
Ottawa Forum would lend themselves to private sector funding. 
a Before seeking corporate support for its work, MI should have in place a Policy 
for Accepting Private Sector Donations approved by the Steering Committee and 
by IDRC. This would set out the conditions under which MI would accept 
corporate donations, including pro-bono and in-kind contributions; would 
prescribe the ways in which corporations can use the donation in their own 
communications; and would proscribe any imputed endorsement of a company's 
product or services, or medical qualifications. 
4.5 Sustainability and capacity building 
One of the questions asked in the interviews was about the sustainability of MI'S program 
a~tivities.~'  It elicited some interesting responses. One was that the notion of 
sustainability is not really applicable to problems like micronutrient malnutrition because 
sustainable solutions were decades away for many parts of the world; they are often 
related to poverty and having good governmental systems in place. 
I think that sustainability is a straw man. Most of the countries are going to need support for years 
to come 
More people need micronutrients every day. More people are born everyday. The problem will 
not disappear. 
When the US Food Aid Program began in 1962 questionswere asked about its sustainability. 
Food Aid is still flowing nearly forty years later. 
2 '  The question was: "Do you think that MI'S program activities are sustainable? What happens when MI 
hnding ends? How has, or should, MI plan for the hture sustainability of its activities?" The quotations 
given are from interviews with MI partners. 
The sustainable elimination o f  global micronutrient malnutrition is very long term. It won't be 
wiped out like smallpox. If ever systems collapse, the problem returns. Look at the countries of 
the former USSR. Iodine deficiencies came back within months. 
The keys to achieving sustainable projects are seen as 
o Working through existing structures and avoiding creating new or duplicative 
ones; 
Working with others, working within their goals and procedures; 
o Identifying good partners and good projects and work only with those; 
o Convincing those with the resources (especially major donors) and the long term 
responsibilities (governments) to take over; 
0 Transferring projects as soon as possible to the private sector 
o Build the capacity of governments and institutions that will take over the projects. 
Supplementation projects are seen as less sustainable than fortification initiatives because 
the chances are poor that governments (or the people themselves) will be able to pay for 
the supplements in most of the countries where donors like CIDA and USAID are 
currently active. Fortification projects involving the private sector are more promising 
when it comes to long-term sustainability because the cost structures are usually built into 
the price of the micronutrients added to the food. However, such projects can require 
leverage, such as initially providing free premixes and machines, to encourage the private 
sector to take over the initiative. Thus, sustainability does not usually come without 
some up-front costs and risks to organizations like MI. 
Sustainability of projects is closely related to working with local partners and building 
their capacities to maintain the program in the long term. Capacity building is the other 
face of sustainability. It seems to get less attention from MI than we would have 
expected. In the Workplan 1997-2000 a number of capacity building activities are listed 
although it is unclear from the reports to the Steering Committee whether they were all 
completed. These include organizing technical courses on flour fortification; developing 
training materials for undergraduate health professionals, establishing Iodine Testing 
laboratories in Africa and developing primary school education materials. 
One type of capacity building initiative which MI has used to great success is the "study 
tour" to build awareness and transfer ideas to key players. One example is the visit of 
Indian government oficials and private sector representatives to INCAP in Guatemala to 
observe the fortification of sugar with vitamin A. 
The Strategic Plan 2000-2005 also does not give much emphasis to capacity building, 
although the draft workplan for the South Asia Region highlights capacity building as 
one of the areas that should receive more attention in the future. In Nepal, it is planned to 4 
L revise the curriculum of paramedics as well as village health workers to include micronutrient malnutrition. We agree that MI should work more in capacity building. MI 
cannot assume that it will be around forever in any particular countrv. It should "build in 
its de~arture from day one". 
We recommend that MI place greater emphasis on capacity building as a means to 
building sustainable projects. Where possible, capacity building should be integrated into 
MI'S other program activities. MI should develop a more coherent stratem for capacity 
building, in consultation with its main partners, targeted mainly at government and the 
private sector, with sustainability of its programs as one of the measures of success. 
4.6 Monitoring, evaluation and learning 
Monitoring and evaluation are often the neglected components of projects and programs, 
because, although they tend to come later during the lifecycle of the activity, they should 
be built into the initial inception or design. All too often, monitoring is done hastily and 
evaluation not at all. Thus corporate learning is severely compromised. . 
L Most organizations were somewhat shame-faced about their own performance in 
monitoring and evaluating their activities or t h e m ~ e l v e s ~ ~ .  From WHO, to HKI, the 
World Bank, ILSI and ISO, we heard that monitoring and evaluation was something they 
were grappling with and felt that they needed to do more than they do. So MI is certainly 
not alone. 
The twin dilemmas faced by all organizations we spoke to, including MI, were 
o How do you identify and measure your own performance and results when the 
activities are undertaken with partners? 
o How do you ensure that you have the information you need to monitor and 
evaluate the activities when you have to rely on partners for information? 
In response to the first question, most organizations would like to look at the big picture - 
which is the collaborative endeavour - and look at longer-term outcomes and impacts. 
The difficulty they face is that their donors -or  themselves- earmark funds within a larger 
project and sometimes want to measure the impact of their individual contributions. As 
one respondent said 
How do you evaluate the impact of your part of a vitamin A program costing $2 million a year 
when your own contribution is only $200,000? 
" The interviews included the question: "How should MI monitor and evaluate its own performance? How 
is program performance with respect to nutritionlmicronutrients evaluated in your own organization?" 
Another difficulty is that they have better information about the inputs and outputs of 
their own part of the program than they do on the results and impacts of the overall effort. 
Thus they tend to report on their own inputs (dollars, capsules shipped from Canada) and 
outputs (meetings organized, documents produced, capsules distributed in Nepal). Some 
organizations that have conducted monitoring and evaluation missions collaboratively 
with other donors, governments and organizations like NGOs, strongly recommend a 
participatory approach for improving the quality of the evaluation and for mutual 
learning. It also can make reporting easier for people in the field, if donors agree 
beforehand on the reporting format and even the indicators to be used. MI has reportedly 
had difficulty in obtaining reports on coverage and results from UNICEF on projects 
funded by CIDA through MI. One of MI's roles could be to strengthen the monitoring 
that some of its partners do on collaborative projects. 
A particular challenge for MI is measuring the performance of its work in advocacy. The 
measures are usually highly selective and qualitative. 
66 How do you measure your impact on someone else's enthusiasm?" 
66 Customer satisfaction is the key to measuring success for MI". 
For example, how do you measure MI's success at Salt 2000? One approach is to think 
in terms of "imputed impactv- some things wouldn't have happened if MI had not done 
them. Other measures proposed to us were to claim success if a project "goes to scale" or 
is still operating well five years after MI has stopped supporting it, or if the people 
involved attribute the success to MI. In the end, one of the important contributions of 
sound evaluation is that it can provide the "objective" evidence needed to effectively 
deliver advocacy messages to governments and the private sector. 
We did not have time to systematically examine the track-record of MI in monitoring and 
evaluating its projects, so our comments are based on some impressions from the files 
and documents available.to us. We did not see much evidence of systematic evaluation or 
corporate learning by MI from the files we examined. The files we saw did not contain 
"internal staff debriefings" after MI sponsored meetings, or assessments of consultant 
performance, or "lessons learned" on closing files. The project database for 1999-2000 
does include a field for "lessons" and, although the comments in the field are not always 
lessons learned, this is an important improvement to MI'S systematic capture of feedback 
on activities. 
Some MI projects, such as the Bangladesh Vitamin A projectz3 have been well designed 
with respect to baseline studies, project targets, indicators and evaluation measures. 
They enable MI and its NGO partners in Bangladesh and Canada to assess the progress 
and impact of the distribution of vitamin A capsules in the country. We also heard 
23 Sian Fitzgerald, 1998, Bangladesh Debidwar Vitamin A Project; Report of the GVAI Review; PATH 
Canada report to MI. 
L positive comments from the NGOs about PATH Canada's role in monitoring the projects 
and in providing technical support and helpful feedback to them in the field. 
Clearly MI wants to have information on the performance of the activities it funds and to 
improve its corporate learning. We would suggest that in the future it ensures that each 
activity has a component for monitoring andlevaluation designed as part of the project 
development and approval process. These will include assessment of each meeting 
organized or sponsored by MI; readership surveys of publications and MI's website; 
written assessment of consultants' work in the field and their reports; reports on lessons 
learned when files are closed; and project monitoring and evaluation studies. 
As part of its new Strategic Plan, we recommend that MI establish an evaluation 
framework. It should be integrated with the proposed Performance Based Management 
System so that evaluation of the past becomes an input into future decisions (4.3.1). 
Finally, this is the first evaluation of MI as a whole, although it is not the first evaluation 
that the Steering Committee has asked for. We have not been able to evaluate all parts of 
MI's activities in sufficient depth. 
We therefore recommend that in the future MI and the Steering Committee should: 
a Ask for in depth reviews, including "scientific audits" of important projects or 
aspects of MI's programs and establish a cycle for reviewing the work of the 
different program units of MI; 
a Establish a framework for regular external evaluations of MI as part of the 
Strategic Plan 2000-2005. 
STRATEGIC PLAN 
The Steering Committee, at its meeting in January 2000, requested that the evaluation 
team comment on the new Strategic Plan. In our interviews, we asked those involved in 
the strategic planning process for their evaluation of the process and we have had an 
opportunity to review the Strategic Plan itself.24 
5.1 Strategic planning process 
The current Strategic Plan is the result of a process that began with a Steering Committee 
Retreat in March 1999 attended by some MI senior staff and the IDRC Regional Director 
for South Asia, who was the Acting MI-SARO Director. This meeting established some 
performance expectations for the next five-year period: 
o Gap analysis: develop a process and check list for gap analysis; redesign MI's 
workplan to reflect a gap analysis paradigm and undertake three country gap 
analyses within the next year. Within two years MI will provide leading edge 
gap analysis; 
o Performance indicators: establish and implement improved performance 
indicators for MI's program; 
o Information sharing: design strategies and vehicles for regular information 
sharing with partners; 
o Donor diversification: secure three new partners within next two years; 
o External evaluation: to be undertaken by June 2000. 
These performance expectations provided some clear directions for MI and a few specific 
targets, but they did not give MI a set of overall objectives for the next five years. Thus, 
when the task was given to MI staff to develop the strategic plan, they apparently did not 
have a clear enough framework to be able to grapple with the difficulty of establishing 
priorities between competing program interests. The internal process was highly 
participatory with two separate "all staff' facilitated meetings in September and October 
1999. The draft document was presented in individual sessions for members of the 
Steering Committee in New York, Washington and Ottawa in late October 1999. In the 
'' Strategic Plan for the Micronutrient Initiative 2000-2005; version dated May 2 2000 
L light of the feedback MI received, the strategic plan was then rewritten with the help of a 
consultant. 
When it discussed the new version of the plan in January 2000, the Steering Committee's 
comments were almost back to the drawing board in terms of the range of different 
individual views about priorities and approaches that MI should focus on. Most members 
were not happy with the document as it stood and asked that MI prepare something 
shorter and more focused with priorities based on cost-effective results, MI'S comparative 
advantage, MI'S resources. and the most effective ways of working with MI'S partners 
(especially the major international agencies and donors). It was expected that the shorter 
strategic plan would be examined again in April 2000, together with a more detailed one 
year PWB showing resource allocation to each priority and focus area. The plan that was 
presented to them in April 2000 was rewritten by MI management in the light of 
comments from about 15 outside people on the January 2000 version. It was finalized in 
May 2000. 
The strategic planning process was therefore long (over a year) and involved two main 
processes: a participatory process involving MI staff and an iterative exchange of views 
between the Steering Committee and MI management. We have been told that no one is 
particularly happy with the outcome but can live with it, and everyone was exhausted by 
the process. One concern expressed is the real possibility of a "discomect between the 
strategic plan and what MI will actually do". With hindsight, a more strategic process 
L might have been something like: 
The Executive Director prepares a "stratepic obiectives" paper through internal 
and external consultation; 
o Using the paper as a springboard, the Steering Committee decides on strategic 
obiectives and the main priorities for the next five years; 
o With this as a framework, MI staff prepare a 5-year workplan or imvlementation 
plan; 
o Once the implementation plan is approved by the Steering Committee, staff 
prepares the annual program of work and budget. 
5.2 Strategic Plan 
The Plan reflects the process and the underlying fact that everyone thinks that MI should 
focus but do not agree on what the focus should be. The Strategic Plan therefore talks 
about focus but does not exactly exclude much of what MI presently does - which 
everyone agrees is too much. It is not clear to us how this Plan will help MI to make the 
tough decisions - to say "no" more often; to choose between competing priorities; to 
make the inevitable tradeoffs. 
In the current short document, there are few specific objectives, or means of determining 
down the road how well MI will have performed. There is mention of a new 
Performance Based Management System (which we agree is needed) but no discussion of 
how it might influence the strategy to be followed. It would seem that between the 
strategic plan and the annual Program of Work is needed a linking document - a five year 
implementation plan to "ground" the strategy before annual actions are defined. 
The focus areas and the major initiatives proposed are generally consistent with what MI 
partners feel are needed. In particular, the section on food fortification and the proposed 
50% level of effort reflects MI'S strengths. No one would argue that anything in the Plan 
is not a priority for someone to do - the issue is more, should MI be doing all of what it 
proposes for itself? The major initiative on iron and the continued commitment to 
vitamin A and iodine, together with some work on other micronutrients and developing 
more integrated approaches were all stressed in the interviews as what the world needs. 
We also heard the need for capacity building which is scarcely mentioned in the MI plan. 
A few of the specific proposals are more questionable in the light of this evaluation. One 
is the "plan for progressive transfer of production capabilities and cost burden to recipient 
countries [of supplementation]". We are unsure about MI'S comparative advantage in 
doing this and also its practicality within a five-year time frame. Many of the countries 
where the micronutrient deficiencies are most severe do not have the budgetary or human 
resources (or industrial infrastructure) to take on these responsibilities in the short term. 
Production of the major micronutrient supplements is done mainly by the private sector 
and as some of the necessary technology and processes are protected by proprietary 
rights, it is not clear how this transfer of production facilities will take place or how MI 
will facilitate it. 
Another concern related to the findings of the evaluation is the proposed work in national . 
d 
programming: 
66 In a limited number o f  countries to (a) demonstrate the impact of well designed and 
executed projects as models for replication and expansion ..... and (b) provide advocacy 
and technical support to plan and implement large scale programs for potential finding by 
development Banks". 
Again, the issue here is that MI does not seem to have a comparative advantage; it 
requires considerable human resources to undertake pilot projects or provide technical 
assistance to implement large-scale programs; and many of MI'S partners do not think. 
that MI should be doing national plans or programs. 
A good feature of the Strategic Plan is the chart showing expected level of effort to be 
devoted to each of the focus areas. This eventually needs to be tied also to budget 
allocations. One continuing difficulty in defining the focus areas is that advocacy (now 
renamed Building commitment and sustainability) is both a focus area and a modality for 
implementation in the other focus areas. Thus, when you add up all the effort on 
advocacy in all the focus areas, there is some undetermined amount greater than 25%. 
The Strategic Plan anticipates some of the internal changes to operations within MI that 
will be needed to support the strategy. The findings of this evaluation support the notion 
that changes are needed in the way MI works internally as a Secretariat. Finally, it is not 
4 4 ~ ~  clear how the new strategy will be related to the existing organizational structure, or if 
any adjustments are needed to the scope of work of the four Units in the light of the new 
program. 
In its present form, the Strategic Plan does not include the objectives needed to provide a 
basis for evaluating MI'S performance over the next five years. It does foresee internal 
and external reviews of MI two years after the beginning of the Strategic Plan, and that a 
Performance Based Management System will be in place to help the evaluation process. 
This is to be commended. 
Regarding the Strategic Plan, we would recommend: 
o A set of 3-4 clear, measurable objectives are set for each program area; 
o MI should consider recasting "advocacy" as a major modality through which MI 
reaches its objectives in each program area, rather than as a separate focus area; 
o The objectives are linked to targets, indicators, outcomes and expected results in 
an implementation plan for the five year program; 
o The PWB could then be adjusted to reflect the framework provided by the 
strategic plan and the implementation plan. 
6 KEY OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
6.1 Information management 
Throughout this report, we have referred to the lack of information systems and the 
difficulty of obtaining information on MI programs. Indeed, we wonder how MI could 
have performed as well as it has, given what we see as the primitive state of its current 
financial and program databases. In 1992, when it was launched, MI was entered into 
IDRCYs financial system as one project. Within two years, the amount involved had risen 
to nearly CAD $20 million, but IDRC's financial accounting structure for MI remained 
the same. During the following eight years, as the IDRC systems were transformed from 
RADIUS to EPIK, the various grants that MI received - bringing its budget up to CAD 
$30 million a year, for a total of over CAD$140 million - were still treated as part of that 
initial proiect. 
This means that all grants which MI issues are not separately identified in the IDRC 
financial system but have to be entered separately by an IDRC person into a Quattro Pro 
spreadsheet which is then provided to MI to enable it to produce financial reports, which 
is both limiting and time-consuming. The problems MI faced in information systems for 
its financial and project management were clearly identified in 1997 25.  Despite its 
eight-year history and significant budget, MI does not today have the systems in place to 
provide the information it needs for strategic planning, nor for monitoring and reporting 
on its grants and activities to its donors. 
The financial information provided to the MI Steering Committee (and therefore to the 
IDRC Board) is inevitably limited. It follows more or less the same format since MI 
began, and does not, in our view, meet the needs of the Steering Committee for their 
oversight of the program and assessment of program performance. Expenditures are 
presented under three categories: Programs, Special Projects and Management and 
Technical Assistance. In terms of the Five Focus Areas in which MI works, and for 
which it has specific objectives, the expenditures under Programs and Special Projects 
overlap so there is no way to determine how the resources are allocated according to the 
structure of MI'S programs. 
In order to respond to CIDA's requirement for a detailed report on the use of its 
contributions, MI developed internally a simple project database for its 1999-2000 
projects using Microsoft Access. This database is limited to a few project descriptors 
(such as country of operations, external partners, project results, project theme) and lacks 
'' Don Sharp, 1997, MI-MIS: Phase I :  Needs Assessment; consultant report for MI, July 1997. 
accompanying financial data on each project (which are still not available) but it is a 
quantum leap from what MI had before. It has already proved useful within MI and by 
the evaluation team, as for the first time, one could gain an overall picture of MI's 
projects and the results being obtained. 
Our strong recommendation is that, as a matter of priority, MI establishes a Task Force 
and a process over the next few months for identifying its needs for a program 
management information system. The Task Force should include both financial and 
program specialists from MI and ideally would have access to expertise in program 
management systems, including within IDRC and CIDA (Food Aid Centre), as well as 
the support of a database designer. IDRC has recently introduced a new system - Grants 
and Proiect Management Svstem (GPMI which integrates project and financial 
management into an advanced relational database. MI would be able to use the GPM 
system in about six months time. 
The question that now faces MI is: will the IDRC GPM system meet its needs? 
Compared to its present state of information poverty, the GPM promises the ability to 
track projects through their lifecycles, to track the status of donor agreements, to generate 
electronic documents, to provide reports on projects and to allow some analysis by 
project type. The current descriptors in the GPM for project type and sub-type are more 
useful at the level of IDRC than of MI. For example, under project wpe, projects are 
L classified as research project, research support project, secretariat, award and within- Centre project. Would all MI projects be classified as "secretariat" without any useful 
differentiation for MI? The project-subtvpe classification includes values such as 
seminar, training, dissemination, evaluation, project development. MI would almost 
certainly need different (additional) project descriptors. 
But the main concern we have is that the GPM at present does not allow projects to be 
tracked and managed by results or by performance. The GPM would have to be modified 
to include new fields for the reporting required by CIDA (and possibly also its other 
donors in the future). The human impact indicators being used by CIDA in its reporting 
include morbidity and mortality measures, as well as specific indicators on micronutrient 
programs such as Additional Person-years of Coverage (APC). MI will want to consider 
how such results-based reporting can be integrated into its overall program and 
performance management system. 
In the light of our review of MI'S projects and our discussions with its donors, especially 
CIDA, together with interviews of MI's partners and MI staff, we have a some 
suggestions for what we see as MI's information system needs for its performance based 
project management: 
o MI should be able to use the system to generate reports to donors on its progress 
and impacts so the system should be powerful enough to analyse inter- 
relationships across its fields to generate a wide variety of reports to meet 
different needs; 
o Indicators of progress towards objectives and the achievement of results should be 
part of the database and project activity data should refer back to strategic 
objectives; 
o Financial information should be structured so that reports can be generated on the 
costs of MI activities such as the funds invested in a given country or in a certain 
type of fortification intervention, so that MI and its donors can judge the cost- 
effectiveness of different programs and interventions. 
In addition, we have a wish list for the future, which also underscores the need to think 
through very carefully - and imaginatively - MI'S new Program Management 
Information System for the long term: 
o The database could help MI to scan the future, the operating environment and the 
unusual: some thought might be given to a "Foresight Module" which identifies 
and maintains a watching brief on upcoming important events, related activities of 
other organizations, new opportunities (e.g. the Rockefeller funded research at 
IRRI on rice genetically improved to contain more vitamin A); 
o The database could be a core resource for corporate learning with evaluation and 
monitoring information regularly entered and successes and failures tracked, 
together with lessons learned. It could eventually be linked to the MI Website 
and be accessible at least in part to partner organizations and to wider MI 
discussion groups. 
We would not wish to prejudge the outcome of the Task Force's work. It might 
recommend adoption of the IDRC GPM system as it is, or with modifications, as the 
simplest and fastest solution. It may recommend to MI and to IDRC that MI needs are 
besi met by another database system entirely, or by a supplementary Project Performance 
Management System that is linked to the GPM; or some other solution that we have not 
thought of. Clearly, the selection of the project management system will also be 
influenced by whether MI remains legally a secretariat within IDRC. Our main message 
is that MI needs an improved information manapement system tailored to its particulai 
requirements as a matter of high prioritv and urgency. 
6.2 Secretariat functions 
The evaluation reviewed four important functions of the MI as a Secretariat: project 
review and administration; processing of contracts and MGCs; commodity procurement; 
organization of meetings, and communications with external partners, consultants and 
grantees. The use of consultants by MI ,is considered separately under section 6.5 and 
evaluation and monitoring of projects has been discussed under section 4.6. 
6.2.1 Project review and administration 
The last year, 1999-2000 was used as a datum for evaluating how MI handles projects. 
This was chosen because it is the year when most of the present staff was already 
appointed and because it is the only year for which a project database exists. The 
evaluators reviewed the project database, the pipeline and a sample of project files. 
The findings show that by the end of the fiscal year, the total projects proposals that had 
passed through the 1999-2000 pipeline were 197. Not all of these proposals were 
received in 1999-2000 as some were delayed from previous years. This number 
represents a considerable workload for MI as each proposal needs to be reviewed 
internally, with a fair proportion also being sent outside for external review. Once a 
proposal is reviewed, a decision to fund or not may be arrived at within the appropriate 
Unit, or it may be referred to another Unit andlor the Executive Director, or even to 
another external reviewer. In many cases, MI staff would ask for more information from 
the proposers or for changes to the proposal design. 
Our review found that the technical review process for proposals was careful and of high 
qualitv. Some proposers told us that MI tries to redesign proposals and impose their own 
technical views too much, but we are unable to judge the fairness of these comments. For 
L some files, we felt that the MI staff had gone almost beyond the call of duty in their 
technical "due diligence". One result of this careful attention to technical detail is that it 
is time-consuming. 
This meant that the good quality of the proposal review work was marred by long delays 
in arriving at a decision for many proposals. Of the 197 proposals in the 1999-2000 
pipeline, by April 1 2000, a decision was reached on 109 or 55% of the total. This left 88 
proposals (45%) still awaiting a decision. Forty-seven percent of these proposals had 
been waiting for a decision from MI for over a year, with the longest delay being three 
years (table 6). 
Table 6. Time intervals that proposals in MI pipeline on 1 April 2000 
had been waiting for a decision 
Number of Percentage of 
Time period since proposal sent to proposals in proposals in pipeline 
MI pipeline on April 1 2000 
on April 1 2000 
2-6 months 22 25% 
7-1 2 months 2 5 29% 
13-1 8 months 24 27% 
19-24 months 10 11% 
> 24 months 7 8% 
88 100% 
Clearly, many of these problems have been inherited from the past when the staff was 
smaller, but the situation would seem serious enough to almost warrant a moratorium on 
new activities until this backlog is cleared up. We were told by many people about 
delays in processing proposals and that in some cases, there were requests to make 
changes from MI which did not result in sufficient "value added" in terms of improving 
the proposal. 
We are not able to adjudicate the merits of the decisions on particular proposals, but we 
saw no evidence in the files that MI was not doing good technical review. However, we 
do think that MI has to be more efficient in its processing of files, and to ensure that it 
maintains a reasonable flow of communications with the proposers as long as the file is 
active. The number of complaints that we heard from partner organizations should be of 
concern to MI. 
Given that MI receives more funds than it can expend in recent years, we were surprised 
to find several instances where MI reduced the proposed time period of projects, and 
where MI decided not to use an executing agency to manage a network or to provide 
technical support. In these cases, MI seems to be taking on more administrative work (for 
example, in having to process two contracts instead of one) and over-burdening itself in 
technical support and monitoring when it can't keep up with the workload it already has. 
Our recommendations therefore would be that MI deal with its proposal backlog as a 
matter of urgency, and identify opportunities to reduce the administrative burden on 
itself. Without second guessing the decisions of the Secretariat, we believe that there are 
opportunities for reducing administrative tasks by funding larger rojects with longer 
!6 timeframes (rather than cutting proposals into several shorter Phases) , and for entrusting 
some of the technical backup and monitoring required to competent executing agencies, 
and/or ensuring that an agency with in-house technical competence, has a clear 
framework for reporting on results. 
MI is rightly concerned to ensure good technical quality, fiscal probity and high ethical 
standards of the projects it funds, but it needs to find the right balance between being 
hands-on and laissez faire. MI has built up a solid experience with outside agencies and 
partners around the world, and should now develop partnership arrangements with them ' 
that ensure good project implementation, technical support and reporting to fulfill the 
requirements of MI and its donors. MI staff does not have the time to undertake these 
tasks themselves - they should be managing others to do them. This is linked both to the 
need for MI to allocate its hnds  more efficiently and effectively and their contribution to 
institutional capacity building in developing countries and among NGOs. 
26 In 1999-2000, MI was responsible for issuing 25 MGCs for a total value of CAD $7.2 2 million 
(excluding two large commodity grants to UNICEF). When the nvo large grants for the West Bengal and 
Gujarat projects totaling CAD $6.1 million are deducted, it means that MI appropriated CAD $ 1 . 1  million 
through 23 projects, averaging only CAD $48,000 million each. A lot of work for relatively small 
amounts! 
e As part of its implementation of the new Strategic Plan, MI should consider having 
service standards for itself as a Secretariat in the services it provides to its donors, its 
partners and its recipients. These are discussed further in section 6.2.2. 
6.2.2 Processing of contracts 
MI is legally part of IDRC, a Crown Corporation of the Government of Canada. It must 
enter into all its contractual relationships through IDRC. In essence, IDRC is entering 
those contractual relationships and is accountable for them. IDRC, as a part of the 
Government of Canada and using public funds, must follow a low-risk policy when it 
comes to entering into contracts and is bound by more rigorous contracting and 
employment procedures than an NGO or private sector organization might feel necessary 
to follow. For example, consultancy contracts for CAD$50,000 and above cannot be 
awarded without going through a tender process. While this reduces the risk for MI, 
IDRC and the donors to MI, it also reduces the flexibility and speed with which MI can 
act. Which side one stands on this issue, depends on how accountable you are - and in 
IDRC's case, it must act on the side of caution and due process. 
The legal relationship leads to some strains in the administrative relationship because the 
internal procedures established over the past three decades by IDRC are designed 
primarily to process research and training awards through Memoranda of Grant 
e Conditions (MGCs), whereas MI'S contracts are less likely to require MGCs and more likely to be consultancy contracts, commodity procurement contracts and grants with 
large in-kind contributions (for example, the purchase of vitamin A capsules and the 
provision of vitamin A capsules to UNICEF). 
Since MI works with both the private sector and with North American universities on 
technology development, as well as being involved in projects which administer 
micronutrients to human populations (especially pregnant mothers and young children) 
the MI contracts and grants are more likely to require ethical review and/or legal clauses 
relating to intellectual property rights. Thus the nature of the bulk of MI'S work is 
substantially different from that of IDRC. This was recognized at the establishment of 
MI, but still raises questions within parts of IDRC. 
The processing of contracts by MIIIDRC is one of the most criticized aspects of MI'S 
relationship with its partner organizations, recipients and consultants. Some even go as 
far as to say that "IDRC gives MI a bad name" or "MI gives IDRC a bad name". It is 
difficult to sort out where the delays arise on particular cases. Sometimes it is within MI; 
sometimes it appears to be within IDRC; sometimes it results from a combination of a 
complicated contract involving intellectual property rights or ethical clearance being 
processed without enough time allowed and without IDRC having the additional 
resources on hand to "fast track" it. 
This latter issue is particularly sensitive to IDRC service providers & MI support staff, 
because they feel that "everything in MI is trrgent; everything comes in at the twelfih 
hour; and everything gets changed right up to the last minute." There appear to be 
severe problems with present practice, even when fast-tracking is not an issue, which 
need first to be addressed within MI, and reviewed with IDRC to see where 
improvements can be made27. 
In addition to glitches in practice, there also seem to be problems with the administrative 
review process. The current arrangement is that MI approves a grant for a specific 
project after the usual discussions and negotiations with the proposer. The contract is 
drafted by a MI Grants Assistant. This is followed by reviews by MI program and 
administrative staff as well as by IDRC administrative and legal services. In all there are 
some ten vetting stages before the grant agreement is issued to a recipient. This appears 
to have some duplication and has led a recent Internal Audit Review to recommend 
reducing the review procedure for consultancy  contract^.^' 
The consultancy contracts of MI pose somewhat different problems for IDRC. MI was 
established at the outset with the idea that "MI will build a roster of suitable const~ltants 
and a capability to undertake the broad range of activities necessary in micronutrient 
programs"29. Thus MI'S method of working is to outsource its project development, 
project monitoring and technical assistance work to a group of some 20 consultants, with 
whom they work on a regular basis. These consultants are, in effect, extensions of the MI 
Secretariat human resources and bring it needed expertise and staffing flexibility. They 
also provide MI with an extended presence in the field. In 1999-2000 MI consultants 
undertook more travel missions than all the consultants combined for the Program Branch 
of IDRC. MI'S staffing pattern and modus operandi is thus somewhat different from that 
of IDRC, although it falls under IDRC human resource policies. 
The particular difficulty posed by MI'S use of the same consultants for extended periods 
of time is that Canadian tax authorities may consider that person has employee status 
with IDRC, irrespective of any terms stating the contrary that are included in the contract. 
IDRC has to be very cautious in this respect and is reluctant to assume the risk (which 
may be small but is there) on behalf of MI. We understand that MI and IDRC are now 
discussing a possible new arrangement, similar to CIDA's "Standing Offer 
Arrangement" that might help to solve the problem for both parties. This might also deal 
with a concern expressed by consultants who are hired for several successive jobs, that ' 
their original contracts are frequently extended or amended to respond to the new tasks 
they are given - again causing delays for the consultants and more administrative work 
for MI and for IDRC. 
27 One anecdote illustrates the prevailing experience among consultants that we interviewed. The 
consultant did not use all his accountable advance for expenses, so sent a cheque made out to IDRC for the 
unused balance o f  his advance at the same time as his invoice for his fees. He reported that the cheque was 
cashed by IDRC within three days. His cheque from IDRC for his services took four months to be 
processed! 
IDRC Internal Audit Report on MI, June 7 2000 
?9 Proposal for a Micronutrients Initiative presented to IDRC Board January 1992. 
In conclusion: 
Client Services Group (CSG) in IDRC has noted a definite improvement in MI'S 
processing of contracts with the appointment of the Grant Assistants. 
MI'S Grant Assistants, IDRC's CSG and legal services adhere to performance 
standards, especially with respect to turn-around times. 
We recommend that MI Program staff also be made aware of these performance 
standards and be required to make every effort to comply with them as far as they 
intervene in the process. 
6.2.3 Commoditv orocurement 
Since 1997, CIDA has been providing MI with substantial "commodity grants" of about 
CAD$10 million a year for the procurement of vitamin A (and some iron) supplements to 
UNICEF or to NGOs for distribution in 70 national micronutrient supplementation 
programs. The activity is itself an unusual role for IDRC, and initially MI staff had no 
4ilw particular expertise to take on this responsibility. At the beginning, much of the 
procurement was confided to an external consultant before MI took on the role in-house. 
Now, that some early glitches have been smoothed out, the activity occupies the time of 
the Director, Finance and Administration and that of a Program Support Officer for about 
3-4 weeks a year each, and the cycle of procurement and distribution with CIDA and 
UNICEF operates well. 
MI'S role is essentially a "middleman" between CIDA, the procurement agency (CCC) 
and UNICEF. Once CIDA makes the grant to IDRC/MI, MI enters into two sets of 
discussions: one with UNICEF to determine the quantity and dosages that are needed and 
another with the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC), which is an agency of the 
Canadian government. 
The CCC handles all aspects of the procurement starting with the tendering process.30 
The CCC evaluates the bids, contracts the suppliers, administers the contract and ensures 
that the correct goods are supplied and delivered. MI is required by CIDA to ensure that 
the CCC arranges for regular quality control of the capsules and their packaging, and 
supervises the shipments. 
On the basis of UNICEF's estimates of the vitamin A that is required, MI proceeds to 
make a grant to UNICEF of vitamin A capsules in-kind, together with a cash grant to 
cover freight from UNICEF's central warehouse in Copenhagen for distribution to each 
30 In practice, only two Canadian companies can produce capsules to the required specifications, in the 
quantities needed and with the quality control necessary. 
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country receiving them, and support to the agencies (government or local NGOs) which 
will be distributing the capsules in the countries and monitoring and reporting on the 
coverage achieved. 
A typical grant, made on July 18 1997, provided UNICEF with up to 150 million vitamin 
A capsules of various dosages and packing units, with a total value not exceeding CAD$4 
million and a grant in cash of up to CAD$l million for distribution costs. The cash grant 
is transferred to UNICEF in New York and the capsules to UNICEF warehouses in 
Copenhagen. 
The evaluation team was able to observe the distribution of CIDA-MI-UNICEF vitamin 
A capsules to children under five years in the mountain villages of Nepal. For Nepal, the 
end points of this long, inter-agency chain that starts in Canada are 35,000 female 
volunteer health workers who distribute the capsules for 2 days twice a year to 2.7 
million Nepalese children at village corners, outside shops, and in front of administrative 
ward offices. The children are protected from vitamin A deficiency for another six 
months, the women (most of whom are illiterate) gain dignity and respect from the 
community. They hold their scissors (used to cut off the neck of the capsule) as a badge 
of pride and a symbol of their health care role - not unlike the doctor's stethoscope. It is 
one example of the empowerment of women to which MI activities contribute. 
As has been pointed out elsewhere, while the commodity procurement role is somewhat 
separate from the other activities of MI and is a far cry from the norm for IDRC, it does 
give MI visibility in the 70 countries in which the capsules are distributed in containers 
bearing the MI logo and unfortunately (for health safety reasons) with labels in English 
and French rather than in the local languages. More importantly, it is probably the 
activity that directly saves more children's lives than anything else in which MI - or for 
that matter - IDRC is involved. 
6.2.4 Organization of meetinps 
MI'S track-record in organizing successful technical and advocacy meetings in different 
parts of the world with key groups, including governments, the private sector, NGOs and' 
international agencies is really impressive. We are in awe of their stamina. 
However, the number of these meetings does bring an administrative burden to the MI 
staff - not only in preparation for them, travel and participation in the sessions, but in the 
follow-up actions required. We believe that MI is probably taking on more meetings than 
the staff can handle. There are last minute rushes to get background papers together, 
heavy demands on travel schedules of staff, and considerable stress generated for MI 
support staff and service providers in IDRC with last minute changes to participant lists 
and travel arrangements. 
Even more of concern for the effectiveness of the meetings to achieve MI'S goals, is that 
MI is not always able to do the follow-up necessary from the meetings. We have heard 
that meeting reports can be long delayed and not distributed to participants, and planned 
follow-up actions may not take place. This means that the return on MI'S investment in 
meetings is not as much as it could be, and more importantly, some key partners could be 
"turned off' MI and left to cool the enthusiasm generated by the meeting without any 
communication from MI. 
The remedies to this situation are fairly obvious to articulate, but harder to implement, 
since they rely on a change of culture within MI - a change in the way that MI operates 
as a Secretariat. The first recommendation is that MI plan its meetings strategically, and 
not get involved in meetings that do not contribute significantly to its objectives. The 
second is to allocate a task manager to each meeting (see section 5.3.3) to coordinate all 
activities and inputs relating to the meeting, and to avoid the last minute changes that 
seem to occur when too many people get involved in decisions. The third 
recommendation is to outsource the organization of more of the meetings. As we 
concluded for MI'S management of projects, our view is that MI staff should be more 
strategic in selecting which meetings it will organize and which it will either delegate or 
leave to others. 
6.3 Staff management 
MI has developed its organizational structure and considerably enlarged its staff 
complement since the beginning of 1998. It remained at a complement of four staff from 
1992-1996. By the end of 1997-98 it had increased to 11 positions. The next year it 
more than doubled - from 11 to 24 positions. In 1999-2000 the staff was 34, and this 
fiscal year it is 39. This means that of the present staff positions, more than two-thirds 
have been filled within the last two years. This dramatically rapid growth inevitably 
brings "growing pains" and the need for adjustments and team building, which we 
recognize take time. 
In order to successfully implement the new Strategic Plan, MI needs to move quickly 
now to reorganize work more efficiently within the Secretariat. The signs are there that 
new management systems to improve the situation are to be in place in this fiscal year. 
Our evaluation therefore refers to the recent past and to the present. It highlights two 
general areas where we think the improvements are needed most urgently: the 
organization of work and the differentiation of roles. Changes in these two areas will, we 
believe, help MI to better set its priorities and ensure that they are met. 
6.3.1 Organization of work 
Our review of the files and our interviews with MI staff point identified a number of 
problems in the services MI provides as a Secretariat which fall generally under the 
rubric of "organization of work". These problems relate to underlying issues of time 
management, teamwork, differentiation of roles and responsibilities and individual levels 
of responsibility and accountability. 
The problems cited to us include situations where "there are too many MI cooks" and 
different MI staff members have contacted outside people asking them for the same 
information, or gave them different information, with no apparent communication 
between program staff in MI. Other examples given in the interviews described 
situations where there was no response from MI to a query, other than that the person 
who could answer the question was away from the office. Many people dealt with this 
situation by contacting the Executive Director directly, thus involving him in day-to-day 
administration. 
An analysis of the travel patterns for MI staff for 1999-2000 shows that the travel budget 
for MI is generous and staff do indeed travel extensively. The average number of days a 
staff member was on travel status was 62 days. MI management traveled an average of 
65 days and staff an average of 56 days. Some of the trips were long: seven trips ranged 
from 19 to 46 days out of Ottawa. With this much travel, there are going to be times 
when operations will be affected in a small organization. To minimize disruption, travel 
needs to be planned and managed, and staff should be accessible electronically when on 
travel status except in exceptional circumstances. 
We would recommend that running three-month travel plans be submitted by all staff and 
managers for regular review by MI management at their Executive Committee meetings 
to anticipate potential conflicts well ahead and to better organize the work of the 
Secretariat. In our experience, the plans have to be reviewed sufficiently in advance that 
the management's hands are not tied because of external commitments already made by 
staff members, which are difficult to break. Travel unforeseen in the quarterly travel 
plans can be dealt with as appropriate by MI management. 
It is equally, if not more important to have systems in place that will allow MI to function' 
as an integrated Secretariat. These include a common information system so that any 
staff member can access updated information on the status of a file, proposal, action or 
decision, and can enter into the file any action they have taken, or request received. At 
present, individual staff members are not sufficiently sharing information so that they can 
back one another up. Internal information sharing is reportedly even less effective 
between MI Units. Any information system developed for MI is ultimately dependent 
for its effectiveness on MI staff working more as a team and less as individuals. Given 
that MI is operating in a fast-moving arena, and aims to be flexible and responsive, the 
current organization of work has remained the status quo for too long. 
We would propose that, in addition to maintaining whatever new program information 
system MI adopts, staff members are organized as "Task Managers" so that one person, 
plus a second person as a back-up, is designated as the focal point for each major activity 
or file. Everyone receiving incoming requests in relation to the activity, including the 
Executive Director, should refer it to the Task Manager, or to the designated alternate, 
who can then consult as appropriate to reach any decision. The Task Manager should 
ensure that all relevant information is entered into the file and would be accountable for 
the performance of those activities for which s h e  is responsible. 
Other initiatives which will help to organize the flow of work include structuring the 
proposal review process by issuing a Call for Proposals which should reduce the number 
of unsolicited proposals, and could also allow them to be processed in one or more 
competition rounds each year, rather than, as at present, looking at proposals at any time 
in the year as they are received. We are very supportive of MI'S current initiatives to 
develop a Call for Proposals process and would urge that it can be integrated across the 
Focus Areas and with Performance Based Management criteria (section 4.3.1). 
Differentiation of roles 
The reorganization of MI into four administrative Units, each with a Director and 
assigned professional and support staff, allowed MI to organize its work and to allocate 
L tasks to increase its efficiency as a Secretariat. That transformation has still not been completed. What we found is that Directors still have a large project portfolio for which 
they are acting as Program Officers (up to 7-10 projects each); they are traveling more 
than the staff in their Units, and they admit that they are not spending as much time 
managing their staff as they feel they should be. They would like their workload to 
change and allow them to spend more time on management. 
Directors are not very clear on what their level of authorization is, or their degrees of 
freedom in making decisions. They do not feel that they have much autonomy. The way 
that MI works at present means that having a specified level of signing authority does not 
make much difference, because most decisions and most contracts are, in practice, 
referred to the Executive Director. 
The Executive Director plays a very hands-on role. In most files that we reviewed, he is 
directly involved in some way or other - in making decisions, in contacts with partners, 
in reviewing the proposals or the final reports - in short, he is often involved in the 
smallest details. He travels much more than any member of his staff. His capacity for 
work is phenomenal, but his absences often mean that decisions are delayed. The Deputy 
Executive Director has been recently appointed to act as organizational "anchor" and to 
deputize for the ED, especially while he is on travel. 
Most of the Program Officers are new appointees and new to IDRC. They are well 
qualified; they are young; they are enthusiastic and dedicated. They need leadership, on- 
the-job training and mentoring. 
Within the support staff, there are two main groups: Grants Assistants and Program 
Assistants. The Grants Assistants are responsible for drafting contracts, Grant 
Agreements (MGCs), Grant Letters and invoices. It is a new position and they are all 
new appointees. The quality and consistency of the work they prepare within MI, and the 
working relations with Client Services Group has reportedly improved greatly with the 
appointment and training of the Grants Assistants. 
The Program Assistants used to perform the tasks that the Grant Assistants now perform, 
as well as more general program support and secretarial tasks. Now they see the Grants 
Assistants as overloaded with work while they feel that they are underused and "printing 
lots of e-mails and doing lots of photocopying ". They are generally unhappy with their 
job descriptions and their jobs. They also feel that they are not adequately informed 
about the status of activities by program officers so that when they are the one left to 
respond to questions from outside, "andput out thefires" they cannot do a good job. 
This review of what we learned from MI staff, leads us to make the following 
recommendations: 
o Directors should have a reduced project portfolio as soon as possible (even for 
those who might not want to give up playing the front-line role of Program 
Officer) and should reduce their travel associated with project development and 
monitoring. They should focus more on managing their Units and act as the 
Directors' "forum" for strategic planning. 
Under the leadership of the Executive Director, the Directors together with the 
Deputy Executive Director are the management team for MI. The establishment 
of the Executive Committee is a step in the right direction and should be 
formalized with terms of reference to become the key management body for MI. 
o The Executive Director needs to focus more than anyone else on the bigger 
picture and making the strategic alliances to move MI'S agenda forward. He 
should delegate more tasks to his Directors and should refer incoming questions 
to the appropriate Unit or Officer. Except in areas related to his own expertise, or 
for particularly important or sensitive activities, or at the later stages of approval,' 
the Executive Director should not be directly involved in the proposal review 
process or in dealing with consultants and recipients. He has key 
representational, resource leveraging, alliance building and strategic thinking 
roles to play that no one else can do. 
This does not mean that the Executive Director should not be involved in 
administration at a higher level. The appointment of a Deputy Executive 
Director is a good and necessary decision, given the nature of MI'S work and the 
size of its budget, but it should not absolve the Executive Director from being 
responsible and accountable for the overall administration of MI as well as the 
performance of its programs. 
a The Program Officers that are new to MI and to IDRC, need more training in 
IDRC procedures. This training was offered by IDRC Service Providers last year 
but was not taken up by all of them. In the light of the reports we heard from 
different service providers in IDRC, it seems clear that more orientation and 
training is needed to improve MI'S use of IDRC services. 
More generally, MI has a high proportion of new Program Officers and could 
benefit from renewed effort in collaborative work and team building, as well as 
some time management training. Finally, program staff needs more clarity about 
their degree of autonomy - when they can, and should take decisions, and when 
they should consult or refer an issue to their supervisors. 
a There is a problem of work distribution between the Grants Assistants and 
Program Assistants and a need to rewrite the job descriptions of the latter. Some 
of the difficulties faced by the Program Assistants are structural - part of their 
old jobs has been reassigned - others relate to the need for new program officers 
and Directors to be oriented to MI and IDRC organizational procedures and 
norms. The Program Assistants are often left to deal with problems created by 
others, without the authority or autonomy to do little more than apologize. 
The problems described above are not unexpected in any situation of such rapid 
'4bv organizational growth as MI has undergone. But they are inhibiting the efficiency, the 
team spirit and the morale of MI, so they do need the urgent attention of MI management. 
6.3.3 Executive Committee 
MI created the Executive Committee in April 1999. Its members are the Executive 
Director, the Deputy Executive Director, and the five Directors, including the Director, 
MI SARO, who participates by telephone. It meets once a month. We have seen no 
terms of reference for this committee but a review of its minutes indicates that it serves as 
a means for the management team to exchange information, to consider staff and 
administrative issues as they arise, and to discuss MI-wide concerns such as the recent 
strategic planning exercise. 
We think the Executive Committee is a valuable forum for the MI "management team" 
and would suggest formalizing its terms of reference and its frequency of meetings. Its 
agenda should be posted for all staff beforehand so that they can provide their ideas and 
input to their Directors and the minutes, except for personnel issues and other in camera 
discussions should be normally shared with staff. This was reported to us as a somewhat 
contentious issue by staff. The comparison was made with their access to the minutes of 
the IDRC Senior Management Committee, but not to the minutes of the MI Executive 
Committee, which is closer to home. Given that internal communications within MI 
could be strengthened, MI management might wish to use the Executive Committee as 
one mechanism for achieving that end. 
6.4 Regional staff 
MI established an office in New Delhi in 1997, located in IDRC's Regional Office for 
South Asia (SARO). It had a difficult beginning with the first Director resigning her 
position after less than two years, followed by the position being left vacant for a year. A 
new Regional Director has taken up the position in April 2000 and has already achieved 
remarkable progress in staff morale and regional strategic thinking. . 
The rationale of focusing MI's effort in South Asia has not been questioned by any of the 
people that we spoke to. South Asia accounts for 22 percent of the world's population 
and 50% of the world's micronutrient deficiency problems. The strategy of placing MI 
staff in the countries, and particularly the purpose of establishing a regional office raises 
more questions. 
6.4.1 Role of regional staff 
Basically, one's point of view seems to stem from whether you think MI should be 
involved in national programs or not. If you do, then having a MI National Program 
Officer in Bangladesh, India and Nepal (and possibly in Pakistan in the near future) 
makes good sense. They can do what IDRC Regional Program Officers do - be closer to 
projects to help them, undertake monitoring and technical assistance, provide 
representation for MI in the many workshops and inter-agency and inter-departmental 
meetings that take place, be a "scout" for MI for good new initiatives, and undertake 
"needs assessment" and "gaps analysis". 
All these roles are well played by the MI National Program Officers (NPOs). They are 
strategically located to influence government policy and to advise on program 
implementation. They have played key roles in bridge-building between the public and 
private sectors and have worked with local food industries including the millers and sugar 
producers in India. Some of MI's best work has been achieved in the region with their ' 
support. 
One of the dangers of MI having its officers placed in country offices is that they 
sometimes are drawn close to the fine line between advising on projects and actually 
helping to execute them. Government resources in nutrition in Bangladesh and Nepal are 
so limited that MI NPOs have helped to draft project proposals, government planning 
documents and act as members or even secretaries of government committees. This 
means that they have less time for their other duties and that capacity building within the 
government and local institutions is delayed. The counter argument is that these 
countries need hands-on support at this time if any progress is to be made in fighting 
micronutrient malnutrition. 
e 
We support the decision of the Regional Director, which we understand is to reduce the 
amount of "hands-on" work undertaken by the NPOs and to encourage them to work 
closely with the key international partner agencies in the region as well as directly with 
the government departments. It is important that MI is not seen as trying to go it alone in 
the region, as at the end of the day, MI does not have the human resources or the access 
to government that allows it to be effective outside of its partnerships. 
6.4.2 Role of MI SARO 
The role of the MI Regional Office in New Delhi (MI-SARO) is more difficult to 
understand in the present operational style of MI. MI-SARO provides financial and 
administrative support to the NPOs and with the appointment of the new Regional 
Director and a Senior Regional Program Officer, it has the capacity to provide technical 
support and regional planning for MI activities. However, no one was able to tell us what 
the MI budget for the South Asia region is, which would seem to an important component 
of a regional strategy. What is not clear to us is how the Steering Committee and MI 
Senior Management see the role of MI-SARO. Presumably with a staff of 5-7 
professionals in the region3', MI Ottawa does not need to be so active itself in South 
Asia. 
The reality seems to be that there are two MI Programs in the SARO region: one run out 
of Ottawa and the other based in the region. Ottawa is responsible for the provision of 
micronutrient products in South Asia. In addition, consultants are contracted to go on 
missions in the countries by MI-Ottawa without consulting or even informing the NPOs. 
Some consultants are reported to arrive in the region and ask for meetings with MI'S 
partners without the NPOs having sufficient warning to act as liaison. The recent project 
for a continuation of the Tufts University work in Bangladesh was almost finalized in 
Ottawa before the Regional Director was consulted. Communications between Ottawa 
MI and MI-SARO need to be improved. 
One important concern is that opportunities may be missed by MI staff in Ottawa to do 
more capacity building in the region by using local institutions and consultants instead of 
international consultants. The NPOs are best placed to advise MI on these opportunities. 
. 
The questions MI needs to ask itself are: 
o Is MI regional strategy for South Asia to be bottom-up (driven from the field) or 
top-down (led by Ottawa)? 
What is MI'S strategy in the region? 
o Is it something more than three or four country strategies? 
5 l The Regional Director, Senior Program Officer, three NPOs and a Vitamin A Regional Coordinator to be 
appointed this year (plus a possible NPO in Pakistan) 
These questions are asked not only in MI-SARO, but were also posed to us by some of 
MI's key partners in the region. These partners are not clear what the role of the MI 
NPOs is and what they can agree to without referring the matter to Ottawa or MI-SARO. 
The NPOs appear at present to have little autonomy or authority, which reduces their 
ability to be responsive to any initiative or request no matter how small the budgetary 
implications and how large the potential advantage for MI programs and presence. 
Clearly the situation needs early resolution by having in place a clearer understanding of 
the roles of MI-SARO and MI-Ottawa vis a vis one another and in relation to the work of 
the NPOs. Our own view is that MI will be missing an important opportunity if it 
establishes a regional and country presence and then does not use it to strengthen and 
lead its work in South Asia. 
6.4.3 Regional Advisorv Committee 
MI/SARO convened a Regional Advisory Committee which has held three meetings 
between 1998-2000. The mandate of the committee was to periodically review progress 
of MI's program activities in the region and to advise the Regional Director on the 
scientific, technical and administrative arrangements of MI activities. The composition 
of the committee included regional representatives of UNICEF, the World Bank, 
UNCHR, WHO and ICCIDD as well as local NGOs and private sector representatives. 
At their meetings, they reviewed reports on activities in each country and discussed 
issues such as the use of international consultants. They also proposed that there should 
be national committees for MI. 
While it is not clear what the impact of the committee's deliberations were on MI 
programs directly, the committee is a useful means to broaden MI's constituency in the 
region and to share information at a senior level with regional representatives of MI'S 
international partner agencies. 
We support the Regional Director's plan to establish MI National Committees and a new, 
broader-based Regional Advisory Committee. The members of these committees can be 
drawn on for advice not only at their formal meetings, but also as a group of senior 
advisors and local sounding board to the Regional Director. They can be asked to 
comment on the Regional Program of Work and on new initiatives. We would also. 
propose that there is some link established and some information flow between the 
national and regional committees and between them and the Steering Committee. In the 
past, the two groups seemed to have been barely aware of one another. 
6~ 6.5 Consultants 
MI's relationship with its consultants has been mentioned in various parts of this report. 
MI uses consultants as a key means to achieve its objectives. In this, it is different from 
IDRC and was always conceptualized as being so from its inception. The regular 
consultants attached to MI are really extensions of its human resources. Many identify 
closely with MI and feel they are "MI". Their prior experience and their missions for MI 
have given them considerable insight into the environment in which MI is operating - at 
the national and international levels. But they lack the mechanisms to contribute to the 
"bigger picture" for MI. They are generally eager to help MI in ways that go beyond 
their individual consultancy assignments. They keep on working for MI despite their 
numerous complaints. 
Consultants provide technical assistance to MI's projects; do project development and 
monitoring; act as troubleshooters, organize meetings and represent MI in different 
countries and at many events. Some have played key roles in helping MI to forge closer 
working partnerships; others have increased the distance between MI and its partners. 
Some are judged to be outstanding in their technical and capacity building skills; the 
competence of others for the task at hand has been questioned. MI consultants have a lot 
to offer MI. The reality is that, in many situations, consultants are the public face of MI. 
Given MI's reliance on consultants, it needs to think more strategically about how to use 
these extensions of its own human resources. Some can act as sounding boards and 
senior advisors and could usefully be drawn into broader strategic discussions with MI 
management and staff. The recent strategic planning exercise did not use this resource as 
much as it might have. Others could be asked to scan the horizon for MI on particular 
problems on which MI should be keeping a watching brief. Others could be invited to 
MI staff meetings, to integrate their work into that of the Secretariat team and to 
contribute to its vision. 
Other consultants, that are regularly undertaking missions for MI should receive feedback 
on their work, and even have performance appraisal reports, so that there can be 
communication between MI and the consultants on what they do. Several consultants said 
that they did not receive any feedback on their work other than the tacit approval implied' 
in their being rehired. These evaluations can be built into their contracts. The value of 
some system for evaluating the consultants' work (including asking the people that they 
work with) is also to deal with the questions being asked about the quality of some MI 
consultants. 
What it may mean is a reconsideration of the contractual status of consultants under some 
longer-term retainer status (section 6.2.2). This may also help with some of the 
consultants' bitter complaints about an "attitude" problem in IDRC. Flashpoints in the 
situation are IDRC's policy that staff can travel business class on long-haul flights to 
Africa and Asia but not consultants (some of whom are traveling more often than staff to 
do MI work) and "unreasonable" policies such as not paying for visas on the basis of 
reasonable and accountable expenses3* When consultants try to negotiate these terms, 
they meet not only inflexibility but also negative attitudes such as "You get enough 
money from your fees -you shouldpay for the additional travel costs yozrrselves". 
The consultants also universally complained about IDRCIMI's administrative 
requirements and slowness in getting contracts signed and invoices paid. We have not 
been able to systematically identify where the problems in slow administration lie, but MI 
management needs to work with IDRC to improve the situation, as it is clearly not 
limited to a few individuals (section 6.2.2). 
One criticism we heard of MI was that it used mainly Canadian and American 
consultants. In practice, many of its developed country consultants are from North 
America but when we checked with partners in Europe, they confirmed that most of the 
expertise in food fortification, in particular, was in North America. MI does also use 
consultants from the regions in which it works and these are generally well received. 
However, MI might wish to consider diversifying its current complement of regular 
consultants, with an eye to additional expertise and possible opportunities to increase 
donor diversification. 
Our findings lead us to conclude that MI will continue to use consultants rather than 
expanding its in-house resources significantly (which it would othenvise have to do) 
because they bring a greater range of expertise and experience, and are more flexible to 
use in human resource planning. The consultants should be managed by results (i.e. have 
specific goals for their work and be evaluated on their performance) and IDRCIMI should 
reconsider the contractual and other arrangements that it has in place for them. 
- - 
'' The current IDRC fixed rate charge of CAD $150 for visas, ground transportation and airport taxes is 
inadequate for missions that include visits to several countries (e.g, a visitor's visa to Bangladesh is $80, 
India $63, Nepal $40). 3 
FINANCIAL ISSUES 
At first glance the financial picture for MI looks very rosy. The 1999-2000 program 
appropriations for MI were CAD $27 million dollars33 out of a total annual budget of 
CAD $37,858,249. By 1 April 2000, MI had accumulated a ositive balance of CAD 
$41,414 for its programs and operations beginning in 2000-200J4. The high income also 
allowed the ratio of operational expenses to program funds disbursed (always a key 
criterion for auditors and donors alike) to be very favourable for MI (only 10.6% of 
actual management and program costs for 1999-2000 or 4.5% of total revenue of CAD 
$71 ,8413' for the same year. The balance sheet would seem to be very positive for MI. 
It is. But there are some important financial issues for MI behind the numbers. 
7.1 Financial status and donor support 
L Table 7 shows the growth in contributions to MI from its donors between 1992-2000. It shows a rapid increase in contributions since 1996: from CAD$13.3 million in 1996-97, 
contributions to MI have tripled to CAD$37.8 in 1999-2000. The total contributions to 
MI from its nine donors in the nearly eight years of its existence have been over CAD 
$140 million. Of this amount, CIDA has provided just over 88%. Of the remaining 
11.9%, the multilateral organizations have provided 7.7%; IDRC has given 2.7%; and the 
private sector (ILSI) has given 0.1%. Thus MI has received almost 91% of its fbnding 
from the Canadian government. 
MI has received funds consistently from its core donors (CIDA, World Bank, IDRC, and 
UNICEF). It has not attracted funds from bilateral donors except CIDA and one small 
contribution from USAID. Despite the large resources currently on hand, MI'S financial 
situation could be seen as somewhat precarious. It is overly dependent on one generous 
donor, CIDA; it is seen by bilateral donors, multilateral partners and almost everyone we 
spoke to, except its core sponsors, as a "Canadian institution". This presents a challenge 
to MI as it seeks to diversify its funding. 
j3 This compares with approximately $70 million available in 1998-99 for all the Regular Programs of 
IDRC. 
3.1 Approximately $13.2 million of this sum is encumbered. 
j5 The contributions to MI in 1999-2000 were CAD$37.85 million. The accumulated balance From 
previous years' contributions was CAD$33.98 million giving a total available revenue of CAD$71.84 
million for 1999-2000. 
Table 7 Financial Contributions to MI 1992-2000 
(Canadian dollars) 
Another aspect of MI'S financial situation that is cause for concern is the pattern of 
expenditures compared to contributions (table 8). Since 1994-95, MI has gone from a 
deficit on the annual expenditures compared to contributions for the fiscal year to unspent 
contributions in each of the last four years. For 1999-2000, MI received CAD $37.858 
million in current contributions from its donors and had total expenditures of CAD 
$30.426 million, thus accumulating CAD$7.432 million for the year. This added to the 
previous accumulated balance of CAD $33.982 million, left MI with a total unspent 
budget of CAD $41.41 million on April 1 2000. About CAD $1 3.2 million of this is 
already committed to pay the outstanding balance on signed contracts, leaving a fund 
balance of CAD $28.2 million. Of this amount we understand about $9.3 million is 
needed for operational and staff costs over the next two and a half years. This would 
leave about CAD $18.9 million available for new program appropriations. 
This accumulation of CAD $18.9 million unspent revenue underscores the need, 
expressed elsewhere in this report that MI needs to find new, more effective ways to 
work. The current style of MI staff operations is to be very hands-on - to get involved in 
organizing travel for meetings and consultants, to write reports and to edit publications, 
to attend many meetings themselves - while the contribution money does not get 
translated into programming. It is certainly true that some major CIDA contributions 
have been made rather late in the fiscal year so that there was some inevitable holdover' to 
the next fiscal year. But the pattern for the last four years has been to allow the unspent 
funds to accumulate dramatically. 
6k Table 8 Annual contributions and expenditures for MI 1994-2000 
(millions of Canadian dollars) 
* In practice there was not a deficit because MI had a positive opening balance from previous years. 
Accumulated 
balance 
MI'S financial status is seen by its partners as one of its greatest strengths - MI has the 
financial support of CIDA and the institutional support of IDRC to take major initiatives 
in programs. We do not see where MI has in hand the program or operational strategy to 
seize the financial advantage that it has. From our interviews with MI staff and our 
review of files, we see almost the opposite - an increasing tendency for staff to take on 
tasks like monitoring and technical assistance that could be undertaken by partner 
L institutions and network coordinators; and a tendency to want to reduce the timeframe for contracts rather than increase them, so that MI can have greater control.36 We think that 
MI can better achieve the quality of projects and consultancies that they fund by more 
advance planning and by ensuring that the participating partners meet appropriate 
reporting requirements. 
7.2 Fee for service activities 
$16,775 
The Secretariat has taken on a few activities on the basis of charging a fee for its services. 
The proposal is that this mechanism allows MI to work with organizations that may 
become donors in the future. We do not doubt that MI has expertise in-house, as well as 
in its roster of consultants, to provide a range of services for which outside organizations, 
such as the Regional Development Banks, would pay. We believe that such an approach 
to diversification of funds is fraught with risks for MI in its current situation. 
Our main concerns are that MI would be directing staff time and resources to activities 
that are not necessarily MI's priorities and would overburden staff that is already unable 
to perform all the tasks in MI's Workplan. It does not seem to make much sense to 
execute service contracts when the shortage in MI is not funds, but staff time. Even 
where the services for which fees would be paid are congruent with MI'S own priorities, 
$24,232 
56 We did not have time to quantitatively verify this from a large enough sample of files, so it is a 
qualitative impression from a few examples and from the interviews. 
$25,493 %33,982 
proposals have to be prepared and technical and financial reports written. This inevitably 
entails additional work for staff. Any such arrangements should probably be very limited 
and have significant benefits in making strategic alliances and not primarily undertaken 
to diversify the funding base. 
7.3 Future diversification of funding 
The Steering Committee asked the Secretariat to diversity its funding sources because, 
despite its current positive financial position, MI cannot take it for granted that any of the 
current donors would provide contributions indefinitely. At its retreat in March 1999, the 
Steering Committee gave them a target of three new donor partners before March 2001. 
Attracting additional financial donors would increase the multilateral character of MI, 
which is important, not only to MI but also to its main donor. 
MI is in a Catch 22 situation here. CIDA's support is somewhat dependent on MI having 
other donors, but other donors are not as attracted to support MI when it is so well 
supported already by CIDA. Other potential donors see MI as a Canadian institution, 
and one that could also act as an instrument of the Canadian government. Some are 
reluctant to join a group of donors where their point of view may be given less weight 
than that of the major donor; others have genuine difficulty in supporting an institution 
which both legally and perceptually part of the Canadian government. 
In developing a donor diversification strategy, we would recommend that MI first 
significantly reduce its accumulated reserves, since potential donors will want to see its 
financial books. Donors are more likely to come on board for a program initiative that 
they have helped to design and which meets some of their own institutional goals. Donor 
psychology is such that they each like to be in on the ground floor on multi-donor 
initiatives and feel that they can each claim ownership and credit. 
We would recommend that MI should consider developing its new global initiative on 
iron with an eye to also diversifying its own working and financial partnerships. Some of 
the lessons in this evaluation for MI on how to manage its partnerships and how to 
change MI'S organizational culture may help MI to integrate its future program 
funding strategy. 
MI'S legal status may also influence whether potential donors to come on board. It is 
very difficult for either bilateral donors or for the private sector to contribute substantial 
funds to MI when it is part of IDRC, and thus, an agency of the Canadian government 
(section 9). Before taking any legal steps to change its status, MI could also consider 
enlarging the Steering Committee from its present core donor group, and making use of 
consultants who are well placed to open doors to potential donors (particularly European 
donors and the private sector). We have suggested elsewhere that before MI makes a 
major overture for support from private corporations, it should have an approved policy 
in place for accepting corporate donations. 
L 
1 
It is never easy to raise hnds and MI will need to involve its present sponsors and outside 
expertise. It has already elicited the assistance of IDRC's Partnership and Business 
Development Office for particular revenue diversification events, such as the March 1998 
"Oslo dinner" for donors. Although MI has some major hurdles to overcome, it also has 
the overwhelming advantage of its focussed mission to fight micronutrient malnutrition. 
GOVERNANCE 
This evaluation did not have governance specifically mentioned in its initial terms of 
reference, but in our discussions with members of the Steering Committee and the 
Executive Director, and in other interviews, it has been raised as one of the questions 
facing MI that we should address in the light of the evaluation findings. In particular, we 
were urged by members of the Steering Committee itself, and by others, to review the 
role and functioning of the Steering Committee itself. Every organization is profoundly 
influenced by its governance system and institutional character. MI is no exception. Its 
relationships with its donors, partners and staff are framed by its institutional status and 
the character of its governing bodies. 
8.1 Accountability structure 
MI is an international secretariat within IDRC. It was the first such arrangement with 
donors that IDRC entered into in 1992. Secretariats are a mechanism to enable donors to 
pool their financial resources while retaining direct input into the program of a 
collaborative initiative. IDRC provides a range of support services to the Secretariat and 
acts as the host institution. 
The Secretariat has its own identity and organizational structure but its legal status is that 
it is part of IDRC and its staff is normally employed by IDRC. Each Secretariat has its 
own Executive Director who reports to the President of IDRC and to its Steering 
Committee, on which its donors usually sit. Since the establishment of MI in April 1992, 
IDRC has hosted fifteen International Secretariats at its headquarters in Ottawa and at its 
regional offices around the world. IDRC hosts MI in Ottawa and MI'S South Asia Office 
at the IDRC Regional Office for South Asia, located in New Delhi. 
We found in the course of our interviews that very few people understand the nature of 
International Secretariats at IDRC, nor that MI was one. Many were confused about the 
legal status of MI and of the relationship with IDRC as host institution. 
MI is accountable to, and reports to three bodies or groups: 
The Steering Committee oversees all program matters. It also nominates the 
Executive Director to IDRC which then appoints him. 
"It approves the secretariat's program of work and budget, reviews program 
policies, strategies and priorities and assesses the performance of the secretariat 
against established benchmarks, and recommends, supervises and assesses the 
performance of the Executive Director. The Steering Committee also establishes 
the parameters of the Executive Director's authority to solicit funds and conclude 
funding agreements with other donors."37 
o The President and Board of IDRC are responsible for ensuring that MI has sound 
financial and administrative management. IDRC assumes accountability to both 
individual donors and the Steering Committee in non-program matters. IDRC 
signs all funding agreements on behalf of MI and is therefore accountable for all 
funds expended. 
"The President of IDRC is responsible to the lDRC Board of Governors for 
reporting to them on MI and for the positions that IDRC takes as a member of 
the Steering Comminee. The Executive Director is required to present to the 
IDRC Board an annual report that relates the work of MI to the program of work 
that was approved by the IDRC Board when the Secretariat was established." 
"For its part, IDRC is responsible to the Steering Committee for ensuring that all 
legal, financial and administrative rules are followed; for providing timely and 
accurate financial reports; and for reporting management deficiencies that might 
hamper program performance." 
o MI's donors MI is in practice responsible for reporting to its individual donors 
on the use of their funds, both in terms of program results and administration. 
At the same time, IDRC is legally accountable to MI's donors for ensuring that it 
follows sound policies and administrative practices, and that "there are regular 
independent assessments of program results against recognized objectives." 
In a broader and less determinate sense, MI is also responsible to its partners for 
its performance because it works closely with them in its programs, but that 
aspect is dealt with elsewhere in the report. 
Four things strike us looking at this set of accountability relationships: 
(1) The structure is complex with reciprocal and parallel responsibilities; 
(2) It does not appear to be well understood by all of the principals involved; 
(3) The President of IDRC is probably the most accountable person within this 
whole set of relationships; 
(4) The critical role for making the accountability structure work is that of the 
Executive Director. 
In practice, there are some difficulties in how this accountability structure presently 
operates. 
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8.1.1 Accountability of Steering Committee 
The Steering Committee receives reports on important aspects of the Secretariat's work 
at each of its meetings (normally two face-to-face and two teleconferences each year). 
This includes reports on program activities from the Executive Director and financial 
reports. In terms of its programs, the Steering Committee receives a narrative report 
structured along the lines of the main focus areas, but which is not as systematic as it 
might be to cover all aspects of the Workplan. 
We think that a more useful approach would be for the Secretariat to report by reference 
to some approved program document such as the Strategic Plan, the Program of Work 
and Budget, or the Performance Based Management System. If it received a systematic 
report by objectives or results once or twice a year, the Steering Committee would have 
a better measure of the progress being achieved to provide oversight and direction. The 
challenge for the Secretariat would be to make such a report digestible and informative 
for the Steering Committee, and to link the report by objectives to contextual 
information on achievements, setbacks and delays. 
Reviewing the minutes of the Steering Committee meetings, we believe that the Steering 
Committee could have helped itself perform its role better if it had systematically asked 
the Secretariat for reviews and evaluations of different aspects of MI'S programs over 
the past eight years. We would recommend that a cycle of such program reviews of all 
major strategic areas be established by the Steering Committee. 
The financial information presented to the Steering Committee (originally by IDRC 
and now by the MI Director of Finance and Administration) follows more or less the 
same format since the inception of MI. Currently, expenditure reports set out the 
expenses in three broad categories: Programs, Special Projects and Management and 
Technical Assistance. As has been pointed out in section 7.1, there is so much overlap 
in the activities funded under Programs and Special Projects that there is no way the 
Steering Committee can determine from the financial reports how much money was 
spent on major program areas like advocacy or on supplementation. 
We recommend that financial reporting to the Steering Committee (and therefore also to 
the Board of IDRC) be consistent with the main program areas and strategic objectives. 
There is no indication in the minutes of the Steering Committee if the Executive 
Director reports to it on his own actions. We would recommend that this take place 
annually, in camera, so that the Executive Director can report on his stewardship of the 
Secretariat and what particular challenges arose. The Steering Committee can use this 
occasion to provide feedback to the Executive Director and provide their input to his 
Performance Appraisal Report that is prepared annually by the President of IDRC. 
8.1.2 Accountabilitv of IDRC 
IDRC is accountable for the good management of MI and of its funds. IDRC enters into 
all contractual relationships on behalf of MI with donors, suppliers, consultants, and 
recipients. IDRC also provides financial accounting and payroll services, human 
resources management, information management, physical space management, legal 
services and travel services. It is thus in daily contact with MI on these matters and is 
abreast of all needs and problems arising. 
The IDRC Board is expected to exercise its accountability via reports from the 
Executive Director of MI and from the President of IDRC. In practice, MI has reported 
through its Executive Director only twice since it was established in 1992: in February 
1996 and in March 1998. These reports were in the nature of information updates and it 
is not clear how the Governors can exercise their accountability on behalf of IDRC on 
this basis. 
The President of IDRC has an important place in the overall accountability structure. 
The President sits on the Steering Committee (she is the current Chair of the 
Committee). She represents one of MI's donors as well as the host institution. She must 
assure her Board that MI'S programs are consistent with IDRC's mandate and that MI 
actions are in IDRC's best institutional interests, or at least not exposing IDRC to undue 
risk as an institution. There is thus an implicit framework within which MI must 
b operate, for which the President of IDRC, together with the Executive Director, is 
responsible for MI'S compliance. The information flow and working relationship 
between the Executive Director and the President (or her designate) is critical for 
making this accountability work. 
8.1.3 Accountability of MI/IDRC to individual donors 
MIADRC must report to individual donors on the use it has made of their funds. CIDA 
in particular provides several grants each year for specified purposes and parts of the 
Regular Program activities. CIDA has also taken the initiative to discuss in detail with 
MI how best to report on the impacts and results of the activities it is funding. It would 
be more efficient if MI could reach agreement with its donors to have a single reporting 
format to all funders that is related to the strategic objectives and Program of Work 
which they approve as members of the Steering Committee. 
We also wonder if it would not be possible for the CIDA Special Projects grants to be 
converted into core grants for regular program activities, while retaining earmarked 
grants for only those specific projects falling outside the agreed regular Program of 
Work. This would shift the balance towards more coherence between MI's approved 
Regular Programs and the bulk of its funding. As we have noted, at present, the CIDA 
grants do allocate considerable parts of their funds to support the regular program 
activities, although the exact amount is difficult to calculate (and is not available to the 
Steering Committee under present reporting formats). 
8.2 MI Steering Committee 
The MI Steering Committee is the oversight body for MI'S programs and as such its 
discussions focus on program  matter^.^' The minutes record discussions that are 
admirably focused on substantive program issues. There does not appear to be much, if 
any, discussion of the financial reports. This may be a function of a lack of financial 
expertise on the Steering Committee and its mandate to be concerned with program 
matters. It may also reflect the problems we have identified in the information provided 
to the Steering Committee, which does not facilitate a linkage between budget spending 
and program objectives. 
However, there is one area on which the Steering Committee did have clear information 
in the reporting to it: the accumulated Ftrnd Balance rising from CAD $16.75 million in 
1996-97 to CAD $41.41 million on April 1 2000 (table 8). Over the past years, the 
Financial Reports have presented a separate report on Details of Ftrnd Balance. The 
minutes do not record any serious discussion of this unexpended budget, which we have 
flagged as a serious issue for MI. This information should have alerted the Steering 
Committee that some action was needed. 
There are two questions that have been raised frequently in the evaluation interviews 
about the composition of the Steering Committee. One is the criterion that the initial 
Steering Committee set for membership in the group. The other is the impact of the 
restricted donor composition on the program of MI and the direction provided by the 
Steering Committee. One might even go so far as to pose the question: is the 
composition of the Steering Committee part of the problem in MI'S lack of program 
focus? 
At its initial meeting in April 1992 the Steering Committee decided that it should itself 
be made up of institutions that provide at least $100,000 to MI over its initial three 
yeaTs. 
In keeping with the need to exhibit commitment to the venture, Members agreed that a 
flat fee of $1 00,000 per agency should be established for MI Board membership. 
Members will be agencies not individuals, and representation may vary. 
SC voting would normally be consensus-generated. Nevertheless, members agreed that 
proportional "voting power" could be applied in cases where consensus is not feasible. 
It was stressed that no single agency should have the power to veto generally accepted 
plans and directions of the MI. 
38 This review of the role of the Steering Committee is based on ( I )  a review of the minutes of meetings 
1992-2000; (2) interviews with all Steering Committee members including the Executive Director; and (3) 
discussions with MI staff on how the Steering Committee's decisions affect their work. We did not have an 
opportunity to directly observe any Steering Committee meetings. J 
It was agreed that earmarking of funds by donors would be acceptable in principle but 
examined on a case-by-case basis. While all additional finding is to be welcomed, 
possible conflicts with the MI'S broad philosophy and operational framework should be 
avoided.39 
The "membership fee rule" limited the initial Steering Committee membership to CIDA, 
World Bank, IDRC and UNICEF'' and made sense in terms of a three-year project, 
which MI was initially. In 1993, the $100,000 contribution was confirmed as one of the 
conditions of membership and used to deny membership to FAO, which had expressed 
interest in joining. By March 3 1 1995, the initial three-year project had come to an end, 
and MI had a deficit of over CAD $10 million. 
In May 1995, the original donors identified their anticipated financial contributions for 
the next three years (on this basis the extension of the MI was later approved by the 
IDRC Board). The Steering Committee identified potential donors to be invited to join 
the second phase without articulating the $100,000 rule. USAID was invited to attend 
the SC meetings as an observer and appears to have joined the group as a member in its 
own right in September 1996.'' They also agreed to a voting formula that would limit 
any one donor to having more than 49% of the vote even if its contribution to the budget 
was greater.42 
These early decisions about the composition of the Steering Committee have created a 
b governing body whose composition and style of operating we believe is different from 
what MI needs today. For example, the $100,000 "rule" was agreed in the context of a 
flat fee contribution to a three-year project. It has not been used consistently. It has 
resulted in excluding or deterring some key partners from joining MI, including FAO, 
WHO and some European bilateral donors. It has been flexibly interpreted to allow 
other members to be part of the group. It has raised questions even among members of 
the Steering Committee regarding its rationale and its impacts. 
The decision in 1995 to base the "voting" power on the amount of funding contributed, 
while not used formally, has profoundly influenced the dynamics of the Steering 
Committee from being a group of equal voices around the table to one in which one 
donor's views are perceived as being dominant. This seems to produce an operating 
style in which different opinions are openly voiced at the meetings but the Steering 
Committee does not then act as a body or team to resolve the differences and arrive at a 
common view. Rather, differences remain unresolved and the guidance given to the 
39 Minutes of the first meeting of the MI Steering Committee, 27 February 1992. 
40 Although technically UNICEF does provide regular contributions to MI (averaging just over $100,000 
per year), it is a net recipient of MI funding. 
41 USAID provided US$ 50,000 through OMNI to activities earmarked for the Ottawa Forum on Food 
Fortification. 
" Minutes of the MI Steering Committee, 1 May 1995 
Executive Director and his staff tends to be more ambiguous or conflicting than is 
needed. 
The recent strategic planning exercise is a case in point. In the end, the process 
produced a Strategic Plan that includes all the individual concerns of the Steering 
Committee members in its definition of program areas, but without clear prioritization 
and objectives - both of which should have come from the Steering Committee. The 
result, we were told, is something that everyone can live with, because it includes the 
activities they each feel are important, but no one feels is really what is needed. It is not 
a good recipe for a focused program or a Secretariat with a clear sense of direction. 
Without some change at the top, MI is likely to continue to chart a course that tries to 
meet the individual priorities of its donors and to keep everyone more or less happy. 
What would we propose? An enlarged, more independent Steering Committee that is 
charged to make decisions with the interests of MI alone in mind. There are several 
reasons for this recommendation: 
o MI'S main modality is to work with and through partners. An expanded 
Steering Committee would increase the range of experience and 
perspective around the table, and enlarge the support group for MI; 
o An enlarged Steering Committee would allow for some individuals 
nominated for their expertise in the field, including people from different 
regions, to contribute to MI'S directions; 
o A more independent body would improve the perception of MI as an 
international organization, and give more credibility to its actions. MI is 
presently seen by many as an instrument of a few donors; 
o The Executive Director is in an impossible position with the present 
structure. He has to make judgments between the sometimes conflicting 
signals given to him by members of the Steering Committee, either inside 
or outside of the SC meetings. He is also without the advice of an 
independent Board which could more effectively adjudicate on the merits 
of a course of action being pressed by one or more of its donors. 
o Members of the present SC, composed only of donors, are at risk of being 
in a conflict of interest position, because the interests of individual donors 
may not be the same as the interests of MI. While this is less of an issue 
for a time-limited collaborative project, it is of more concern eight years 
later when MI has acquired more of its own institutional identity. 43 
43 It is for this reason that many donors have policies against sitting on the governing bodies of 
the organizations that they fund. 3 
8.3 Technical Advisory Committee 
The question of a scientific or technical advisory committee (TAC) for MI has come up 
throughout its history, as a means of strengthening the scientific and technical quality of 
MI's work. At its inaugural meeting in 1992 the Steering Committee was in agreement 
with the idea of an External Advisory Committee that would include eminent names in 
nutrition as well as providing broad managerial and operational advice. It proposed to 
drop the "Technical" designation. In the event, the Advisory Committee was never 
formally constituted. In May 1995 the Steering Committee again discussed the idea but 
rejected it in favour of calling on a group of people as individual technical advisors. 
In our interviews, we raised the question again with the Steering Committee members 
and with a few of MI's senior advisors. The great majority felt that a TAC was not 
needed as a formal body for two main reasons: 
u It would be difficult to find a small and workable group that can provide 
expert advice on all aspects of MI's programs; and therefore the idea of 
calling on individual experts as needed provided more flexibility; 
u A TAC would add to the operational costs of MI and might build in rigidity 
as another body in the governance structure. 
A few interviewees thought that a useful middle road might be to have small advisory 
groups called around major initiatives, such as the global iron strategy now planned for 
2000-2005. These groups would not be "standing committees" but rather called on an ad 
hoc basis with membership and terms defined by program needs. We agree with this 
latter proposition, with the added proviso that the advice given to the Secretariat by any 
such advisory groups be also shared with the Steering Committee. 
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
From its inception, the relationship between MI and IDRC was not seen as necessarily a 
permanent one but rather one in which IDRC acted as host organization for an initial ten- 
year period.44 During these first ten years, MI's goals were set to support the decadal 
goals of the World Summit for Children. It was anticipated that after ten years, MI's 
status would change. The MI Steering Committee discussed MI's status on several 
occasions, and looked at various institutional options. The conclusion was always that 
the status quo was the best option for MI. We have been asked to indicate what the 
evaluation findings might imply for the future of MI. This means looking again at MI'S 
overall institutional relationship with IDRC. 
9.1 Relationship with IDRC 
As we have noted elsewhere, MI was IDRC's first experiment with the concept of an 
international secretariat. The relationship between the MI Secretariat "project" and IDRC 
was not thought out clearly at the outset, and was in fact the cause for several early 
misunderstandings between IDRC and the other donors. As IDRC's experience of MI 
and its 14 other International Secretariats grew between 1992-1999, IDRC policy and 
procedures in relation to its Secretariats became more codified. 
At the same time, MI grew from a four-person secretariat with a budget of approximately 
CAD $6 million a year to its present 39 staff and budget of nearly CAD$38 million in 
2000. It dwarfs the size and financial resources of any of IDRC's own Program 
Initiatives, or the other International Secretariats of IDRC. 
MI is also different from IDRC in a number of important ways: 
o The mix of modalities it uses for delivering its ~roiects. IDRC is 
primarily a research funding and research capacity building organization, 
and most of its contracts are MGCs. In addition to funding research, MI 
is supporting operational research, development of technologies, 
technical assistance, pharmaceutical commodity procurement, and 
national nutrition development programs. Most of MI's contracts are not 
MGCs. 
o Research with human subiects and intellectual propertv riphts. While 
IDRC funds both kinds of research, the balance is v e n  different from that 
of MI, many of whose research projects either deal with direct health 
interventions on human populations or are more likely to lead to patents 
and to raise issues of intellectual property rights. MI projects are 
44 Proposal to IDRC Board on Micronutrients Initiative, January 1992 
therefore on average more time-consuming to process, as they require 
careful ethical, scientific and legal review on the part of IDRC to ensure 
"due diligence". They also have the potential to expose IDRC to greater 
risk than do the bulk of IDRC's research grants to developing country 
institutions. 
a MI uses consultants as a key component of its human resources. IDRC 
uses its own staff and funds developing country institutions more often 
than consultants to carry out its work. 
These differences and the overall scale of MI'S operations have meant that IDRC's 
exposure to risk on the part of MI is quite different from that presented by the other 
Secretariats that IDRC hosts. As we have suggested at various parts of this report, the 
risks relate to the substantial funds involved and the delegation to an outside group (the 
Steering Committee) of some of IDRC's accountability to donors; the type of projects MI 
funds; and the financial risks to IDRC of hiring long term consultants under Canadian 
labour law for IDRC. Thus, from IDRC's perspective, it is assuming considerable risk 
and accountability on behalf of MI. In addition to which, the nature of MI'S program and 
its operational style is particularly demanding on IDRC services from administrative, to 
legal and travel services. 
From MI'S and its donors' perspective, IDRC has required MI to use IDRC 
L administrative policies, which in some cases do not meet the needs of MI; it has imposed IDRC pay scales for MI staff, which are believed to have made it more difficult for MI to 
recruit the senior people that is seen as needed; and it is overly cautious in reducing its 
exposure to risk which has slowed down the normal contracting process and made life 
difficult for MI, its consultants and its grantees. 
The evaluation has shown that both perspectives have merit, and that the differences in 
view have been accentuated by two intervening factors: the operational and management 
style of MI and the lack of adequate information flow between MI and IDRC. Apart 
from the President of IDRC, who currently chairs the MI Steering Committee, there is no 
one within IDRC who is actin as a corporate focal point or "Task Manager" for MI to 
manage to overall relationship$' The Executive Director has not seized the initiative to 
deal with some of the problems in the relationship, such as travel policy'for consultants,' 
which, we are told, could have been dealt with by MI and IDRC agreeing to a special set 
of arrangements for MI, as long as whatever policy was agreed, was systematically 
followed by MI. 
On the other hand, some positive changes have been made. We have noted that the 
appointment of the MI Grants Assistants has proven instrumental in dramatically 
improving MI working relations with IDRC Client Services Group. In 1998, IDRC 
agreed to make an exception in favour of MI of its policy on interest. According to this 
policy, funds generated by contributions to Secretariats are kept by IDRC. This is 
Occasionally a senior officer has attended an SC meeting or the discussion of a particular item (e.g. 
patents) but no one officer seems to have regularly attended SC meetings since the end of 1998. 
reasonable if the funds concerned are limited and IDRC sometimes has to use its own 
funds to "backstop" donors' contributions to secretariats that arrive late. The retention of 
interest on the large donor funds provided to MI proved to be a major irritant in the 
relationship, and was solved by IDRC's action. 
Although MI and IDRC clearly have other problems to resolve in their working 
relationship, they have both demonstrated a willingness to work together to find solutions 
to them. On the other hand, some of the issues raised with us about the scale, different 
styles and different degrees of risk between MI and IDRC, suggest that MI has evolved to 
a stage where IDRC and MI should consider whether the time has come to reconsider 
MI's future options. The beginning of a new strategic plan is also a good context in 
which to examine what those options might be. We would recommend that IDRC and the 
Steering Committee agree on a process for examining MI's future institutional 
development with the goal of arriving at a preliminary decision before the end of the 
fiscal vear. 
9.2 Institutional options 
While it will be up to IDRC and the MI Steering Committee to agree on the best solution 
for MI, it would seem that there are five options that should be examined in the process 
that we are recommending. These are: 
n The status quo revisited. MI remains as a Secretariat within IDRC but a new 
arrangement is concluded between IDRC and the Steering Committee covering all 
aspects of the relationship and thus serves as the basis for the interaction in the 
future. 
The new host option MI does not become a separate legal entity but moves to 
another host organization that is willing to receive it and makes an appropriate 
arrangement with MI and its donors. MI will therefore assume the legal identity 
of the new host organization. 
o The merger option MI merges with an organization or an existing program and 
together they form a new legal entity. 
o The co-location option MI becomes an independent legal entity and remains 
physically housed in IDRC from which it continues to purchase its administrative 
and other services as its Directors decide. 
o The separate and distinct option MI becomes an independent legal entity and 
moves to new headquarters. IDRC is not its main service provider. 
If it is agreed that MI will become a separate legal entity, the two main possibilities 
are either a non-profit NGO or to set up MI as an international organization with 
standing in international law. This is a far more ambitious and time-consuming 
approach that would require MI to be established by way of treaty to which several 
countries (or even international organizations) are party. It would be a difficult task 
to undertake without the leadership of Canada, since MI is already so identified with 
Canada. 
9.3 Implications of a change in legal status 
The ramifications of any change in legal status for MI are beyond the scope of this report, 
but there are three important ones that have been directly raised with us. These are: 
o The current contracts of MI staff with IDRC will come to an end with MI'S 
change of legal status and both parties will need to decide whether they will stay 
with IDRC or will be hired by the new MI. 
o The new legal entity will have to renegotiate its presence in the South Asian 
countries where MI is currently represented under the IDRC Regional Office 
Agreement with the Government of India. One should not underestimate the 
work involved in formalizing the new MI'S presence in India. There will also be 
the less complicated decision about where to locate the MI staff in India, who are 
presently housed in the IDRC Regional Office. 
o Any major change in legal status, location or in service provider will inevitably 
bring major disruptions to program activities and to staff working relationships. 
MI and IDRC will need to consider carefully the costs and benefits of any change 
from a renegotiated "status quo" option to remain as part of IDRC. 
l o  MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1 General conclusions of the evaluation 
MI is fulfilling its mandate. It is playing an important and unique role in the global fight 
against micronutrient malnutrition. It has been accorded remarkable recognition among 
the major international agencies with which it collaborates; and MI has their goodwill 
and respect. MI has some real achievements that it can point to over its eight years of 
existence. It success stories include its role in the large scale distribution of vitamin A 
supplementation to seventy countries in the world where the problem is most severe; to 
support to the development of double fortified salt - which has the potential to be a major 
breakthrough with tremendous benefit for human health; to consensus building scientific 
meta-analyses on key debates within the nutrition community. MI is making a direct 
contribution to improving the health and well being of millions, of vulnerable people 
around the world. It is not doing this alone. It is working with the support of its key 
donors and partners - CIDA, the World Bank, IDRC, UNICEF, USAID and others. 
MI has achieved results despite some significant problems that it faces internally and 
some issues that need resolution in its program scope, its governance, funding base, and 
institutional status. The key problems to address are those of the management of the MI 
Secretariat. MI management does not yet have the systems in place to be able to manage 
MI programs and finances properly. The key systems it urgently needs are program and 
financial information systems, systems for organizing staff and secretariat functions, and 
procedures for efficiently and transparently providing services to its clients - its donors, 
its external partners and its recipients. All these systems can be put in place fairly 
quickly. Not much will change if they are not. 
The more challenging task for management is to change the organizational culture to one 
that is more based on team work; on a better balance between responsiveness and 
efficiency; and more oriented to working with other international organizations to support 
the direction of their programs. In short, MI could better integrate "building alliances" 
into its everyday working life. 
There are also challenges for MI'S Steering Committee. One of the problems faced by 
MI management has been a lack of clear signals from the Steering Committee about its 
own vision for MI. Does the Steering Committee want MI to remain under the close 
control of its original sponsors and donors, or do they see MI as becoming more an 
institution in its own right - with its own priorities and guiding body to counterbalance 
the interests of its donors? MI needs the direction and support of its Steering Committee 
as it embarks on a new strategy for the next five years and contemplates its institutional 
future. 
One of the important issues ahead for the Steering Committee is to discuss with IDRC the 
various organizational options for MI, particularly whether MI should retain its present 
status as a Secretariat within IDRC and therefore legally a part of its host organization, or 
should establish itself as a separate legal entity - thus transforming the governance role of 
its present Steering Committee. 
In the light of the evaluation study, we recommend that MI needs to take the remainder of 
this fiscal year as a transition year to put new systems in place, to reduce backlog and to 
deal with the accumulated budget reserve before beginning to implement its new strategic 
plan. MI management and staff need time-out to re-organize, re-focus and re-tool 
themselves for the major tasks and changes ahead. 
10.2 Recommendations 
The recommendations, together with the key conclusions from which they derive, are 
listed according to the structure of the report. The most significant ones, including some 
L that are likely to be controversial are underlined. 
MI'S current program 
MI currently has a project portfolio of some 76 projects in 50 countries in all developing 
regions of the world. Some of these are multi-million dollar commodity procurement 
projects; others are for an individual workshop. In term of numbers, the present projects 
are primarily focused on vitamin A and multi-micronutrients, and on research and 
technology development in food fortification. Advocacy and working with partners are 
two of the main ways in which MI implements its program. Almost all of the current 
projects are undertaken with partners. MI'S main partners in its current projects are 
UNICEF, WHO, PAHO, and the World Bank. Although MI does not pay explicit 
attention to gender analysis, its programs primarily benefit women and children in 
improving their health status. 
Advocacy 
o Advocacv is both a focus area in MI'S programs and a key modalitv throueh 
which MI implements the rest of its programs. In its new Prouam structure MI 
could consider recasting advocacy as the primary modalitv and not have a 
separate focus area devoted to it. This would not necessarily chan~e  the amount 
of resources devoted to advocacy but would make the setting of obiectives 
clearer. 
o MI should undertake more critical advocacy which is scientifically sound and 
does not "start with solutions instead of questions"; and where dissenting views 
are given a hearing. The meta-analysis of iron is a good example and has 
enhanced MI'S reputation. 
o MI should build its advocacy strategy on developing alliances with strong 
partners because it is one of the most effective ways to influence people. It 
should not try to "go it alone" or be overly concerned with getting credit. 
Effecting change in governments, the private sector ' and in international 
organizations is more important (and more recognized) in the long term than 
seeking "Made in MI initiatives". 
o In developing a new advocacy initiative for iron, MI should ensure that it has 
access to the best expertise on iron to ensure the credibility of its actions and 
because iron anemia deficiency is a more complex problem to solve than 
deficiencies in iodine or vitamin A. 
o MI could consider more consensus building multi-stakeholder processes as part of 
its advocacy strategy. 
o MI could consider developing an advocacy strategy specifically to promote wider 
involvement of the private sector in fighting micronutrient deficiencies. This 
could build on the plan of action outlined at the Ottawa Forum 1995 which 
proposed involving the Codex Alimentarius Commission in developing guidelines 
for food fortification to encourage more private sector action. 
Research and technoloav 
o MI should continue its support to research and technology development across the 
spectrum of technology development that it currently undertakes. This part of 
MI's programs targets key obstacles and uncertainties, mainly in food fortification' 
and builds on MI's strengths. 
o More networking of research and technology development projects is 
recommended to encourage technology transfer between regions. One example is 
to adapt the experience of fortification at the household milling level from Africa 
to Asia. 
o MI could do more policy research on legislation, regulation and economic 
incentives to encourage the private sector to fortify foods, particularly to share 
national experiences across regions, including from the industrialized countries. 
MI could invest in more development of fortification technologies that can be 
used by small enterprises, households and primary food producers like farmers, as 
well as the formal food processing sector. 
o It is recommended that MI commission an independent scientific assessment of 
the progress made in double or multiple fortified salt with recommendations for 
future strategy for MI in this area. 
National and reaional Droarams 
o MI should consider reducing the amount of work it is support in^ in national and 
state micronutrient programs because it is not one of MI's comparative 
advantages, and MI does not have the human resources to provide the technical 
support needed. 
Any future work in national programs should be in collaboration with 
international partners that have a strong presence in the country and access to 
government and financial resources. MI should not seek to independently 
develop program initiatives with government. 
o National programming should include a large capacity building component, for 
both local institutions and governments. MI should be prepared to have the 
program work take longer if it also builds local ownership and capacity. 
Wherever possible, local consultants from the region should be involved. 
o Regional networks with strong partners around specific themes such as flour 
fortification build more on MI's program strengths than do national nutrition 
programs. The flour fortification network in the Middle East and North Africa 
with WHO is a good example. 
Publications and web site 
o MI should put in place an integrated strategy for information dissemination which 
includes both its publications and its website. It should focus on what it does best ' 
- which are technical publications and technical briefings and make as many 
publications as possible available on its website for free download. 
o MI has undertaken more publications than it can handle in-house. This has led to 
problems of delays, misunderstandings with co-sponsors of meetings and reports, 
and criticisms that undermine the advocacy value of the publications. 
To deal with these problems, it is recommended that MI do fewer publications 
and out-source more of the work, including technical editorial work much of 
which is presently done by MI professional staff. MI should also ensure that the 
arrangements to publish reports are clearly understood by its partners and that MI 
abides by the agreements. 
MI publishes many proceedings of meetings, some of which are overly delayed 
and therefore do not capitalize on the momentum generated by the meeting itself. 
As far as possible, meeting reports should be primarily distributed free on the MI 
website. 
o As a priority, MI'S website should be rebuilt and re-launched to become a 
premier website for micronutrient information, especially food fortification. It 
should be interactive and a key mechanism for MI to facilitate on-line discussions 
on key issues and distribute materials to participants in its meetings and 
workshops. 
Key program issues 
The key program issues raised in the evaluation concern MI'S organizational niche 
with respect to its partners; the decision criteria used by MI to define its priorities and 
individual project support; the management of its partnerships, which are critical to 
the implementation of its program and to its success; the link between sustainability 
and capacity building in MI'S projects; and the feedback between monitoring and 
evaluation and program planning. 
What is MI's niche? 
o MI'S niche is seen both within MI and its partners as advocacy and building 
alliances through the provision of funds and technical expertise. However, 
some of MI's program activities seem to fall outside of its niche and raise 
questions for its partners. These include commodity procurement and national 
programs. 
It is recommended that MI explain more clearly to its key partners the 
rationale for its work in national programs and commodity procurement in the 
context of its comparative advantage as an organization and its working 
partnerships with them. 
Program focus 
Building on MI's strengths and on the major gaps and needs as assessed by 
the international community, MI should give high priority to iron and foog 
fortification. 
Decision criteria for Dropram management 
o MI needs a clear set of decision criteria to be able to say no and to arrive at 
more equitable and efficient decisions on project funding. This must go hand 
in hand with the development of better information systems for managing 
projects. 
o It is recommended that MI put in place as a priority a Performance Based 
Management System(PBMS) that will allow it to link planning, progress and 
results. The decision criteria to be built into this PBMS should include results 
based management and analysis of needs and opportunities ( g a ~ s  analysis). 
o As a start, it is recommended that MI consider a core set of some 10-20 
indicators which could include the measures developed by CIDA for progress 
in food fortification and additional persons covered by supplementation 
programs. 
o The MI-PBMS should be designed with input from its kev partners to explore 
the potential for using: some common indicators to measure results, and to 
encourage the international community to develop some common criteria and 
measures in micronutrient programs and evaluations. This approach could 
bring benefits in terms of MI's increased transparency and leadership and 
could lead to more agreement on measuring and reporting on collaborative 
projects. 
Management o f  MI's partnershim 
o MI implements its program through and with its partners. The key ones are 
seven international agencies with which it implements half of its current 
activities, especially UNICEF and WHO. 
o MI should consider more carefully its corporate relationships with its partners 
and develop a code of conduct that is supportive of more effective working. 
relationships with them. The elements for such a code of conduct policy 
might include: 
o Increasing the transparency of MI's operations by providing more 
information about the decision criteria used in MI and who on staff are 
the focal points for each major initiative; 
o Ensuring that collaborative arrangements are clear to all parties and are 
followed, including agreed timeframes for tasks undertaken by MI; 
o Being more open to input from partners when MI has the lead and to 
sharing credit in agreed ways; 
o Helping partners to strengthen their own programs and organizations, 
through arrangements such as MI secondments and internships, and 
identifying opportunities for collaboration and follow-up action by 
partners. 
Partnershius with the private sector 
o Working with the private sector is seen as one of MI's big comparative 
advantages, together with its good track-record in building dialogue between 
the public and private sectors. MI should continue to focus on this important 
advocacy work with the private sector and involve it in more of its projects. 
o MI's private sector partners are less well informed about the overall context 
and scope of MI's work and are therefore less likely to see opportunities for 
enlarging the partnership andlor proposing creative solutions to problems. MI 
should ensure that its private sector partners are not compartmentalized into 
specific commercial relations but are engaged'in a broader sense in fighting 
micronutrient deficiencies; 
o For those companies which derive commercial benefit from working with MI 
(including commercially useful information), it is recommended that MI have 
a policy that seeks to have the companies contribute to the public good - and 
specifically to further the goals of food fortification for poor and vulnerable 
populations. These contributions could include in-kind training opportunities 
for developing country personnel. 
o MI could seek corporate funds for some of its work in food fortification, 
especiallv from the charitable arms of major companies in food production. 
Before doing so, it should have in place a Policy for accept in.^ Private Sector 
Donations that sets out the conditions under which MI would be able to accept 
donations; would prescribe the ways in which corporations can use the ' 
donation in their communications and would proscribe any imputed 
endorsement of the company bv MI. 
Strstainabilitv and cawacitv building 
o While sustainability in micronutrient programs is a long way off, there are 
ways that MI can work to achieve sustainability in its projects. These include: 
o Working through existing structures and avoiding creating new or 
duplicative ones; 
o Working closely with partner organizations, including within their 
procedures and promoting mutual goals; 
o Finding good partners and good projects and working only on those; 
o Using alliances and good partnership skills to convince those with the 
resources (especially the major donors) and those with the 
responsibilities (governments) to take over projects and programs; 
o Transferring projects as soon as possible to the private sector; 
o Building the capacities of governments and institutions before they are 
expected to take over responsibility for programs. 
o Supplementation projects are seen as more dependent in the long run on 
international donors. Fortification projects are more promising prospects for 
sustainability because the private sector usually builds the costs into its prices 
over the long term. Both supplementation programs and "incubator" support 
to fortification programs are seen as needed for the next two decades. 
o Capacity building is a kev mechanism for building long term sustainabilitv. 
MI has not done as much work in building the capacity of local institutions 
and individuals in the past as it might have. It is recommended that MI give 
more priority to capacity building, especially activities that are integrated into 
its other programs. It should also think through its goals and strategy for 
capacitv building, 
Monitorina, evalzration and learninx 
o MI has not given as much attention to monitoring and evaluation in the past as 
it should do in the future. In this, it is not unlike most organizations that were 
interviewed. The effects of advocacy actions are particularly difficult to 
measure separately from the impact they have on MI achieving other program ' 
goals. 
o MI should establish an evaluation framework as part of its proposed 
Performance Based Management Svstem (PBMS) to integrate monitoring and 
evaluation into future program decisions. 
o In addition to its current evaluations of projects, MI'S corporate learning 
would be strengthened if it systematically put in place: 
o Meeting evaluations by participants as inputs to staff reviews of what 
lessons are to be learned after each meeting MI organizes or sponsors; 
o Readerships surveys of key publications and the MI website; 
o Selected "in-depth" reviews or scientific audits of important or highly 
visible projects within an established cycle of review for different 
program areas; 
o Written assessment of consultants' performance and providing 
feedback to them; 
o A field in its proposed project database for "lessons learned" when 
projects and files are closed, which is systematically reviewed 
internally for patterns and "higher order lessons learned"; 
o More project monitoring and evaluations which should be outsourced 
not only to consultants, but also to developing country institutions 
(which will also help to build their capacity); 
o Establish a timetable and framework for regular external evaluations 
of MI as part of the Strategic Plan 2000-2005, including a review 
process for follow-up actions resulting from this evaluation. 
Strategic Plan 2000-2005 
The evaluation findings have some implications for the new strategic plan which relate 
both to the process and to its outcome. 
Strategic planning process 
o The strategic planning process took more than a year and considerable time 
commitment from MI staff and the Steering Committee. It did not involve 
MI's partners except in asking a few individuals for comments on a 
penultimate draft. Most people agree that the outcome is less than satisfactory 
but is sufficient to move ahead. 
An alternative recommended approach to strategic planning in MI would be: 
o A "strategic objectives" paper is prepared by the Executive Director 
through internal and external consultations; 
o The Steering Committee reviews the paper and after discussion, 
decides on MI's strategic objectives and main priorities for the next 
five years; 
o Using the Steering Committee decisions as a framework, MI prepares 
a Strategic Plan and an Implementation Plan for the five years; 
o The Steering Committee approves the documents and MI staff prepare 
the annual program of work and budget (PWB) for later approval by 
the Steering Committee. 
Strategic Plan 2000-2005 
o In its present form, the Strategic Plan does not include the obiectives that are 
needed to provide a basis for evaluating MI's performance although it does 
foresee a Performance Based Management System and obiectives. In this 
regard. it is recommended that: 
o A set of 3-4 clear, measurable obiectives are set for each focus area; 
o MI should consider recasting "advocacv" as a maior modality rather 
than as a separate propram area in the Plan; 
o The obiectives are linked to specified targets, indicators, outcomes and 
expected results in an Implementation Plan for the strategic planning 
period of five years; 
o The PWB for 2000-2001 could be adjusted later in the vear to reflect 
any changes indicated by the Im~lementation Plan and the obiectives 
for approval by the Steering Committee. 
Key Operational Issues 
There are several aspects of MI's work that could be improved in order to make MI more 
efficient. Key among them is the urgent need to put in place an information system 
tailored to MI needs, to iron out bottlenecks in staff management and contracting ' 
processes. Better integrating MI SARO and the NPOs into the mainstream of MI is also 
a factor in improving program delivery in South Asia. 
Information management 
a MI should as a matter of vriority identifv its needs for a program 
management information system. These needs should be defined by a 
Task Force comprising both program and administrative sectors of MI as 
well as external exuertise in program management and relational database 
development. 
The proposed program management information system should be able to 
generate various kinds of reports (to donors, for planning purposes, for 
measuring 'progress and impact); it should provide for inputting data on 
indicators and project activity should refer back to strategic objectives. 
The proposed system should be so structured that all kinds of financial 
reports can be generated and show expenditures incurred in a given 
country or for example, for a certain type of fortification intervention. 
The database should be a core resource used for corporate learning with 
evaluations and monitoring information regularly entered - eventually, it 
should be linked to MI'S website and be accessible to interested external 
parties. 
Secretariat Functions 
Project Review and Administration 
MI should reduce administrative tasks by funding larger projects with 
longer timeframes and making more frequent use of competent 
executing agencies for technical backup and monitoring of proiects. 
Processing o f  contracts 
a MI program staff should be expected to c o m ~ l y  with performance 
standards, especiallv as regards turnaround time. relating to the 
components of contract processing requiring their input. 
a MI and IDRC should continue in their efforts to find ways to remove 
duplication in the contract review process and to have in place some 
acceptable form of long-term contract that could be used for 
consultants. 
Organization o f  meetings 
a MI should plan its meeting strategically and not get involved in 
meetings that do not contribute significantly to its obiectives. 
MI should designate for each meeting a task manager who would 
coordinate all activities and inputs relating to the meeting and avoid 
last minute changes. 
Staff Management 
Oraanization o f  work 
MI needs to better plan and manage travel and staff on travel should be 
available to the office electronically. 
o Three-month travel plans should be submitted by all staff and 
managers for regular review by MI management at their Executive 
Committee meetings. 
o MI should have in place a common information system so that any 
staff member can access updated information on the status of a file, 
proposal. action or decision, and can enter into the file any action they 
have taken or request received. 
Staff members should be organized as 'Task Managers' so that one 
person. plus a second person as a back-up, is designated as a focal 
point for each maior or special activity or file. 
Differentiation o f  roles 
o Directors should focus more on managing: they should have little or 
no project portfolio and should reduce travel associated with proiect 
development and monitoring. 
o The Executive Director should focus more on the bigger picture and 
the ma kin^ of strategic alliances to move MI'S agenda forward. He 
questions to the appropriate Unit or Officer. He should not normally 
be directly involved in the proposal review process or in dealing; with 
the administrative or process problems of consultants and recipients. 
The Executive Director remains responsible for the overall 
administration of MI. 
o All Program officers that were new to MI and IDRC when they joined 
MI should receive more training in IDRC procedures. 
o MI management should attend to the distribution of work between 
Grants Assistants and Program Assistants and rewrite the job 
descriptions of the latter. 
MI's Management Team 
Under the leadership of the Executive Director, the Executive 
Committee consisting of the Deputy Executive Director and Unit 
Directors constitutes MI's management team; its terms of reference 
should be formalized and highlight the committee's role in respect of 
program, financial and administrative management. 
Agenda of Executive Committee meetings should be posted 
beforehand so that all staff can forward their suggestions and minutes 
should be made available to all staff on MI's Intranet or through some 
other appropriate mechanism. 
Regional Staff 
Role o f  regional staff 
o NPO's should avoid getting too 'hands on' when advising national 
governments. 
o NPOs should be granted clearly defined authority to expend funds for 
program-related purposes. 
3 
Role o f  MI SARO 
o There should be a clearer understanding of the roles of MI-SARO and 
MI-Ottawa vis a vis one another and in relation to the work of the 
NPOs. In particular, MI SARO management should be involved in 
any maior decision being considered by MI-Ottawa in respect of the 
region. 
o MI SARO should be informed of proposed staff and consultants visits ' 
well ahead of time. 
MI SARO and NPO's should pay special attention to working with 
agencies in the regionlcountry with active programs relevant to 
micronutrient malnutrition. 
Renional Advisory Committee 
o MI SARO should be encouraged to pursue its plans to establish 
national advisory committees and to resurrect under an appropriate 
format the regional advisory committee. 
o The Steering Committee should be regularly informed of the advice 
and recommendations emanating from these committees. 
Consultants 
o MI needs to think more strategically about how to use consultants - 
seen as extensions of its own human resources. Those working closest 
with MI should be dealt with more as staff: thev should be invited to 
participate in staff meetings. their work should be better integrated into 
that of the Secretariat as a whole and they should contribute to its 
vision. 
o MI'S long-term consultants should be managed by results (that is, have 
specific goals, given regular written feedback and have their 
performance evaluated at least annually by the appropriate Director, in 
consultation with the Management Team). 
o Administrative difficulties in the handling of MI consultants should be 
discussed between MI and IDRC managers; MI should actively seek 
departures from standard IDRC administrative policies, where this is 
warranted. 
o MI should consider the opportunities that may be generated by 
widening its roster of consultants, in particular, it should make greater 
use of expertise in developing countries and elsewhere outside North 
America. 
Financial Issues 
Financial status and donor support 
o Over the next 2-3 vears, MI, in cooperation with its donors and 
through a more efficient mode of operations. should aim at eliminating 
its Reserve Fund. 
Fee for services activities 
Given its current reserve and workload, MI should not be acting as a 
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consulting firm and engaging in fee for services activities; once these 
problems are resolved, it should do so only exceptionally and for very 
strategic reasons. 
Future diversification o f  funding 
o Before engaging in a donor diversification strategy, MI should first 
significantly reduce or indeed eliminate its accumulated Reserve Fund. 
Governance 
MI'S governing body - composed mainly of donor agencies - affects very much by its 
decisions the way the whole Secretariat operates. Also the web of accountability 
relationships for international Secretariats at IDRC is overly complex - involving as it 
does the Steering Committee, IDRC (the President and the IDRC Board) and individual 
donors - and is probably not the most suitable for a Secretariat with MI'S scale of 
operations. With the information currently made available to it, the Steering Committee 
is unable to exercise proper oversight over MI'S program delivery. 
Steering Committee 
o The Steering Committee should be enlarged by the addition of other 
reputable experts. including one with a financial and management 
background. representing different MI constituencies (partners, 
recipients, NGOs etc); 
o The composition and role. powers and functions of the Steering, 
Committee need to be formalized. consolidated and accessible to 
members, staff and other interested parties. 
o In consultation with the Executive Director, the Steering Committee 
should agree on the Secretariat's strategic objectives for MI'S program 
cvcle. 
o Information provided to the Steering Committee should be im~roved. 
Program information should be presented bv reference to the Strategic 
Plan, the proposed implementation plan, the Program of Work and 
Budget, or the Performance Based Management. Specifically. the 
current practice of submitting a narrative activitv update should be 
3 
abandoned in favour of a more svstematic and more rigorous reporting 
bv strategic objective or focus area. 
Financial information should parallel the program information so that 
the Steering. Committee mav be in a ~osi t ion to better judge on the 
advisabilitv of investments. In particular, the current practice of 
reporting on expenditures mainly bv reference to overlapping broad 
Special Projects and Regular Programs should be done awav with. 
o The Executive Director should report in camera to the Steering 
Committee on his stewardship of the Secretariat and in particular on 
the challenges he is faced with. The Steering Committee should use 
this opportunity for providing feedback to the Executive Director. It 
should also in camera and in the absence of the Executive Director 
provide its input to his Performance Appraisal Report prepared 
annually by the President of IDRC. 
o The Steering Committee should put in place a cycle of evaluations for 
different aspects of MI'S work. 
Technical Advisory Committee 
The Steering Committee need not have a formal technical advisory 
committee attached to it. Instead, the MI management, in consultation 
with the Steering Committee, should consider the setting up of ad hoc 
advisory bodies around major initiatives that are being planned - such 
as the proposed global iron strategy; the advice provided by such 
groups should be shared with the Steering Committee. 
o IDRC should consider appointing a senior officer with responsibility 
for managing all aspects of the IDRC-MI relationship for the Centre.' 
That officer - in addition to the President - should regularly attend 
meetings of the Steering Committee. 
The Executive Directive should be particularly sensitive to his 
responsibility for making the Secretariat's accountability to IDRC 
work. 
o The Executive Director and the President (or her designate) must 
maintain a good working relationship and ensure a good information 
flow between them. 
Institutional Issues 
The relationship with IDRC 
MI is currently set up as a separate unit within IDRC. When it was originally established, 
this arrangement was viewed as being operative for a ten-year period at the end of which 
an assessment would be made of its continued relevancy. Since its inception, MI has 
grown to point where in terms of staff and resource it is now far larger than any other 
program unit within IDRC save for the whole of the Program Branch itself. In addition, 
MI's modus operandi has also developed as something very unique within IDRC. All 
this sets the stage for undertaking now a review of what should happen next to MI as an 
institution. 
a IDRC and the Steering Committee should agree on a process for 
examining MI's future institutional development with the goal of arriving 
-at a preliminarv decision before the end of the fiscal year. 
10.3 Next steps 
If the findings and recommendations of the evaluation study are accepted in their broad 
outline, they imply that some immediate next steps should be taken. In our view, these 
tasks will require much of the Secretariat's time and energy in the next six months and it 
cannot therefore be "business as usual" for MI. We would propose that the remainder of 
2000-2001 be seen as a transition year in which the first order of the day is to put the new 
systems in place and to allow staff to reduce the backlog and refocus on the new strategy. 
One key task is to design a program strategy based on results for dramatically reducing 
the accumulated budget reserve. There is considerable opportunity for doing this. Last 
fiscal year, MI's 23 grants averaged less than CAD $48,000 each (excluding large two 
grants for $6 million). MI should develop larger projects with more out-sourcing of tasks 
like technical support and monitoring. 
The key'tasks in program management are to: 
a Put in place the several elements of a Performance Based Management 
System; 
a Specifying the strategic objectives for the Strategic Plan (and having them 
approved by the Steering Committee within the next two months); 
a Preparing an Im~lementation Plan (including results, indicators etc); 
o Elaborating a rolling Program of Work and Budget. 
The key tasks in governance are to: 
a To recruit new members, who could initially be invited to serve in an 
advisory capacity on a "Transition Board" (if the Steering Committee 
agrees to expand its membership); 
To undertake a study of the different institutional futures for MI. 
The key tasks in Secretariat operations are to: 
o Put in place an integrated program information system that is designed to 
meet needs defined by both the programs and administration parts of MI ; 
Develop an integrated financial management component of the 
information system; 
o Deal with the back-log of proposals and other outstanding work of the 
Secretariat; 
o Prepare new Callsfor Proposals based on the strategic objectives and the 
implementation plan and rebuild the website; 
o Develop a work-plan with the Steering Committee to reduce the 
accumulated reserve over the next two or so years. 
In our view these tasks will - and should - occupy the time of most of the Secretariat 
management and staff until the end of this fiscal year in March 2001. The tasks need 
to be underpinned by a period of consolidation, re-orientation and team building 
(including between MI-Ottawa and MI-SARO) before embarking on a new program 
cycle. 
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